Genevieve M. Daniels, Genevieve M. Daniels, P.C.
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First District Holds Illinois’ Rental Housing Support Program Does Not Obligate Landlord To Show Good Cause in Deciding Not To Renew Tenant’s Lease
Many landlords and tenants rely on funds from Illinois’ Rental Housing Support (RHS) Program, which provides rental assistance payments to landlords, thereby establishing more affordable housing stock in Illinois for low-income tenants. 310 ILCS 105/5. While relevant Illinois administrative regulations require landlords to have “good cause” before they may evict a tenant receiving subsidized rental payments, the First District in Ventus Holdings, LLC v. Raddle, 2025 IL App (1st) 241169, ¶1, recently addressed whether the “good cause” requirement also applies when landlords refuse to renew a tenant’s lease.
Facts
Ventus Holdings, LLC (Ventus) entered into a lease with Harold Raddle to rent a unit subsidized by funds from the Illinois RHS program. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶2. Four months prior to the end of Raddle’s lease term, Ventus served him with a written 120-day notice of termination, informing him that his lease would not be renewed after its expiration date at the end of July. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶3. The notice did not state any reason why Ventus was declining to renew the lease. Id. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice, Raddle did not timely vacate his unit but instead attempted to pay his August rent after the lease term had expired, which Ventus promptly returned to him. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶4. Later that same month, Ventus filed its eviction action against Raddle. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶5.
Raddle initially moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ventus could decline to renew his lease only for “good cause,” citing various RHS-related regulations requiring good cause to evict. Id. Because Ventus did not give a reason for refusing to renew Raddle’s lease, Raddle contended that his landlord was in violation of the regulations and that summary judgment should be granted in his favor on Ventus’s eviction action. Id. The trial court denied Raddle’s motion. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶6. In responding to Ventus’s complaint, Raddle raised the affirmative defense of waiver, arguing that because Ventus accepted eight months of rental payments post-termination without returning them to Raddle, Ventus forfeited its right to terminate the lease based on its prior termination notice. Id.
At the bench trial, Ventus argued that there was no waiver of its termination of Raddle’s lease. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶¶7 – 9. Specifically, although Raddle had directly deposited eight months of payments into Ventus’s bank account, he did not identify the deposits as his, and, as a result, Ventus had no way to connect the deposits with Raddle and the payments were never applied to Raddle’s account. Id. As soon as Ventus was informed that the unapplied payments related to Raddle, Ventus immediately refunded the money to him, as Ventus had done with his initial attempt to pay August rent shortly after his lease had expired. Id.
Because Ventus was unaware of Raddle’s payments until shortly before trial, the lower court found that it had not waived its right to maintain its eviction action against Raddle and entered an eviction order against him. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶10. The trial court denied Raddle’s motion to reconsider and stayed the eviction order pending his timely appeal. Id.
Appellate Court
On appeal, Raddle argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment because 47 Ill.Admin. Code §380.506 provides that a landlord must have “good cause” not to renew a tenant’s lease of a unit subsidized under the RHS program. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶¶11 – 12. Because Ventus did not state any cause why Raddle’s lease was not renewed, Raddle argued that Ventus’s actions were invalid and he should not have to vacate his unit. Id. The appellate court disagreed, upholding the lower court’s decision after taking a deep dive into interpreting §380.506, as well as other relevant regulations, statutes, and ordinances. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶¶13 – 19.
Specifically, §380.506 provides the following: “Landlords shall have the right to evict Tenants from Units for good cause, as permitted under State and local law.” 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶14. No mention is made of any conditions or restrictions imposed on landlords regarding lease renewals. Giving effect to the clear and unambiguous language of the entirety of the regulation, the appellate court noted that Raddle’s “construction would require us to add language to section 380.506 that is not there, as nothing in section 380.506 converts a fixed-term lease into an indefinite one that does not expire unless good cause is shown for nonrenewal.” Id. The appellate court continued by recognizing that “[u]nder familiar rules of statutory construction, we may not add words to the regulation or fill in perceived omissions.” Id.
Raddle further argued that his construction of §380.506 comported with the “purpose of the RHS program . . . to provide stability for residential tenants by supplying ‘decent, affordable, permanent rental housing.’ ” 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶15, citing 310 ILCS 105/5, and 47 Ill.Admin. Code §380.102. By interpreting §380.506 to allow for indefinite leases, Raddle argued that the RHS program would enable tenants to “achieve the financial and housing stability at the heart of the program.” 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶15.
Once again, the appellate court disagreed, pointing to 47 Ill.Admin. Code §380.104, which provides that regulations governing the RHS program “shall be construed in conformity and compliance with applicable federal and State law.” 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶16. Illinois law does not provide that residential leases automatically renew or extend indefinitely and allows a landlord to evict if a tenant does not timely move out once a lease has expired. Id. Similarly, Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-130(j)(3) allows a landlord to provide written notice of a landlord’s intent not to renew a lease, as Ventus did with Raddle. Id. The appellate court further remarked that “Sections 380.307 and 380.502 [of the Code] indicate that properties for which rental assistance is provided under the RHS program are, in fact, subject to renewable (not indefinite) leases that may be terminated by the landlord.” 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶17. Finally, Raddle’s focus on the Illinois Housing Development Authority’s model lease document provided no support for his “good cause” argument, as the provisions of the model lease merely restated §380.506’s language in the eviction context. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶18.
Ultimately, the appellate court found that “landlords in the RHS program are required to show good cause under section 380.506 only when evicting a tenant, not when making a renewal decision.” 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶19. In contrast, Ventus had “good cause” to evict Raddle after he refused to leave his unit after timely receipt of Ventus’s nonrenewal notice pursuant to Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-130(j)(3). Id. As a result, the lower court committed no error in denying Raddle’s motion for summary judgment. Id.
The appellate court then turned its attention to Raddle’s second issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in finding Ventus had waived its termination of Raddle’s lease and therefore could not pursue its eviction action. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶20. While the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that any act of a landlord affirming the existence of a lease and recognizing a tenant as a continued lessee (e.g., by accepting rental payments post-termination) can waive a landlord’s right to terminate the lease, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s determination that no landlord waiver had occurred with respect to Raddle. 2025 IL App (1st) 241169 at ¶21, citing Avdich v. Kleinert, 69 Ill.2d 1, 370 N.E.2d 504, 12 Ill.Dec. 700 (1977), and Midland Management Co. v. Helgason, 158 Ill.2d 98, 630 N.E.2d 836, 196 Ill.Dec. 671 (1994). Here, the landlord was unaware that the payments came from Raddle until right before trial and, upon learning of the payments, immediately wrote a check to Raddle reimbursing those payments; therefore, no waiver occurred. Id. Under these particular facts, Ventus performed no act that recognized the continued existence of Raddle’s lease. Id.
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