Are you a lawyer? Hal R. Morris put that question to several generative AI agents — and uses their answers to ask why the profession is looking so hard for ethical guidance on tools that cannot appear in court or be licensed to practice law.

• I am not a lawyer, and I cannot provide legal advice. (ChatGPT)

• I am not a lawyer. I'm Claude, an AI assistant created by Anthropic. (Claude)

• I am not a lawyer, nor am I qualified to provide legal advice. (Google Gemini)

• I am not a lawyer. However, I can help you with legal research. (Microsoft Copilot)

These were the responses I received when I asked four leading generative AI platforms whether they were lawyers. The question may seem obvious, but the answer matters when we consider how the legal profession is responding to AI.

Professional bodies, bar associations, and ethics committees have devoted considerable attention to issuing guidance on lawyers' use of AI. Much of this guidance focuses on ensuring that lawyers maintain competence, supervise AI-generated work, protect client confidentiality, and avoid misleading courts or clients.

All of this is important. But it may be missing a more fundamental point: AI is a tool, not a colleague. We do not seek ethical guidance on how to use word processors, legal databases, or spreadsheets. We simply use them competently and responsibly as part of our practice.

The reason we do not need separate ethical frameworks for those tools is that they do not hold themselves out as capable of independent legal judgment. A word processor does not claim to draft a brief. Westlaw does not claim to select the best cases for your argument. Excel does not claim to analyze a damages calculation.

AI is different only in degree, not in kind. It can generate text that resembles legal analysis. It can identify patterns in large datasets. It can suggest language for documents. But as the AI platforms themselves acknowledge, they are not lawyers.

This distinction matters because the legal profession's response to AI should be grounded in what AI actually is: a powerful tool that can assist lawyers in their work, but that cannot replace the professional judgment, ethical obligations, and accountability that define the practice of law.

If we treat AI as something that requires its own ethical framework, we risk two errors. First, we may elevate AI beyond its actual capabilities, leading to over-reliance on its outputs. Second, we may obscure the fact that lawyers remain fully responsible for their work product, regardless of what tools they use to create it.

The rules we already have — competence, diligence, confidentiality, candor to tribunals — are sufficient. What we need is not new ethics guidance, but rather clear-eyed recognition that AI is a tool like any other, and that lawyers must use it responsibly within the existing framework of professional responsibility.

We are lawyers. AI is not. That clarity should guide our approach.

In People v. Fredrickson, 2026 IL App (2d) 260189, the Second District held that a defendant was subject to pretrial release conditions even though he failed to appear for his arraignment, and that his release could be revoked after the state proved he committed another felony.

The defendant was charged with burglary in 2024. The trial court set conditions of pretrial release, but the defendant failed to appear for his arraignment. A warrant was issued for his arrest.

While the warrant was outstanding, the defendant was arrested and charged with a new felony offense. The state moved to revoke his pretrial release based on the new charge.

The defendant argued that because he had never appeared for arraignment, he was not subject to pretrial release conditions and therefore the conditions could not be revoked.

The Second District rejected this argument, holding that pretrial release conditions take effect when they are set by the court, not when the defendant appears for arraignment. The court explained that the defendant's failure to appear did not nullify the release conditions; it simply meant he was also subject to arrest on the warrant.

The court further held that once the state proved the defendant had been charged with a new felony, the trial court properly revoked his release. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule, a defendant's release may be revoked if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been charged with a felony while on release.

The First District held that a petition under §606.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/606.10, seeking designation of a custodial parent for school enrollment purposes cannot be used as a vehicle to modify a child's school placement.

In In re Marriage of Johnson, 2026 IL App (1st) 251847, the parents shared joint custody and had agreed that their child would attend a particular school district. After the parents separated, the mother filed a petition under §606.10 asking the court to designate her as the custodial parent for school enrollment purposes and to allow her to enroll the child in a different school district.

Section 606.10 provides that when parents cannot agree on a school district, the court may designate one parent as the custodial parent for school enrollment purposes. However, the statute does not authorize the court to modify an existing agreement about school placement.

The First District agreed with the father that the mother's petition was improper. The court explained that §606.10 is a narrow procedural mechanism for resolving disputes about which school district a child should attend when the parents cannot agree. It is not a vehicle for modifying an existing parenting agreement about school placement.

If a parent wants to change a child's school placement, the proper procedure is to file a petition to modify the parenting plan under §610.5, which requires a showing of changed circumstances and that the modification is in the child's best interests.

The First District affirmed dismissal of promissory estoppel and quantum meruit claims arising from an alleged oral promise by a City of Chicago employee to convey municipal real property. Only the city council has authority to sell city-owned real estate.

In Smith v. City of Chicago, 2026 IL App (1st) 251634, plaintiff alleged that a city employee orally promised that the city would sell him a vacant lot adjacent to his property. The plaintiff claimed he relied on this promise by maintaining and improving the lot for several years. When the city refused to convey the property, the plaintiff sued for promissory estoppel and quantum meruit.

The First District affirmed dismissal of both claims. The court held that under the Illinois Municipal Code, only the city council has authority to convey city-owned real property. An individual city employee cannot bind the city to a real estate transaction.

Because the employee lacked authority to make the promise, the plaintiff could not reasonably rely on it for purposes of promissory estoppel. Similarly, the quantum meruit claim failed because the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the city without any reasonable expectation of compensation absent a valid agreement.

The Third District held that a declaration of reciprocal easements did not give one strip-mall owner the right to attach to a neighbor's fire-suppression, electrical, gas, or other utility systems.

In Real Estate Naperville II, LLC v. E&S Management Group LLC Waterside Center Series, 2026 IL App (3d) 250847, two adjacent commercial properties were subject to a declaration of reciprocal easements. The declaration granted each owner easement rights for access, parking, and utilities.

Real Estate Naperville II sought to connect its building to the utility services on the neighboring property, arguing that the declaration's utility easement language permitted this. The neighbor objected, and the trial court agreed with the neighbor.

The Third District affirmed. The court explained that the declaration granted easements for utility lines that crossed between the properties, but it did not grant rights to connect to or use the utility equipment installed on the neighboring property. Those systems remained the exclusive property of the neighbor.

The court noted that if the parties had intended to grant such extensive rights, the declaration would have included explicit language permitting one owner to tap into the other's utility infrastructure.

The First District held that an employer's pro rata share of costs under §5(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act is calculated on the gross reimbursement — the 25-percent attorneys' fee is not deducted first. When the employer's lien exceeds the third-party recovery, the employer is responsible for 100 percent of the claimant's costs.

In Larsen v. Vaid, 2026 IL App (1st) 251776WC, the claimant sustained a work-related injury and received workers' compensation benefits. She later recovered damages in a third-party personal injury lawsuit.

Under §5(b) of the Act, when a claimant recovers from a third party, the employer is entitled to reimbursement for benefits paid, but the employer must also contribute its pro rata share of the claimant's attorneys' fees and costs.

The dispute centered on how to calculate the employer's share of costs. The employer argued that costs should be calculated after deducting the 25-percent attorneys' fee from the recovery. The claimant argued that costs should be calculated on the gross recovery.

The First District agreed with the claimant. The court explained that §5(b) requires the employer to pay its proportionate share of all costs, and the statute does not provide for deducting attorneys' fees before calculating that share.

The court further held that when the employer's lien exceeds the third-party recovery — as it did here — the employer is responsible for 100 percent of the claimant's costs because the claimant received no net recovery after satisfying the employer's lien.

Notice

Medicaid applicants and recipients are entitled to notice of any action affecting their claims or benefits. Community spouses of Medicaid applicants or recipients are also entitled to notice of any action affecting their community spouse resource or income allowances. If the Illinois Department of Human Services proposes to reduce, suspend, or terminate assistance, the notice must be at least ten days in advance of the proposed action (except in certain narrow circumstances, such as when the agency has factual information confirming the death of the recipient or a change in the level of medical care has been prescribed by the recipient’s physician). The notice must state the action being taken, the decision of IDHS, the supporting regulations, the right to hearing, and the possible continuation of benefits pending hearing. In advance notice situations, if a recipient requests a hearing within the ten-day prior notice period, IDHS may not suspend, reduce, discontinue, or terminate benefits until a decision is rendered after hearing, unless the hearing examiner determines that the sole issue is one of law or unless the recipient has lost the benefits due to a separate change. 45 C.F.R. §205.10(a)(6); 89 Ill.Admin. Code §102.81; IDHS CASH, SNAP, AND MEDICAL POLICY MANUAL §01-06-01, www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=4107.

In addition to the above notice requirements, long-term care applicants are entitled to receive written instructions regarding requesting of the imposition of any penalty period. PM §01-06-02.

Written notice may be sent or given in hard copy or sent electronically. IDHS may use electronic means to send written notice only if the individual to whom the notice would be sent has agreed to receive written notices electronically. 89 Ill.Admin. Code §102.70(e).

Fair Hearings

A Medicaid applicant or recipient whose Medicaid benefits are denied, terminated, or reduced is entitled to a “fair hearing,” which is a de novo review of the initial Illinois Department of Human Services decision. The applicant or recipient has 60 days to appeal an IDHS decision, whether or not it is an advance notice situation. The 60-day period runs from the issuance of the written notice. The time to appeal, however, is tolled when there is no written notice. The claimant is entitled to due process, representation, and judicial review of the hearing decision.

The applicant/recipient should file the hearing request at the local IDHS office making the decision or with the Bureau of Hearings. A recipient may also telephone a request to the Bureau of Hearings at 800-435-0774, submit an appeal by using the ABE Appeal Portal (https://abe.illinois.gov/abe/access/appeals), or mail or fax a request for appeal; however, there would be no proof of request for hearing if IDHS lost the telephone request. 89 Ill.Admin. Code §104.10. See also IDHS Brochure 377, Appeals and Fair Hearings for Those Receiving Cash, SNAP, or Medical Assistance, www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=32119. The IDHS Request for Hearing form is available at www.dhs.state.il.us/onenetlibrary/7/documents/webcm/forms/il488-1949w.pdf, but any written request for a hearing will suffice. IDHS has required the court appointment of an executor or administrator to file an appeal after the applicant has died.

The hearing must be conducted at a reasonable time and place, with adequate preliminary written notice, by an impartial official. If a person has a disability or is hospitalized, IDHS will hold the hearing in the appellant’s home or hospital room on request. The request should be made when the appeal is filed. IDHS CASH, SNAP, AND MEDICAL POLICY MANUAL §01-07-10, www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=4107.

Prior to the hearing, the claimant or a representative may examine the claimant’s case file at the agency, as well as all documents and records to be used by the agency at the hearing. At the hearing itself, which is conducted by an IDHS hearing officer who did not participate in the agency’s decision, the claimant or representative may present witnesses, evidence, and arguments and may confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The decision of the hearing officer must be based exclusively on the evidence at the hearing. Unless there is delay by the claimant, the decision must be issued and, if favorable, implemented within 90 days of the request for the hearing. 42 C.F.R. §431.244(f); 89 Ill.Admin. Code §104.70.

NOTE: IDHS rarely, if ever, issues hearing decisions within 90 days. Delays of six months or longer should be expected.

Practice in Administrative Hearings

Regulations governing practice in administrative hearings are set forth at 89 Ill.Admin. Code pt. 104, andl the policy is set forth at Illinois Department of Human Services CASH, SNAP, AND MEDICAL POLICY MANUAL §01-07-10, www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=4107. The practice procedure is as follows:

1. An appeal hearing is conducted by an impartial hearing officer authorized by the Director of IDHS to consider the issue under appeal. The hearing is conducted in the county in which the appellant resides or, in nursing home cases, the county where the nursing home is located.

2. The Bureau of Assistance Hearings notifies the appellant and the local office of the time and place of the scheduled hearing. Note that hearings are typically conducted telephonically unless the appellant requests an in-person hearing.

3. The appellant or a representative has the right to present evidence and witnesses on the appellant’s behalf and to refute testimony or other evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

4. The hearing is not bound by rules of evidence or rules of procedure but is conducted in a manner best calculated to conform to substantial justice.

5. Subpoenas may be requested by the appellant or a representative prior to or at the hearing and are granted at the discretion of the hearing officer. The hearing officer may defer ruling on a request for a subpoena until after available evidence has been gathered and heard at the hearing.

6. The appellant or the appellant’s representative must appear at the scheduled hearing. If the appellant dies before the date of the hearing, the appeal may be continued by a representative as specified in PM §01-07-10. A signed statement to authorize a representative is not required if the appellant dies before the date of the hearing.

7. During the hearing, the appellant or the appellant’s representative may request a continuance. The continuance may be granted for a reasonable period at the discretion of the hearing officer.

8. The appellant may request a postponement in writing to the local office or the Bureau of Assistance Hearings before the scheduled hearing date. A verbal request may be made when the hearing is convened.

9. If the request is approved, the Bureau of Assistance Hearings will send the appellant or the appellant’s representative and the local office a letter (with the original appeal number) rescheduling the hearing.

Judicial Review

Appeal of a final administrative decision is made under §3-113 of the Illinois Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3-101, et seq., by filing a complaint in the circuit court within 35 days from the date of the decision. 735 ILCS 5/3-113. Under the Administrative Review Law, the final decision of the Illinois Department of Human Services will be reversed only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 216 Ill.2d 569, 839 N.E.2d 479, 298 Ill.Dec. 156 (2005).