Genevieve M. Daniels, Genevieve M. Daniels, P.C.
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Dog Bites, Landlords and Tenants, a Rickety Fence, and a Public Alley
Some of us of a certain age will recall what happened when Inspector Clouseau asked a hotel proprietor, “Does your dog bite?” After nearly getting his hand bitten off, the following question remains: would the proprietor have been liable to Inspector Clouseau for not adequately warning him that the dog did indeed bite? Luckily, a recent case out of the first district, Garcia v. Bawcum, 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U, helps shed light on what may or may not trigger an Illinois landlord’s liability when a tenant’s dog bites someone, especially when the injury occurs off the leased premises.
Facts
Robert Jewell, Cynthia Jewell, and Jewell Properties, LLC (collectively, the Jewells), owned a property that they leased to the defendant, Doris Bawcum. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶4. The backyard at the leased premises contained a common area bounded by a picket fence that separated the common area from the public alley. Id. The fence was “rickety” and had been in disrepair since Bawcum had moved into the property. Id.
Enter Bawcum’s dog, Titan. One day, Titan escaped Bawcum’s control and forced himself through the deteriorating fence and into the alley, where he bit plaintiff Myrian Garcia’s leg. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶5. Apparently, Titan had been involved in two prior incidents of which the Jewells were not aware. Id. Garcia filed suit against the Jewells under a theory of negligence, arguing they had a duty to maintain the fence and prevent such incidents. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶6. The Jewells moved for summary judgment, arguing they owed no duty to Garcia, and the trial court agreed. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶7. Garcia timely appealed. Id.
Appellate Court
Generally speaking, “a landlord is not liable for injuries caused by a dangerous or defective condition on the premises leased to a tenant and under the tenant’s control.” 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶9. Moreover, Illinois courts have repeatedly rejected the claim that landlords should be responsible for dog bites that take place off the leased premises. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶11, citing Sedlacek v. Belmonte Properties, LLC, 2014 IL App (2d) 130969, ¶32, 16 N.E.3d 878, 384 Ill.Dec. 485, and Solorio v. Rodriguez, 2013 IL App (1st) 121282, ¶28, 987 N.E.2d 452, 369 Ill.Dec. 825. Here, Garcia was bitten in a public alley, not on the leased premises. Id.
Garcia’s arguments (and the appellate court’s analysis) largely centered around Klitzka v. Hellios, 348 Ill.App.3d 594, 810 N.E.2d 252, 284 Ill.Dec. 599 (2d Dist. 2004).2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶12. Specifically, Klitzka held that a landlord who relinquishes control of a property to a tenant owes no duty to third parties who are injured while on the leased property unless an exception applies. Id., citing Klitzka, supra, 810 N.E.2d at 255 – 256. Having said this, the court in Klitzka also laid out six exceptions that could trigger landlord liability, including (1) when a latent defect exists at the time of the leasing that the landlord should know about and (2) when the landlord voluntarily undertakes to render a service. Id. Garcia argued that under these two exceptions, there was at least a factual question that precluded summary judgement. Id.
The appellate court disagreed, finding that the Jewells did not owe a duty to Garcia. First, because there was no evidence that the Jewells ever voluntarily took responsibility for maintaining the fence, they could not be liable for its condition. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802‑U at ¶13. Noting that the voluntary undertaking exception should be narrowly construed, the appellate court relied heavily on the analysis of Sedlacek, supra, 2014 IL App (2d) 130969 at ¶¶30 – 31, which it found had almost identical facts to the case before it. Id. Specifically, the court in Sedlacek held that only an express promise to fix the fence to contain a dog would constitute a voluntary undertaking. The Sedlacek court also found the landlord’s original intent to fix the fence to contain animals generally had been abandoned through inaction. Id. Here, because the Jewells never made any promise or took any action to fix the fence for any reason, including to contain Titan, there was no voluntary undertaking on which they could be held liable to Garcia. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶13.
Second, there was no latent defect present. A latent defect is one that is “hidden and not readily observable or discoverable to any but the most searching examination.” 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶14. Because the fence’s rickety condition was an obvious defect that Bawcum would have known about at the time she entered her lease, the Jewells had no duty to warn Bawcum about it or to fix it. Id. Moreover, the common area rear yard was never a fully enclosed space, which was also a condition Bawcum was aware of at the time she entered her lease, so there could be no expectation that the rear yard was sufficient to contain Titan. Id.
For all these reasons, Garcia’s claims against the Jewells failed as a matter of law and entry of summary judgment was appropriate. 2025 IL App (1st) 240802-U at ¶15.
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