May 2026 IICLE FLASHPOINTS

When a contract to sell a condominium unit was contingent on the closing of a separate deconversion contract that did not occur, the court held that the buyer had not breached under the “wrongful prevention doctrine.” Blitz Capital Group LLC v. North Dearborn Property LLC, 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U. The appellate court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s breach of contract and fraud claims. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶1.

Facts

The defendant and 200 North Dearborn Condominium Association were under contract to purchase and “deconvert” condominium units. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶2. The subject of our examination here is the separate, contingent contract the defendant entered into with the owner of the penthouse unit and several parking spaces. Id. If the contract with the association terminated, the contract with the plaintiff in this case would also terminate. Id.

After the association terminated its contract with the defendant, the plaintiff sued the defendant alleging two counts of breach of contract, common-law fraud, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud & Deceptive Business Practices Act. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶3. The trial court dismissed the fraud counts without prejudice, and the plaintiff chose not to replead those counts, so they were dismissed with prejudice. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶4. The trial court also dismissed the breach of contract claims. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶5. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully caused the condition precedent of closing the association contract to fail and that the defendant violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not closing the association contract. Id.

The association contract did not have a financing contingency. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶9. The due diligence provision under the association contract was extended by mutual agreement of the association and the defendant many times. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶11. In August 2023, the defendant told the association that it had secured financing and would be closing within the next two months. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶13. When no closing occurred, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant close within 30 days, which letter was ignored. Id.

In February 2024, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶14. Meanwhile, the association extended its contract with the defendant for the seventh and final time with a closing date in May 2024. When the defendant again failed to close, the association terminated its contract with the defendant. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶12.

As to its breach of contract claims, the plaintiff alleged that by not responding to the plaintiff’s request for an assurance of the defendant’s ability and intent to close, the defendant breached the spirit and terms of the contract and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶14. As to the fraud claims, the plaintiff alleged that by not including a financing contingency in the association contract, the defendant falsely represented that it had funds to close and misrepresented that they had financing. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶15. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant misrepresented to the plaintiff that it had financing and, after extending closings, offered to buy units at market prices instead of the contract prices. Id. The plaintiff alleged that these misrepresentations constituted common-law fraud and deceptive acts under the Consumer Fraud Act. Id.

Analysis

The appellate court likened the “wrongful prevention doctrine” to estoppel. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶24. The doctrine prohibits a party from profiting by its wrongful conduct. Id., citing Cummings v. Beaton & Associates, Inc., 249 Ill.App.3d 287, 618 N.E.2d 292, 3030, 187 Ill.Dec. 701 (1st Dist. 1992). Under the doctrine, if a party causes a contractual condition to fail, the contract can still be enforced against the party because a party cannot cause a condition to fail and then take advantage of the failure to avoid liability. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶24. The court found that nothing in the record showed that the defendant had breached the association contract. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶25. After all the delays, the association, as it had a right to do, terminated the contract. Id.

Additionally, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in every contract. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶27. Under this covenant, a party must exercise any discretion it has under the contract reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. In this case, the plaintiff did not show that the defendant failed to take reasonable efforts to close the association contract, which was a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s contract. Id.

Similarly, the appellate court affirmed dismissal of the fraud claims. It could not find any cases (nor did the plaintiff argue any) to support the plaintiff’s argument that the failure to include a financing contingency implies that the buyer has the funds to close. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶34. Also, the plaintiff had no right to demand a closing before the association contract closed because closing the association contract was a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s contract closing. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶35. The plaintiff also could not show detrimental reliance to support either common-law fraud or Consumer Fraud claims. 2026 IL App (1st) 251008-U at ¶36.

For more information about condominium law, see CONDOMINIUM LAW: GOVERNANCE, AUTHORITY, AND CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Kenneth Michaels, Jr., Bauch & Michaels, LLC, Chicago

Kenneth Michaels, Jr. is a partner at Bauch & Michaels, LLC, with over four decades of experience in commercial litigation, transactions, and corporate governance. He represents a diverse clientele, including banks, insurance companies, and Fortune 500 businesses, specializing in asset sales, property management, and loan agreements. Ken is also a recognized Illinois “Super Lawyer” in real property law and has contributed extensively to legal education and community service. He teaches at the University of Illinois Chicago Law School and has been a public official in Illinois for nearly 30 years.

In People v. Davis, 2026 IL App (3d) 250122, the Third District Appellate Court reversed a defendant’s conviction for presenting forged Cook County Court letters that purposed naming her as a guardian ad litem for her son because there was no evidence that she caused a financial loss or earned a financial gain.

In Davis, the defendant complained to a Monee officer that her mother was the guardian and had custody of her (defendant’s) son and that her mother would not allow the defendant to see her son. A few months later, the defendant presented Cook County Circuit Court documents and letters that named herself as the guardian ad litem for her son and which also authorized her to have custody of him. 2026 IL App (3d) 250122 at ¶4.

The officer who viewed the documents noticed that they may had been altered. A Cook County Circuit Court executive clerk testified at the trial that the court order the defendant gave to the police officer had numerous errors such as being filed in Juvenile Court instead of Probate Court, purportedly been issued by the county clerk instead of the circuit clerk and having an incorrect seal. 2026 IL App (3d) 250122 at ¶5.

The trial court found her guilty of forgery after the bench trial but the appellate court reversed. 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a) states that:

A person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he or she knowingly:

(1) makes a false document or alters any document to make it false and that document is apparently capable of defrauding another; or

(2) issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered.

The appellate court agreed with the defendant that the post-2011 version of the forgery statute’s phrase of “with the intent to defraud” was defined as “knowingly, and with the specific intent to deceive or cheat for the purpose of causing financial loss to another or bringing some financial gain to oneself.” [Emphasis omitted.] 2026 IL App (3d) 250122 at ¶18.

The appellate court noted that since there was no evidence of a financial gain or loss the defendant’s conviction must be reversed. 2026 IL App 9(d) 250122 at ¶¶20, 22. The appellate court noted that the statute’s grammar of having “ ‘knowingly” tied to ‘specific intent’ by the use of the connector ‘and’ and ‘for the purpose of’ appearing directly after the ‘specific intent’ phrase without any qualifying or separating connectors” supported this conclusion. 2026 IL App (3d) 250122 at ¶22.

The appellate court also reiterated that the phrase “for the purpose of” in criminal statutes had been routinely used to describe a more culpable mental state such as specific intent. Therefore, since the forgery statute had an additional qualifier for its specific intent, i.e., “for the purposes of causing financial loss to another or bringing some financial gain to oneself,” this further refined the statute’s mental state requirement. 2026 IL App (3d) 250122 at ¶23.

The appellate court concluded that “[t]he plain and ordinary language of the definition of ‘intent to defraud’ means the applicable mental state for forgery expressly includes the specific intent to obtain financial gain for oneself or to cause financial loss to another. Accordingly, the State must show proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent to defraud that relates to a pecuniary interest as a mandatory element of forgery.” 2026 IL App (3d) 250122 at ¶25.

For more information about criminal law, see CRIMINAL RECORDS: EXPUNGEMENT AND OTHER RELIEF (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Matthew R. Leisten, Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office, Oregon, IL

Matthew R. Leisten serves as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for the Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office in Oregon, Illinois. In his role, he provides essential updates on caselaw relevant to search warrants, focusing on issues such as good faith, staleness, and the impact of modern technology on legal procedures. His experience includes handling complex warrants involving advanced technologies like geofences and Triggerfish. Additionally, Leisten contributes to legal education through publications and presentations, ensuring that attorneys stay informed about current legal trends and practices.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lewis v. Indiana Department of Transportation, No. 25-1776, 2026 WL 1090714 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026), provides important insights for employers regarding the handling of discrimination and retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), Pub.L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub.L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. This decision underscores the importance of understanding the causation standards and the necessity of maintaining clear documentation of employee performance issues.

Background

Keisha Lewis (Lewis), worked for the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) from December 2014 to December 2022. Her job responsibilities included reviewing and approving federal relocation claim vouchers for assistant payments. 2026 WL 1090714 at *1.

In 2021, INDOT conducted a job review, and Lewis received a promotion and a raise. Lewis, who is African American, claimed the raise was insufficient because a white male colleague received a higher raise. INDOT explained that this was because the colleague’s base salary was lower than Lewis’s, so he received a higher percentage raise. Id.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, INDOT employees returned to the office by summer 2022. Lewis requested and received a work accommodation to work from home based on health issues related to her kidney transplant and compromised immune system. Lewis began to refuse work assigned as part of her job duties, and her supervisor stepped in to monitor work and initiated daily virtual check-ins. Id.

Lewis was informed by her supervisor that the failure to perform job duties was insubordination. The supervisor also requested additional documentation to support her work accommodation based on a recent social media post about Lewis attending a high school football game. Id.

Lewis filed several internal complaints. Lewis was permitted to keep her work accommodation, and the complaints were dismissed. 2026 WL 1090714 at *2.

Lewis’s supervisor reported continued concerns with her performance and refusal to perform work. This included being late to meetings, refusing to complete productivity reports and work logs, and ongoing concerns with her backlog of late projects. The supervisor continued to document this but did not issue discipline for fear of retaliation. Id.

The last straw was when Lewis again refused work; INDOT then realized that the backlog of work was significant and put INDOT at risk for loss of federal funding. INDOT terminated her employment based on poor performance and insubordinate conduct. Id.

Lewis sued INDOT, alleging that her termination was due to disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation for filing a complaint, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. §1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of INDOT, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

Discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act requires proof that the adverse action occurred “solely by reason of” disability, which is a stricter standard than the ADA’s but-for causation. 2026 WL 1090714 at **3 – 4. Here, it was undisputed that Lewis had a large backlog of work and refused to perform tasks associated with her position. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that no reasonable jury could find that Lewis’s disability was the sole cause of her termination. Id.

Lewis also failed to create a triable issue of pretext. Lewis claimed that INDOT was looking for a reason to terminate her after she requested and received an accommodation. Following Monroe v. Indiana Department of Transportation, 871 F.3d 495, 505 (7th Cir. 2017), and Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit explained that the question is whether INDOT honestly believed its stated reason. Lewis, supra, 2026 WL 1090714 at *4. To establish otherwise requires a “lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Id., quoting Argyropoulos, supra, 539 F.3d at 726. Notably, here, Lewis was not able to contest the fact of her large backlog of work and refusal to perform tasks. Lewis, supra, 2026 WL 1090714 at *4.

For a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the Seventh Circuit precedent is inconsistent as to whether a plaintiff must show the protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse action (Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 440 (7th Cir. 2022)) or whether it is enough to show “retaliatory intent played a part in [the] termination” (Fuller v. McDonough, 84 F.4th 686, 691 (7th Cir. 2023)). Lewis, supra, 2026 WL 1090714 at *5. The Seventh Circuit rejected Lewis’s retaliation theories under both the stricter and more lenient causation standards because the record supported non-retaliatory reasons for discharge — namely because INDOT had sufficiently documented and had support for the productivity and performance concerns, which were unrelated to the fact that she filed a complaint. Id.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Title VII race discrimination and retaliation because the only evidence proffered by Lewis was that a white male colleague received a higher raise. Lewis did not develop this argument as she failed to provide sufficient comparator data or rebut INDOT’s explanation for the difference in the raise. Lewis, supra, 2026 WL 1090714 at *6.

Practical Implications for Employers

• Employers should maintain thorough documentation of employee performance issues and any disciplinary actions taken. This documentation can be crucial in defending against claims of discrimination or retaliation.

• Employers should ensure that all employees are treated consistently and that any disparities in treatment are justified by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. This is particularly important in cases involving pay raises or promotions.

• Regular training for supervisors and human resources personnel on handling accommodation requests and performance issues can help prevent misunderstandings and potential claims. Clear communication with employees about performance expectations and performance issues is also essential.

• Be vigilant about actions that could be perceived as retaliatory, especially following an employee’s complaint or request for accommodation. Ensure that any adverse actions are based on documented performance issues rather than perceived retaliation.

For more information about employment and labor law, see EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (IICLE^®, 2026). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Catherine R. Locallo, Robbins Schwartz, Chicago

Catherine R. Locallo, a partner at Robbins Schwartz, specializes in labor and employment law with a focus on education and board governance. She provides guidance on employment law, collective bargaining, and compliance with various acts. Catherine started as a paralegal, joined Robbins Schwartz in 2004, and became a partner in 2017. She holds a J.D. from The John Marshall Law School and a B.S. from Southern Illinois University. Notably, she is also involved in multiple professional organizations and community activities, including the Glenview Stars Hockey Association.

In Summers v. Catlin, 2026 IL App (3d) 250194, after the trial court issued an allocation judgment designating the mother as the “majority-time parent,” the father sought and was granted a full waiver of court fees pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 298 and filed a notice of appeal from numerous court orders including the allocation judgment. When preparing the request for preparation of the record, the father learned the total cost of the transcripts was over $19,000 and filed a motion for waiver of the costs based on the Rule 298 petition being previously granted. 2026 IL App (3d) 250194 at ¶5.

The trial court denied the motion on the following grounds: (1) the father had not sought the services of a pro bono lawyer; and (2) he sought a waiver only under §5-105, not §5-105.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/1-101, et seq. The trial distinguished the case at bar from In re Marriage of Main, 2020 IL App (2d) 200131, 175 N.E.3d 222, 447 Ill.Dec. 854, due to the fact that the appellant had sought the services of a pro bonolawyer and sought relief under both sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2026 IL App (3d) 250194 at ¶6.

The trial court also certified the following question for the appellate court: “When a fee waiver has been granted to a litigant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 298, [do] court costs, as defined in 735 ILCS 5/5-105, extend to the cost of the transcripts?” Id. The Third District answered the question in the affirmative and remanded the case to the trial court to determine which transcripts were necessary for the father’s appeal and to provide those to him without delay.

The appellate court upheld Main, supra, and relied on the language in 735 ILCS 5/5-105.5(b), which “explicitly states that ‘all fees and costs relat[ed] to filing, appearing, transcripts on appeal, and service of process shall be waived.’ ” 2026 IL App (3d) 250194 at ¶16. It also noted that the Main court was aware that §5-105 and its subsections did not include a reference to transcripts on appeal but concluded that nothing in the statutory scheme demonstrates any intent by the legislature or the Supreme Court to treat pro se indigent litigants less favorably or even differently than those represented by civil legal services providers or pro bonoattorneys.

For more information about family law, see FAMILY LAW: PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF DISSOLUTION ACTIONS (IICLE^®, 2023). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Michelle A. Lawless, Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago

Michelle A. Lawless, founder of The Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, has over 20 years of experience in family law. After a distinguished career at a prestigious litigation firm, she started her own practice to offer a more compassionate and resolution-focused approach. Michelle specializes in collaborative law, mediation, and attorney-assisted mediation, helping clients navigate family disputes with minimal conflict. She is recognized for her thought leadership, extensive financial experience, and dedication to creating better outcomes for families.

Cesar Guerrero sought to be placed on the April 1, 2025, consolidated election ballot as the Democratic candidate for township supervisor in Joliet Township. Guerrero vs. Parker, 2026 IL App (3d) 250284, ¶1. In October 2024, the Illinois State Board of Elections (Election Board) sent a letter to Guerrero informing him that the campaign committee owed $6,550 in civil penalties, and that if such penalties remained unpaid as of the date the ballots were certified, his name would not appear on the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶3. In December 2024, Guerrero was formally nominated as the Democratic candidate for township supervisor. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶4.

On January 22, 2025, the day prior to ballot certification, the campaign committee’s civil penalties remained unpaid. Id. Accordingly, Guerrero’s name was included on a ballot forfeiture list pursuant to §9-30 of the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/9-30, which provided that, “[a]n election authority is barred from placing on the ballot the name of any candidate whose political committee has an unpaid civil penalty owed to the State Board of Elections.” 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶4.

On January 29, 2025, the county clerk directed the township clerk to remove Guerrero’s name from the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶5. On that same day, the Election Board sent correspondence to the campaign committee acknowledging its receipt of payment for the $6,550.00 civil penalty. On January 30, 2025, pursuant to the county clerk’s directive, the township clerk notified Guerrero that his name was removed from the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶6.

On February 4, 2025, the Democratic organization held a special meeting to fill the ballot vacancy created by Guerrero’s removal and unanimously selected Guerrero as its candidate. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶6. The next day, Guerrero filed the Democratic committee’s nominating resolution to fill the vacancy and associated papers with the township clerk. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶6. No objections were filed, and the township clerk certified Guerrero’s placement on the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶6. The county clerk, however, refused to accept the township clerk’s certification on the grounds that Guerrero’s name appeared on the earlier ballot forfeiture list. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶7.

Circuit Court

Guerrero filed a three-count complaint in circuit court, seeking a writ of mandamus, a declaratory judgment, and alleging a violation of his civil rights. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶9. Specifically, Guerrero sought to have the circuit court compel the township clerk to certify his name on the ballot and further compel the county clerk to accept said certification and to include his name on the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶9. Guerrero also sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶9. Finally, Guerrero alleged that by depriving him of access to the ballot, he was intentionally deprived of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and §29-17 of the Election Code, 10 ILCS 5/29-17. Id. Guerrero also sought a temporary restraining order compelling such actions. Id. In response, the county clerk maintained that Guerrero was not eligible to appear on the ballot due to his earlier inclusion on the forfeiture list. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶10. The county clerk further asserted that Guerrero’s subsequent nomination was invalid because the Democratic committee did not comply with the Election Code’s eight-day timeline for filling a vacancy, asserting the vacancy was created the day that the ballot was certified and the fine remain unpaid. Id.

The circuit court found in favor of Guerrero on the first two counts and directed that his name be included on the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶13. In support of this finding, the circuit court noted that nothing in §9-30 of the Election Code established that a candidate must be removed from the ballot after all outstanding fines had been paid. Id. Moreover, the circuit court further opined that even if §9-30 required Guerrero’s removal from the ballot, the subsequent nomination by the Democratic committee to fill the vacancy was a separate candidacy for which he was not disqualified. Id. The circuit court also rejected the county clerk’s challenges regarding timeliness, finding that the earliest date that could be considered an “event creating the vacancy” was January 29, 2025, the date of the county clerk’s directive to the township clerk to remove Guerrero from the ballot. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶14. After various motions and cross-motions, the circuit court grated summary judgment in favor of the county clerk on the third count’s constitutional law claims, noting there were no questions of material fact with respect to the county clerk’s liability. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶26.

The county clerk filed an appeal on counts I and II. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶27. Guerrero filed a cross-appeal on count III and a motion to dismiss the county clerk’s appeal on counts I and II based on mootness, given that Guerrero had since been elected to and certified as township supervisor. Id.

Appellate Court

The appellate court first addressed Guerrero’s motion to dismiss the county clerk’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on the contention that at the time of the appeal, no actual controversy existed. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶32. The appellate court rejected Guerrero’s mootness argument, finding that the public interest exception applied. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶38.

Addressing the county clerk’s appeal of counts I and II on its merits, the appellate court utilized principles of statutory construction to examine §9-30’s application to the facts at hand. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶40. While the county clerk argued that the ballot forfeiture rule was mandatory due to §9-30’s repeated use of the word “shall”, the appellate court noted that when the provision was read in its entirety, the word “while” provided an additional qualifier and that §9-30 was no longer applicable once the penalties had been paid. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶46. The appellate court further noted that even had Guerrero been properly removed pursuant to §9-30, his subsequent nomination must be considered a separate and distinguishable candidacy, at which date there were no outstanding penalties. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶47.

Addressing the timeliness of Guerrero’s subsequent nomination, the county clerk argued that the ballot vacancy occurred on the ballot forfeiture date of January 23, and therefore, in accordance with 10 ILCS 5/7-61, the last day to fill the vacancy was January 31, while the nomination did not occur until February 4. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶54. The appellate court disagreed, noting that Guerrero’s nominating papers reflected no facial deficiency and stated that the vacancy occurred on January 30, when the County clerk vacated the seat. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶55. It further explained that to find an earlier vacancy would require the clerk to look outside the four corners of the filing, which would go beyond the clerk’s ministerial role in the election process. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶56. Accordingly, the appellate court rejected the county clerk’s assertion that the event creating the vacancy was the day the fine was otherwise due and determined that the nomination had been timely submitted. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶57.

The appellate court also rejected Guerrero’s cross-appeal on his constitutional law claim, noting that it was responsible for reviewing only the grant of summary judgment and not the denial of judgment on the pleadings. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶65. Through that lens, it found that there was no basis in the record that would preclude the circuit court’s determination, and therefore, affirmed its findings on that count. 2026 IL App (3d) 250284 at ¶66.

For more information about government law, see MUNICIPAL LAW: ANNEXATION, ZONING, AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY (IICLE^®, 2024). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Laura M. Julien, Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C., Sugar Grove

Laura M. Julien is a partner with Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C. in Sugar Grove, Illinois, where she concentrates her practice in municipal law, school law, corporate law, and real estate matters. She is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, Kane County Bar Association, State Bar of Wisconsin, National Council of School Attorneys, Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association, and Illinois Council of School Attorneys. She is also a recurrent presenter with the National Business Institute. Laura earned her undergraduate, with honors, from the University of Wisconsin and her J.D. degree from the University of Notre Dame Law School.

This month’s article discusses two First District cases — Jordan v. Mazza, 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U and Davidson v. Parsons-Passmore, 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U — which discuss an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in landlord-tenant disputes. Apart from both giving an instructive overview on a trial court’s broad discretion to review a fee petition for reasonableness, when read together, the cases indirectly highlight the differences between when claims are litigated under Chicago’s onerous Residential Landlord Tenant Ordinance (RLTO) and when they are not. While a trial court outside of the RLTO’s statutory framework may also exercise discretion in awarding a prevailing party its costs, the Chicago litigant and the courts are bound to the ordinance’s provisions, which require reimbursement of all court costs, as well as the imposition of (often hefty) monetary penalties for what can only be described as minor, technical violations of the RLTO.

Jordan v. Mazza

Joseph Mazza rented the first floor of a residential building owned by Alicja Szewczyk and Aneta Jordan. After the written lease expired, Mazza continued to live in the premises on a month-to-month basis. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶5. Szewczyk notified Mazza that she was terminating the lease and eventually filed an eviction action. After Mazza vacated the premises, Szewczyk and Jordan filed an action against him seeking three times monthly rent under the lease’s holdover provision ($47,750) and attorneys’ fees and costs under the lease’s fee-shifting provision, which allowed a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶6.

The parties engaged in protracted litigation. After mandatory arbitration, the panel found in favor of Szewczyk and Jordan, but Mazza rejected the award. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶7. Ultimately, the parties stipulated that Szewczyk and Jordan were entitled to $3,870 in damages plus attorneys’ fees and costs, and the trial court entered judgment in favor their favor. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶8. Although Szewczyk and Jordan sought $96,974.30 in fees and costs, the trial court lowered the award to $20,788.29, which the plaintiffs timely appealed. Id.

Appellate Court

On appeal, Szewczyk and Jordan argued that the lower court abused its discretion when it did not engage in a line-by-line review of their attorneys’ time sheets, based its attorneys’ fees award in part on the arbitration panel’s assessment, and reduced their costs. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶10.

Determining whether an attorneys’ fees award is reasonable is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶12. “Regardless of the basis for awarding attorney fees (statutory or contractual), an attorney can only receive a reasonable fee.” [Emphasis in original.] 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶13, citing Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Moreover, reasonableness depends in part on the connection between the fees sought and the amount recovered in the litigation. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶18. Factors considered in making such a determination include the following: “‘the nature of the case, the case’s novelty and difficulty level, the skill and standing of the attorney, the degree of responsibility required, the usual and customary charges for similar work, and the connection between the litigation and the fees charged.”’ 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶13, citing Richardson v. Haddon, 375 Ill.App.3d 312, 873 N.E.2d 570, 572, 313 Ill.Dec. 946 (1st Dist. 2007). It was Szewczyk and Jordan’s burden to prove that their attorneys’ fees’ request was reasonable. Id.

Here, noting that this was a “simple eviction case” and there was “nothing novel” about the issues, the trial court found that the case should have been resolved quickly and that similar cases are usually resolved in less than a year. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶14. The lower court took issue with the fact that Szewczyk and Jordan had pursued overly aggressive (and failing) legal theories, erroneously seeking triple rent for the three months Mazza held over, prompting protracted litigation activity, and attempting to shift the blame on Mazza for simply failing to agree with their position. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶¶ 15 – 18. In response to their fee petition, Mazza filed a detailed, line-by-line objection to each of the billing entries, noting work billed on unsuccessful issues, excessive or unnecessary work, duplicative entries, or entries without sufficient detail. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶19.

Ultimately, the appellate court found that the lower court’s decision to award $20,000 as reasonable attorneys’ fees (i.e., fees that were five times the judgment amount in a simple case with a modest recovery) was within its discretion. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶20. “‘The residence in question was vacated long ago and this battle has raged for over two years as the parties fought over discovery, lease terms, motions for sanctions, counterclaims and filed various motions regarding misnamed pleadings[.] This case displays everything that litigation should not be about.’” 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶17.

In rendering its decision, the appellate court noted that “[a] fee shifting provision in a contract or statute is not intended to be a windfall for the prevailing party’s lawyer” [and that a] lawyer seeking a fee award from an adversary must exercise the same restraint in billing that a reasonable client would expect.” 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶18, citing Aliano v. Transform SR LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 172325, ¶33, 167 N.E.3d 665, 445 Ill.Dec. 657. The circuit court’s decision to award $20,000 as reasonable attorneys’ fees was deemed not to be outside the bounds of discretion. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶20. They were substantial fees in a simple case with a modest recovery (i.e., the fee awarded was still more than five times the judgment amount). Id.

While Szewczyk and Jordan took issue with the fact that the trial court did not conduct a line-by-line audit of their fee petition, the appellate court noted that trial judges are not required to become “green-eyeshade accountants” and are merely tasked with trying to do rough justice, not achieve auditing perfection. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶¶ 21 – 22. Moreover, the reviewing court noted that the various cases relied on by Szewczyk and Jordan were easily distinguishable. Nor was there evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in referring to the $10,000 in fees awarded arbitration, as there was ample evidence in the record outside of the arbitration award supporting the lower court’s rationale. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶¶ 23 – 25.

Similarly, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s reduction of costs awarded to Szewczyk and Jordan. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶¶26 – 31. Some of the costs were not verifiable or related to work deemed unnecessary to the case or were part of the attorney’s overhead, fixed expenses (e.g., printing and delivering courtesy copies) and, therefore, already reflected in an attorney’s hourly rate. 2026 IL App (1st) 250123-U at ¶¶29 – 30.

Davidson v. Parsons-Passmore

Suzette Davidson filed suit against her former landlord, Andrea Parsons-Passmore for statutory violations under the Chicago RLTO. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶2. Davidson prevailed in the trial court, obtaining partial summary judgment on some claims and judgment on the remaining claims after a bench trial. Specifically, Davidson obtained summary judgment on Parsons-Passmore’s failure to attach a copy of the RLTO summary to her lease, resulting in a $100 statutory penalty, and failure to properly memorialize the handling of the security deposit, resulting in a $7,050 statutory penalty. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶¶7 and 10. At trial, the judge also found in Davidson’s favor because Parsons-Passmore charged a late fee that was $3.75 more than allowed under the RLTO, resulting in a $4,700 statutory penalty and bringing Davidson’s total recovery under her complaint to $11,850. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶11. Pursuant to the RLTO, the trial court also granted Davidson leave to file a petition for attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. The total attorneys’ fees sought in the petition were $14,087.50 and the total costs were $1,117.92. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶12.

After a hearing on her fee petition, the trial court ordered only a portion of Davidson’s attorneys’ fees and costs. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶2. Noting that the “total judgment amount was over $11,000 while the actual amount that was overcharged was less than $10” and that, based on a technicality, Parsons-Passmore (who was pro se) “was hammered with statutory fees,” in the interest of justice, the trial court reduced Davidson’s attorneys’ fees down to $3,000 and her costs to $500. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶¶13 –14.

Davidson filed a timely appeal, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion when it drastically reduced her attorneys’ fees and costs without legal basis. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶¶2, 17.

Appellate Court

Upon violation of the RLTO, §5-12-180 of the Ordinance mandates recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and all court costs to a prevailing party. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶¶ 17 – 18, citing Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 307 Ill.App.3d 155, 717 N.E.2d 443, 446, 240 Ill.Dec. 350 (1st Dist. 1999). This provision helps support the RLTO’s purpose “to protect tenants and hold landlords to a high standard of conduct when entrusted with a tenant’s money.” 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶18. Having said this, Illinois courts have also deemed the RLTO to be remedial, rather than penal, in nature. Id. The amount of the attorneys’ fees award, though, is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶19, citing 304 Ill.App.3d 871, 710 N.E.2d 155, 156, 237 Ill.Dec. 732 (1st Dist. 1999).

The burden to establish that fees are reasonable rests with the attorney, who must provide sufficiently detailed records maintained throughout the proceeding regarding the work performed, by whom, and at what rate. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶20, citing Marriage of Kane, 2016 IL App (2d) 150774, ¶25, 76 N.E.3d 20, 412 Ill.Dec. 580. Factors to be considered by the trial court also include the level of skill and experience of the attorney, the reasonableness of the fee, whether the case involves novel or difficult issues or legal aspects, and whether a party is appearing pro se. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶¶ 21, 24. The trial judge also may rely on the judge’s own experience. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶20, citing Marriage of Kane, supra, 2016 IL App (2d) 150774 at ¶25.

Considering the above framework, the appellate court found that the lower court’s reduction of the fee award to $3,000 was not an abuse of its discretion. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶22. Parsons-Passmore essentially violated the RLTO by charging $3.75 more than allowed for a late fee, failing to provide a copy of the RLTO to Davidson, along with some minor, technical violations related to the handling of her security deposit. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶23. The RLTO sets specific penalties for these infractions — totaling $11,850 — which Davidson was awarded in part by summary judgment and in part after a short bench trial. The lower court judge assessed the matter as a simple one, especially for an experienced practitioner like the one representing Davidson, while also finding that the attorney filed excessive pleadings and refused to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations, thereby protracting the litigation. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶25.

Ultimately, the trial court judge reduced the fee award in the interest of judgment. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶26. In doing so, the judge was not required to conduct a line-by-line analysis of the billing statements or to articulate how the lower court evaluated any of the factors in determining the reasonableness of the fees. Id., citing Marriage of Kane, supra, 2016 IL App (2d) 150774 at ¶31. All that Davidson was entitled to under the RLTO was a hearing on her fee petition and recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees, which the record established she had received. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶26. As a result, the appellate court did not find any abuse of discretion in the $3,000 award. Id.

In contrast, the appellate court reached a different conclusion regarding Davidson’s costs award. 2026 IL App (1st) 242180-U at ¶27. Because RLTO §5-12-180 expressly requires a prevailing party to cover all of its court costs, the appellate court reversed the reduction of court costs and remanded the case with instructions to enter an award reflecting the total amount of costs sought by Davidson ($1,117.92). Id.

For more information about real estate law, see MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: CORRESPONDING ISSUES (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Genevieve M. Daniels, Genevieve M. Daniels, P.C.

Genevieve M. Daniels, a versatile litigator and transactional attorney, specializes in commercial, employment, and real estate law. She offers comprehensive legal services, including real estate transactions, employment law compliance, and dispute resolution. Genevieve's unique experience allows her to provide clients with strategic insights and effective advocacy. She is also an active presenter, arts supporter, and passionate about Persian cooking and adventure travel.

Excerpted from §§8.27 - 8.33 of Amelia S. Buragas ,Ch. 8, Damages in Medical Malpractice, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (IICLE^® 2026)

Collateral-Source Rule

While not a damages-reducing factor per se, the collateral-source rule continues to be an active area of litigation and one that practitioners should watch closely for developments because it directly impacts the amount of damages a plaintiff can claim for medical bills. Under the collateral-source rule, “benefits received by the injured party from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not diminish damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804, 803 N.E.2d 647, 649, 281 Ill.Dec. 243 (3d Dist. 2004), quoting Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill.2d 308, 546 N.E.2d 524, 530, 137 Ill.Dec. 579 (1989). The collateral-source rule has both evidentiary and substantive components. Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1022, 323 Ill.Dec. 26 (2008). The evidence component prohibits the defendant from introducing any evidence that the plaintiff’s damages were paid by a collateral source, such as insurance. Id. Substantively, the rule “bars a defendant from reducing the plaintiff’s compensatory award by the amount the plaintiff received from the collateral source.” 892 N.E.2d at 1023, quoting Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72, 833 N.E.2d 847, 852, 295 Ill.Dec. 641 (2005), quoting in turn James M. Fischer, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES §12(a), p. 77 (1999).

In most instances, the amount billed by medical providers is greater than the amount paid by insurance on behalf of the patient. This has led to a dispute as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to place into evidence the full amount of the bills or whether the plaintiff is limited solely to the amount actually paid. The “actual amount paid” approach has been criticized because it “results in a diminution of the tortfeasor’s liability vis-a-vis an insured victim when compared with the same tortfeasor’s liability vis-a-vis an uninsured victim.” Wills, supra, 892 N.E.2d at 1026, quoting Bozeman v. State, 897 So.2d 692, 703 (La. 2004). Some courts instead rely on the “benefit of the bargain” approach, which allows the plaintiff to recover the full amount of the medical expenses billed in instances in which the plaintiff has paid some consideration (e.g., insurance premiums) for the benefit of the write-off. Wills, supra, 892 N.E.2d at 1026. A criticism of this approach is that it undermines the collateral-source rule by using the plaintiff’s relationship with a third party to measure the tortfeasor’s liability. 892 N.E.2d at 1027.

The Illinois Supreme Court examined these divergent theories of recovery in Wills and adopted the “reasonable-value approach,” which focuses on whether the amount charged was reasonable and customary. 892 N.E.2d at 1030. In doing so, the court noted that the benefits provided by the collateral source were intended to benefit the plaintiff and a “benefit that is directed to the injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for the tortfeasor.” Id., quoting Arthur, supra, 833 N.E.2d at 852, quoting in turn RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §920A, cmt. b (1979). Thus, the defendant may not introduce evidence that the plaintiff’s bills were settled for a lesser amount because doing so would undermine the collateral-source rule. Wills, supra, 892 N.E.2d at 1033. However, the defendant is free to cross-examine any witness that the plaintiff calls to attack the reasonableness of the amount charged and may call its own witnesses to testify that the billed amounts do not reflect the reasonable value of the services. Id. Once the bills are put into evidence, it is up to the jury to consider whether to award all, part, or none of the bills as damages. Wills, supra, 892 N.E.2d at 1034.

Setoffs

Setoffs are entered post-verdict and reduce the amount paid to the plaintiff by the defendant.

Setoffs for Medical Payments

Section 2-1205 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/1-101, et seq., allows for reduction of the amount of the plaintiff’s medical bills that have been paid by any other “person, corporation, insurance company or fund.” This section applies only to actions premised in negligence and does not include intentional torts. Id. This reduction also does not apply to the extent that there is a right of recoupment through subrogation, trust agreement, lien, or otherwise. 735 ILCS 5/2-1205(2). Further, the reduction cannot reduce the judgment by more than 50 percent of the total verdict, and the damages awarded must be increased by the amount of any insurance premiums or direct costs paid by the plaintiff. 735 ILCS 5/2-1205(3), 5/2-1205(4). Application for reduction must be made within 30 days of the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1205(1); Richter v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 177 Ill.App.3d 247, 532 N.E.2d 269, 126 Ill.Dec. 584 (1st Dist. 1988) (holding that defendant’s motion filed 30 days after entry of order denying posttrial motion and 6 months after return of jury verdict was untimely).

The courts have strictly interpreted the language of §2-1205, and the right to reduction applies only in instances in which payments are made by reason of a legal obligation. Thus, payments that are gifts or loans from a family member do not trigger the provisions of this statute. Longman v. Jasiek, 91 Ill.App.3d 83, 414 N.E.2d 520, 46 Ill.Dec. 636 (3d Dist. 1980) (finding that defendant was not entitled to reduction when plaintiff’s parents had paid their adult daughter’s medical bills). Section 2-1205 also only permits reduction of a medical expense award for amounts actually paid by an insurer and does not allow for reductions for portions of medical bills that are “written off” due to the contractual relationship between the insurer and the medical providers. Bajgrowicz v. Dev Medical Associates, S.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 230196-U, ¶183.

Any setoffs made pursuant to §2-1205 are to be made from the net recovery. Cohan v. Garretson, 282 Ill.App.3d 248, 667 N.E.2d 1325, 217 Ill.Dec. 749 (1st Dist. 1996).

Setoffs for Contribution

The Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/0.01, et seq., “seeks to promote two important public policies — the encouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors.” Johnson v. United Airlines, 203 Ill.2d 121, 784 N.E.2d 812, 821, 271 Ill.Dec. 258 (2003). A settling joint tortfeasor who settles in good faith with the injured party is discharged from contribution liability and is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement. 740 ILCS 100/2(d).

Partial settlement of a claim does not extinguish the plaintiff’s cause of action or reduce the total amount recoverable. However, it may entitle the remaining defendants to a setoff against any judgment:

When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater. 740 ILCS 100/2(c).

Whether a settlement is made in good faith is to be determined by the trial court, which uses a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill.2d 185, 756 N.E.2d 836, 840, 258 Ill.Dec. 562 (2001).

Failure To Mitigate

A medical malpractice verdict may be reduced to the extent that the plaintiff voluntarily fails to follow a doctor’s advice or to accept reasonable medical treatment. Newell v. Corres, 125 Ill.App.3d 1087, 466 N.E.2d 1085, 81 Ill.Dec. 283 (1st Dist. 1984). The failure to mitigate damages relates to the patient’s conduct only after the alleged malpractice occurred. Fisher v. Slager, 201 Ill.App.3d 480, 559 N.E.2d 118, 147 Ill.Dec. 118 (1st Dist. 1990). The failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969). If a defendant pleads an affirmative defense and the evidence supports a finding that the patient failed to follow a doctor’s advice or failed to seek treatment, the court may use I.P.I. — Civil No. 105.08.

Mitigation of damages is a discrete concept from comparative negligence. Comparative negligence involves circumstances in which the plaintiff’s negligence is a legally contributing cause of harm. Mitigation of damages, on the other hand, recognizes a duty by the injured party to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care to minimize damages after the injury occurs. Jones v. Rallos, 384 Ill.App.3d 73, 890 N.E.2d 1190, 322 Ill.Dec. 271 (1st Dist. 2008).

Comparative Negligence

Comparative negligence is a damages-reducing factor and, ordinarily, a jury question. Gruidl v. Schell, 166 Ill.App.3d 276, 519 N.E.2d 963, 116 Ill.Dec. 748 (1st Dist. 1988). However, courts are somewhat skeptical of applying comparative negligence in medical malpractice cases and will not find comparative negligence merely because the plaintiff’s conduct placed the plaintiff in a position requiring medical treatment. See Owens v. Stokoe, 115 Ill.2d 177, 503 N.E.2d 251, 104 Ill.Dec. 694 (1986). Nonetheless, comparative negligence may be found in instances in which there is an allegation that the plaintiff failed to follow medical advice or to participate in care. See Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 332 Ill.App.3d 8, 772 N.E.2d 967, 265 Ill.Dec. 596 (1st Dist. 2002). When comparative negligence is a factor to be considered in a claim involving the Wrongful Death Act, use I.P.I. — Civil No. B31.08.

Preexisting Conditions/“Same Part of the Body” Rule

In some instances, the defendant may argue that the plaintiff was not harmed and that the injury is solely the result of a preexisting condition. Under the historical “same part of the body” rule, evidence of a prior injury was admissible without any showing that it was causally related to the present injury if both injuries affected the same part of the body. Brown v. Baker, 284 Ill.App.3d 401, 672 N.E.2d 69, 71, 219 Ill.Dec. 754 (5th Dist. 1996). If the injury was not to the same part of the body, the defendant was required to establish a causal connection between the current injury and the prior injury. Bailey v. Wilson, 299 Ill.App.3d 297, 700 N.E.2d 1113, 1116, 233 Ill.Dec. 405 (4th Dist. 1998).

In Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill.2d 49, 733 N.E.2d 1275, 248 Ill.Dec. 277 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court abandoned this distinction. The court explained that the “same part of the body” rule was built on the presumption that “if a plaintiff has previously suffered an injury to the same part of the body, then that previous injury is automatically relevant to the present injury simply because it affected the same part of the body.” 733 N.E.2d at 1279. The court noted that this was a conclusion with which it could no longer agree. Id. Under Voykin, supra, the defendant must establish a causal relationship between the current injury and the prior injury, regardless of the locations of the injuries. 733 N.E.2d at 1280, further held that, in most instances, the defendant must offer expert opinion testimony to support causation.

Amelia S. Buragas, Illinois State University

Amelia S. Buragas is an Assistant Professor and the Director of Legal Studies at Illinois State University in Normal. She is a member of the Appellate Lawyers Association and the Illinois State Bar Association. Buragas received her BS from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, her MA from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and her JD magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, from the University of Wisconsin Law School.

Our May FLASHPOINTS Author Spotlight recognizes Hugh F. Drake, one of the two most recent members to join the IICLE® Board of Directors.

Drake first became familiar with IICLE when he was new to estate planning as an attendee at the IICLE Estate Planning Short Course in Champaign. When it comes to Illinois law, “IICLE has been the most reliable resource” for Drake’s practice. “Over the past 25 years, IICLE has stayed in the mix for me — through its publications and programs, and later through my own work as an author and presenter. I was grateful to be invited to serve on the IICLE Board of Directors, and I’m honored to be a small part of IICLE’s work to help Illinois lawyers.”

Drake practices in the areas of estate planning, estate administration, and business planning. He advises clients on all aspects of wealth transfer, as well as trust and estate administration matters. Drake is a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. In addition to the IICLE Board of Directors, Drake serves on the Board of Directors for the Springfield Memorial Hospital Foundation. He has also served in various leadership positions with the Illinois State Bar Association, the Sangamon Valley Estate Planning Council, and the Community Foundation for the Land of Lincoln and was the 2023 Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Trust and Estate Law. He is a frequent lecturer, both nationally and locally, has published numerous articles on tax and estate planning in such publications as Trusts and Estates, The Practical Tax Lawyer, and Probate & Property, and has been quoted in The Wall Street Journal.