March 2026 IICLE FLASHPOINTS

People sometimes ask whether it is still necessary to address Holocaust-era restitution, almost 80 years since the end of WWII. Shouldn’t that be finished by now? Sadly, it’s not. Numerous restitution issues remain unfinished in a variety of countries. See Ellen Germain, U.S. Department of State, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Remedies for Looted Art and Cultural Property — Civil, Criminal or Consensual, Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 28, 2025).

The issue of how to deal with Nazi-confiscated art has plagued both Holocaust survivors and courts for years. Various governments, including the United States, have sought to address this issue through the non-binding but influential 1998 Washington Principles to identify and provide resources to return Nazi-era confiscated art. See Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/washington-conference-principles-on-nazi-confiscated-art. Later, these principles were expanded by the 2009 Terezin Declaration, which recognized that “there remain[ed] substantial issues to be addressed, because only a part of the confiscated property has been recovered or compensated” and “urge[d] that every effort be made to rectify the consequences of wrongful property seizures, such as confiscations, forced sales and sales under duress of property, which were part of the persecution of these innocent people and groups, the vast majority of whom died heirless.” See 2009 Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues, Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/prague-holocaust-era-assets-conference-terezin-declaration.

In 2016, the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub.L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524 (Jan. 1, 2016) (the “2016 HEAR Act”), was passed and later revised by Congress with the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2025, S.B. 1884, 119th Cong., 1st Sess. (2025) (the “2025 HEAR Act”), which recognized: “Some courts have frustrated the intent of this Act by dismissing recovery lawsuits in reliance on defenses based on the passage of time.” 2025 HEAR Act, §2(a)(1)(B). Although the 2016 HEAR Act did not provide for a private right of action, it did recognize that “ ‘steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution’ to claims involving such art that has not been restituted if the owners or their heirs can be identified.” 2016 HEAR Act, §2(3).

It was on this palette that Schoeps v. Sompo Holdings, Inc., 160 F.4th 815 (7th Cir. 2025), was decided. Schoeps presents significant implications for restitution claims to recover Nazi-looted artwork under the 2016 HEAR Act.

Schoeps was decided before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. In Schoeps, the plaintiffs were the heirs of Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a German banker and private art collector. In the 1930s, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy acquired Vincent van Gogh’s Sunflowers as part of his private art collection. 160 F.4th at 819. Through the following years, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy — who was Jewish and a prominent community member — was targeted and persecuted by the Nazi government for his religion. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was subject to a campaign of discrimination in which he was involuntarily removed from various professional organizations, including the Berlin Stock Exchange, and lost his company when it was involuntary transferred to non-Jewish ownership.

As a result of such persecution, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was left without a livelihood and was forced to liquidate his private art collection, which at the time included Sunflowers. He placed Sunflowers on consignment with a Parisian art dealer who sold the painting to an individual. Sunflowers was sold again in 1987 at the Christie’s auction house in London for $40 million. Id. The purchaser was Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company, which later became part of Sompo, the current owner of Sunflowers.

In September 2001, Sunflowers was loaned to the Art Institute of Chicago for a four-month exhibit. 160 F.4th at 820. In exchange, the Art Institute of Chicago promised to lend certain Van Gogh paintings to a Tokyo exhibition in 2003. Id. In preparation for the Chicago exhibit, concerns were expressed about Sunflowers’ provenance, specifically that it may be a Nazi-looted artwork. Nevertheless, Sunflowers was shown at the Art Institute of Chicago for several months before it returned overseas.

The plaintiffs, the heirs of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, sued Sompo Holdings, Inc.; Sompo International Holdings Ltd.; Sompo Japan Insurance, Inc.; and Sompo Fine Art Foundation, seeking recovery of Sunflowers (or the current fair value of the painting), damages, and injunctive relief. They brought various state law claims, as well as unjust enrichment and restitution claims under the federal common law and ostensibly pursuant to the district court’s plenary equitable authority under Article III, §2 of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs asserted their claims were timely under the 2016 HEAR Act, which preempted state and federal statutes of limitations for civil claims to recover Nazi-era artwork, allowing the plaintiffs to file suit within six years of discovering a certain artwork and their possessory interest therein. 160 F.4th at 821. As stated above, however, the 2016 HEAR Act did not supply a standalone private cause of action.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, and the district court granted the motion. The district court found no federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal claims on the grounds that no such claims existed under the federal common law, absent any conflict between federal policy and Illinois state law. 160 F.4th at 822. It also noted that the court’s plenary equitable authority was an insufficient basis to hear claims that otherwise do not arise under federal law or diversity jurisdiction. Id. Regarding the state claims, the district court held that while the 2016 HEAR Act’s extension of state limitation periods was sufficient to vest the court with federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the court still lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 160 F.4th at 823.

The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the dismissal of the federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the dismissal of the state claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs also argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to permit them the opportunity to file a second amended complaint. Id.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. As to the federal claims, the plaintiffs argued that since the 2016 HEAR Act did not explicitly deprive the court of its equitable authority and did not create a discreet statutory remedy, the court maintained such authority and could therefore consider unjust enrichment and restitution remedies. Id. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, instead pointing to the explicit language of the 2016 HEAR Act, which stated: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create a civil claim or cause of action under Federal or State law.” 2016 HEAR Act §5(f). Pursuant to this text, the court found no “implied” federal cause of action and, therefore, no implied remedy. 160 F.4th at 823 – 824.

The plaintiffs also argued that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the restitution and unjust enrichment claims under the federal common law because the 2016 HEAR Act implicated U.S. foreign policy. The Seventh Circuit held that, while U.S. foreign policy supports restitution of Nazi-looted art between private parties, the plaintiffs failed to establish a conflict between state law causes of action and U.S. foreign policy, as required for the application of federal common law. 160 F.4th at 824 – 825. Based on the above, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed the federal claims for lack of federal question jurisdiction. 160 F.4th at 826.

As to the state claims, the Seventh Circuit agreed that there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The plaintiffs argued that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by an Illinois court was appropriate because the defendants displayed Sunflowers at the Art Institute of Chicago, they used Sunflowers to market their business in Illinois, and the painting was integral to the defendants marketing practices. 160 F.4th at 829. The court considered this jurisdictional interpretation to be far too broad. It explained that while, for example, the defendants had a subsidiary that sold insurance in Illinois, such activity did not give the defendant sufficient notice of a potential lawsuit related to Sunflowers, a painting purchased by its parent company in Europe and typically displayed in Japan. Id. The court also held that the exhibition in Chicago did not constitute an injury to the plaintiffs; rather, the true injury — i.e., the sale of the artwork — occurred in various European countries, not Illinois. Consequently, none of the plaintiffs’ claims “ar[ose] out of or relate[d] to” the exhibition in Illinois. 160 F.4th at 830. In light of these jurisdictional deficiencies, the court chose to forgo further jurisdictional analysis.

For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding no federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal claims and no personal jurisdiction over the defendants regarding the state claims.

Schoeps has significant implications for restitution claims related to the recovery of Nazi-era artwork. The Seventh Circuit essentially affirmed that courts do not have jurisdiction to hear such restitution claims under the 2016 HEAR Act, at least not without a separate basis of authority — and such authority cannot be found in federal common law. This decision narrows the jurisdictional viability of such restitution claims and is likely to discourage similar claims in this circuit. And, it goes without saying, Schoeps strongly undermines the plain congressional intent behind the 2016 HEAR Act.

Subsequent to this Seventh Circuit decision, Congress — in a show of bipartisanship — passed the 2025 HEAR Act, which expressly provides:

The intent of this Act is to permit claims to recover Nazi-looted art to be brought, notwithstanding the passage of time since World War II. Some courts have frustrated the intent of this Act by dismissing recovery lawsuits in reliance on defenses based on the passage of time, such as laches (for example, Zuckerman v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2019)) or adverse possession, acquisitive prescription, or usucapion (for example, Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation, 89 F.4th 1226 (9th Cir. 2024)) or on other non-merits discretionary defenses, such as the act of state doctrine (for example, Von Saher v Norton Simon Museum, 897 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018)), forum non-conveniens, international comity, or prudential exhaustion. In order to effectuate the purpose of the Act to permit claims to recover Nazi-looted art to be resolved on the merits, these defenses must be precluded. 2025 HEAR Act, §2(a)(1)(B).

Whether the 2025 HEAR Act will have greater success in the courts than its 2016 counterpart remains to be seen. Congress’ acknowledgment of the inconsistencies between the intent of the 2016 HEAR Act and its practical application in the courts may win the U.S. Supreme Court’s attention, especially if subsequent decisions by other circuits conflict with Schoeps. In any case, until then, the practical effects of the 2025 HEAR Act remain subject to a circuit split.

For more information about civil law, see Civil Appeals: State and Federal (IICLE®, 2025). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Hal R. Morris, Saul Ewing LLP, Chicago

Hal R. Morris is a Partner and General Counsel at Saul Ewing LLP, in Chicago, where he concentrates his practice in appellate, litigation, and legal ethics. Morris is on the ARDC Hearing Panel and an instructor at the University of Chicago Law School. He has also been the recipient of the Litigation Award from the Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association. Morris earned his B.A. from the University of Chicago, his M.B.A. from the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, and his J.D. with highest honors from Chicago-Kent College of Law.

Megan Warshawsky, Saul Ewing LLP, Chicago

Megan Warshawsky is an associate at Saul Ewing LLP, in Chicago, and concentrates her practice on complex commercial litigation. Warshawsky is a member of the American Bar Association and is admitted to the Bar in Illinois and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. She received her J.D. magna cum laude from Chicago-Kent College of Law and her B.A. from Tufts University.

The First District Appellate Court reversed a trial court’s ruling in People v. Zanio, 2025 IL App (1st) 241643, in which the defendant was acquitted of battery but found guilty of the uncharged offense of disorderly conduct in connection with groping a minor student at the school where he was a teacher.

The defendant in Zanio was charged with battery for allegedly touching the breast of a 12-year-old student at school. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶4. As the only witness during the bench trial, the minor student testified that the defendant put a stack of papers against her chest and grabbed her breast with his other hand. The student’s Child Advocacy Center interview about the incident was published at trial. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶¶6 – 7.

The trial court found the student’s testimony credible and characterized the conduct of the 83-year-old defendant as “insulting, alarming, unreasonable, disturbing, threatening, [and] abusive.” 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶9. However, the trial court did not feel his conduct amounted to battery and instead found him guilty of disorderly conduct, an uncharged offense. Id.

The appellate court noted that defendants generally cannot be convicted of uncharged offenses because they have a due process right to notice of the crimes charged. However, an exception to that rule is if the uncharged offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense and the evidence at trial rationally supports a conviction on the lesser included offense and an acquittal on the greater offense. The court found the defendant’s conviction did not fit that exception. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶14.

The appellate court stated that a lesser included offense is proved by the same or less than all the facts, a less culpable mental state, or both, as is required to prove the charged offense. Under the “charging instrument approach,” if the charging instrument “contain[s] a broad foundation or main outline of the lesser offense,” then the lesser offense is included in the charged offense. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶¶16 – 17, quoting People v. Clark, 2016 IL 118845, ¶31, 50 N.E.3d 1120, 401 Ill.Dec. 638. The charging instrument does not have to explicitly state all the elements of the lesser offense but must broadly describe the conduct needed to commit the lesser offense, and it must be possible to reasonably infer any missing element from the factual allegations. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶17.

The appellate court wrangled with whether the defendant’s conduct provoked “a breach of the peace,” which is an element of disorderly conduct. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶¶19 – 20. The complaint stated that the defendant was a teacher who grabbed the breast of the student over her clothing, that the student was under the age of 13, and that this occurred at school. The court decided that the defendant was not put on notice that the conduct in the complaint could constitute disorderly conduct, in part because it was brief, isolated conduct that was not an overt threat amounting to a breach of the peace. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶¶21, 24.

The appellate court ultimately criticized the trial court for acquitting the defendant of battery when the student’s testimony was uncontradicted, she was found to be credible, and there was no dispute that the defendant made insulting or provoking contact with her. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶35. While the appellate court understood that the trial court wanted to “give [the defendant] the benefit of some grace regarding his conduct,” it found the circumstances did not allow him to be convicted of an uncharged offense and reversed the trial court’s judgment. 2025 IL App (1st) 241643 at ¶37.

For more information about criminal law, see CRIMINAL RECORDS: EXPUNGEMENT AND OTHER RELIEF (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Matthew R. Leisten, Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office, Oregon, IL

Matthew R. Leisten serves as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for the Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office in Oregon, Illinois. In his role, he provides essential updates on caselaw relevant to search warrants, focusing on issues such as good faith, staleness, and the impact of modern technology on legal procedures. His experience includes handling complex warrants involving advanced technologies like geofences and Triggerfish. Additionally, Leisten contributes to legal education through publications and presentations, ensuring that attorneys stay informed about current legal trends and practices.

In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2025 IL App (2d) 240028, a postjudgment action, a father filed a petition for increased parenting time only (not a change in decision-making), based on certain changes, including the children’s increased ages and his transition to full-time remote work. At the end of a lengthy multi-day hearing, the mother moved for a directed finding, arguing that the father had not proven a substantial change in circumstances; the trial court granted the mother’s finding. The Second District vacated and remanded the matter, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard under §610.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA), 750 ILCS 5/610.5. When a party seeks only a modification of parenting time, IMDMA §610.5(a), which references a change in circumstances standard applies, not IMDMA §610.5(c), which references a substantial change in circumstances. The father needed to show only changed circumstances to move to the next question, which was whether a modification was in the best interest of the children. 2025 IL App (2d) 240028 at ¶33. In its ruling the court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the plain language of §§610.5(a) and 610.5(c) and concluded that the statute’s language was not ambiguous and that the legislature intended to have different standards when modifying only parenting time separate and apart when a party requests a modification of decision-making or both parenting time and decision-making. 2025 IL App (2d) 240028 at ¶87. The court relied on the reasoning in In re Marriage of Salbi, 2024 IL App (2d) 240322-U and rejected the analysis in In re Marriage of Trapkus, 2022 IL App (3d) 190631, ¶87, 207 N.E.3d 1043, 462 Ill.Dec. 740. The court also cited to the 2017 amendments to the IMDMA, which included the following sentence in §610.5(a): “Parenting time may be modified at any time, without a showing of serious endangerment, upon a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the best interests of the child.” 2025 IL App (2d) 240028 at ¶102. Justic Birkett issued a lengthy dissenting opinion.

Investigators Performing Investigative Work on Behalf of Attorneys Are Entitled to the Same Absolute Litigation Privilege Afforded Attorneys

In a case of first impression, a target of a private investigation (an alleged paramour) filed a tort claim against a divorce litigant and a private detective hired by the divorce litigant’s counsel. Lewis v. Kalbhen, 2025 IL App (1st) 242110. The claim was a three-count petition filed under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq., alleging unauthorized intrusion into her private affairs, public disclosure of private facts with the intention of causing severe emotional distress, and violation of the DPPA when the investigator ran a check on her license plate and disclosed private information contained in her motor vehicle records. 2025 IL App (1st) 242110 at ¶2. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the target appealed. The appellate court held that the absolute litigation privilege extended to the private investigator hired by the divorce litigant’s counsel. During the divorce case, the wife’s counsel directed an investigative firm to run a license-plate check on a vehicle suspected to belong to the husband’s girlfriend and then to prepare a background report to investigate a potential dissipation of assets claim. The report included identifying information that could be used to facilitate subpoenas and additional discovery. 2025 IL App (1st) 242110 at ¶9. The litigation privilege extended beyond counsel and parties to investigators acting as agents of counsel, even absent a written engagement or payment, as long as the communications and conduct are pertinent to proposed or pending litigation.

Postjudgment Child Support Modification Upheld Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

In re Parentage of Jade J., 2025 IL App (1st) 241803, was a parentage action in which neither the mother or the father resided in Illinois at the time of the entry of the original order for support or during the subsequent modification proceedings including the appeal. At issue in the case was the interpretation of what constitutes “consent” to Illinois modifying a support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 750 ILCS 22/101, et seq. The original support order was entered well after the birth of the child in Harvey, Illinois, in 2005. The mother initiated the proceedings in 2009, and a support order was entered in 2012. In 2015, the father filed a petition to modify support and determine arrears, alleging he had no income. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶4. In December 2015, the court held a hearing and issued three orders: (1) allowing a lawyer for the mother to file an appearance, granting the mother time to file responses to certain motions, a discovery timeline, and set a file hearing for a date in March 2016; (2) temporarily reducing the father’s child support; and (3) a uniform order for support in which the court found it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶5. The lawyer for the mother never filed an appearance, and the case proceeded for two years with several continuances in which neither the mother or a lawyer on the mother’s behalf appeared. In 2017, the trial court issued a permanent order for support in the amount of $265 per month. In 2023, six years after the final modification order and after the minor child’s emancipation, the mother filed a motion under §2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, seeking to vacate the 2017 order on the grounds the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order and that the mother did not receive any notice of any of the hearing and, therefore, did not consent to its entry. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶8. The father filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied the mother’s motion to vacate. The mother appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. Section 205 of the UIFSA, 750 ILCS 22-205, states that if Illinois is not the residence of the obligor, the oblige, or the child, the parties need to consent in the record or in open court that Illinois may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its original support order. The court rejected the mother’s attempt to collaterally attack the order years later via §2-1401, emphasizing that consent to jurisdiction under the UIFSA is sufficient to confer continuing authority to modify child support even when Illinois is no longer the parties’ home state. The mother’s attorney appeared at a 2015 modification hearing, did not object to jurisdiction, allowed the court to enter substantive temporary support orders, received and accepted reduced support for years, and later withdrew her argument challenging personal jurisdiction during the appeal process. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶24. Collectively, these actions reinforced the conclusion that she consented to the entry of the order under §205(a)(2) of the UIFSA. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶26. Justice Howse issued a dissenting opinion.

For more information about family law, see ADOPTION LAW (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Michelle A. Lawless, Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago

Michelle A. Lawless, founder of The Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, has over 20 years of experience in family law. After a distinguished career at a prestigious litigation firm, she started her own practice to offer a more compassionate and resolution-focused approach. Michelle specializes in collaborative law, mediation, and attorney-assisted mediation, helping clients navigate family disputes with minimal conflict. She is recognized for her thought leadership, extensive financial experience, and dedication to creating better outcomes for families.

Facts

In 2004, the Village of Winfield (Village) established a tax increment financing district (TIF 1) pursuant to the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (TIF Act), 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-1, et seq. Board of Education of Winfield School District 34 v. Village of Winfield, 2026 IL App (3d) 250182, ¶4. TIF 1 was established for a 23-year term and is scheduled to expire in 2027. Id.

In 2021, the Village began the process of establishing a second TIF district (TIF 2). Id. Because the Village sought to have certain parcels located in TIF 1 included in the TIF 2 district, it underwent a “de-TIF, re-TIF” process, whereby it removed the subject parcels from TIF 1 before creating TIF 2. Id.

Prior to the establishment of TIF 2, the Village also entered into a development agreement with a hospital that owned property within the area that would later be designated as part of the TIF. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶32. The development agreement was entered into 14-months prior to the creation of TIF 2 and contained a provision that the Village may “seek to extend the duration of the existing TIF District or any portion thereof in a manner solely with the discretion of the Village and as authorized by the TIF Act, including the ‘de-TIF — re-TIF process.” 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶33.

As part of its establishment of TIF 2, the Village made all required findings under the TIF Act. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶5. These findings included the determination that the proposed TIF qualified as a conservation area, that the parcels within the TIF met the TIF Act’s contiguity requirements, and that development of the area would not occur “but for” the creation of the TIF. Id. The TIF eligibility report also concluded that the area was TIF eligible due to “(1) lack of community planning, (2) deleterious land use/layout, (3) declining/lagging equalized assessed value . . . , (4) deterioration, and (5) obsolescence.” Id. This exceeded the TIF Act’s three-factor minimum required to declare a conservation area.

Following the Village’s establishment of TIF 2, Winfield School District #34 and the Board of Education of Community High School District #94 (collectively, “the Districts”) filed suit against the Village challenging the validity of TIF 2. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶9. Specifically, the Districts asserted that the Village’s removal of parcels from TIF 1 and subsequent placement into TIF 2 was an impermissible attempt at circumventing the TIF Act’s 23-year limit on TIF districts. Id. The Districts also challenged the Village’s findings related to TIF 2’s establishment criteria, arguing that TIF 2 failed the TIF Act’s “but-for” test, did not meet contiguity requirements, and was improperly designated as a conservation area for not meeting the statutory criteria. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶11.

Circuit Court

The Village filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that the TIF Act did not contain any prohibition or limitation on removing parcels from one TIF district and placing them into another 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶10. The circuit court agreed with the Village and granted partial summary judgment on the issue. Id.

Following discovery on the remaining counts, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶11. The circuit court granted the Village’s motion for summary judgment, finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and confirming that the Village had sufficiently demonstrated that it had met all of the TIF Act’s requirements when establishing TIF 2. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶¶11 – 13. The Districts appealed the circuit court’s determination.

Appellate Court

The appellate court’s review of the circuit court’s judgment was two-fold. First, it was charged with determining whether the Circuit Court erred in determining that no material issues of fact existed. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶27. Second, if no genuine issue of material fact existed, the appellate court was then charged with determining whether the judgment in favor of the Village was correct. Id. The appellate court proceeded by addressing each of the Districts’ arguments in turn.

“But-For” Test

Under the TIF Act, a municipality must demonstrate that the property located within the TIF district “would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed without the adoption of a redevelopment plan” (i.e., the property would not develop but for the creation of the TIF district). 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶30. The Districts argued that TIF 2 did not satisfy the statute’s “but-for” test because the parcels in TIF 2 already had private development interest that predated the establishment of TIF 2. Id. In support of this claim, the Districts noted that the Village had previously entered into a development agreement with an entity owning 34 of the 51 parcels located within TIF 2 and that at least 12 permits had been issued on those parcels prior to the creation of TIF 2. Id. The Village asserted that both the development agreement and the creation of the TIF district were necessary components for the redevelopment of those parcels.

The appellate court agreed with the circuit court, noting that even though the development agreement predated the creation of TIF 2, it was inextricably related to the creation of TIF 2 and the entity’s anticipated availability of TIF funds. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶33. The appellate court also rejected the Districts’ argument that TIF 2 was created “solely for the purpose of obtaining funds for a new village hall,” further noting that the Districts did not provide any authority supporting the proposition that secondary benefits to a public entity negated the validity of a TIF District. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶38. In addition, the appellate court rejected the Districts’ attempt at invalidating TIF 2 based upon its inclusion of publicly owned property, asserting that even had the issue been properly raised, the relevant inquiry required consideration of the redevelopment area as a whole, rather than an examination of individual parcels within the district. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶36.

Contiguity

The appellate court next addressed the Districts’ argument that TIF 2 did not meet the TIF Act’s contiguity requirements because 11 of the 51 parcels constating largely of landscaped greens, were included for the “sole purpose of achieving contiguity,” and would not otherwise benefit the TIF District. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶40. The Districts maintained that the TIF Act required everyparcel within the TIF to substantially benefit from the creation of the TIF. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶42. The Village refuted this assertion, stating that the proposed improvement must substantially benefit the TIF District as a whole and that the TIF Act did not require that a municipality demonstrate a benefit to each individual parcel. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶43. The appellate court agreed with the Village and affirmed the circuit court’s finding on this issue.

Conservation Area and Vacant Land

The Districts also asserted that TIF 2 was improperly designated as a conservation area due to the fact that 42 of the 51 parcels located within its boundaries were vacant and therefore, could not legally qualify as an “improved area” under the TIF Act. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶47. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting that the TIF Act differentiated only between “vacant” and “improved” areas when seeking a designation of “blight” and that the same differentiation did not apply to conservation areas under a plain reading of the statute. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶¶48 – 49.

Conservation Area and Eligibility Factors

The Districts further challenged the Village’s application of the TIF Act’s eligibility factors, arguing that genuine issues of material fact remained with regard to the Village’s eligibility findings. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶51. The appellate court disagreed with the Districts, noting that under the TIF Act, a conservation area was required to satisfy only 3 of the 13 enumerated eligibility criterion. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶52. While the Village’s findings asserted that TIF 2 satisfied 5 of the 13 factors, the circuit court disagreed and found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 2 of the factors. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶53. However, because the circuit court believed that the Village had met its burden with regard to 3 of the factors, it found that the criteria for establishing a conservation area was satisfied. Id. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s determination and held that the Village made sufficient findings regarding the designation of TIF 2 as a conservation area. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶61.

Forming TIF 2 with TIF 1 Parcels

Finally, the Districts argued that the transfer of parcels from TIF 1 into TIF 2 circumvented the 23-year statutory limitation on the term of the TIF. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶63. The Village refuted the Districts’ characterization and clarified that the parcels were not transferred directly from one TIF into to another but, rather, were removed from one TIF and subsequently placed in a different TIF, each of which had independently qualified under the TIF Act. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶63. The appellate court noted that nothing in the TIF Act expressly prohibited parcels that had once been in one TIF district from being placed into another TIF district as long as the requisite statutory requirements were followed. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶65. The appellate court also noted that even following TIF 2’s inception, TIF 1 continued to exist separate and apart from TIF 2. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court and declined to find that the creation of TIF 2 was an improper extension of the life of the TIF. 2026 IL App (3d) 250182 at ¶67.

For more information about government law, see SUNSHINE LAWS (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Laura M. Julien, Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C., Sugar Grove

Laura M. Julien is a partner with Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C. in Sugar Grove, Illinois, where she concentrates her practice in municipal law, school law, corporate law, and real estate matters. She is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, Kane County Bar Association, State Bar of Wisconsin, National Council of School Attorneys, Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association, and Illinois Council of School Attorneys. She is also a recurrent presenter with the National Business Institute. Laura earned her undergraduate, with honors, from the University of Wisconsin and her J.D. degree from the University of Notre Dame Law School.

Excerpted from §§4.94 – 4.96 of Jennifer C. Waryjas, Ch. 4, Other Illinois Department of Revenue Taxes, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION (IICLE®, 2026)

Cannabis Cultivation Privilege Tax

Effective September 1, 2019, the Cannabis Cultivation Privilege Tax Law, 410 ILCS 705/60 1, et seq., imposed a 7-percent tax imposed on the gross receipts of cannabis cultivation. 410 ILCS 705/60-10(a). The Illinois Department of Revenue may determine the selling price when the seller and purchaser are affiliated, when the sale and purchase is not an arm’s-length transaction, or when cannabis is transferred by a craft grower to the craft grower’s dispensing organization, infuser, or processing organization and the value is not established. Id. The Department’s value will be “commensurate with the actual price received for products of like quality, character, and use in the area.” Id. If there are no comparables, the Department is authorized by the statute to establish a reasonable value of comparable products. Id.

The cannabis cultivation privilege tax is solely the responsibility of the cultivator who makes the first sale, not the subsequent purchaser, dispensing organization, or an infuser. 410 ILCS 705/60-10(b). This tax is in addition to all other occupation, privilege, or excise taxes. 410 ILCS 705/60-10(c). The Department may require a cultivator to combine this tax return with the tax return under the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act. 86 Ill.Admin. Code §429.125(b).

Cannabis Purchaser Excise Tax

The Cannabis Purchaser Excise Tax Law, 410 ILCS 705/65-1, et seq., is imposed on purchasers at the following rates:

1. Any cannabis, other than a cannabis-infused product, with an adjusted delta-9-THC level (see definition in §4.95 above) at or below 35 percent is taxed at 10 percent of the purchase price.

2. Any cannabis, other than a cannabis-infused product, with an adjusted delta-9-THC level above 35 percent is taxed at a rate of 25 percent of the purchase price; and

3. Any cannabis-infused product is taxed at a rate of 20 percent of the purchase price. 410 ILCS 705/65-10.

Cannabis-infused products do not include cannabis concentrates, so cannabis concentrates shall not be taxed at the 20-percent rate on the purchase price. 86 Ill.Admin. Code §423.105. Instead, tax is based on the adjusted THC level of the cannabis concentrate. Id. Vape products should be taxed based on the percentage of THC in the solution of the device.

In addition, state and local sales taxes apply to cannabis, so taxpayers must look to location-specific sales tax rates for medical and recreational use cannabis. The County Cannabis Retailers’ Occupation Tax Law, 55 ILCS 5/5-1006.8, is a prime example. This law allows corporate authorities in any county to impose a tax on the business of selling cannabis, excluding medical cannabis, at retail in the county. 55 ILCS 5/5-1006.8(a). The tax rate may not exceed 3.75 percent of the gross receipts of sales made in the county and 3 percent of the gross receipts made in a municipality in the county. Id.

Cannabis Retailers

Cannabis retailers are required to apply for a certificate of registration from the Illinois Department of Revenue. 410 ILCS 705/65-20. Cannabis retailers collect and remit tax on the sales of cannabis. 410 ILCS 705/65-25. If the purchaser is not a cardholder under the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Program Act, the purchaser is presumed to be subject to tax collection as set forth above. 410 ILCS 705/65-15(a). If a cannabis retailer over-collects the tax, the purchaser has a legal right to claim a refund for overpayment. 410 ILCS 705/65-15(b). However, if the retailer does not refund the amount to the purchaser, the retailer is liable to pay the over-collection to the Department. Id.

Retailers are required to file monthly returns on or before the 20th day of the month for the preceding calendar month. 410 ILCS 705/65-30. The return must list

1. the cannabis retailer’s name;

2. the address of the retailer’s principal place of business and, if applicable, principal place of business from which the cannabis retailer engaged in the business of selling cannabis subject to tax;

3. the total purchase price received by the cannabis retailer for cannabis subject to tax under the Cannabis Purchaser Excise Tax Law;

4. the amount of tax due at each rate;

5. the signature of the cannabis retailer; and

6. any other information as the Department may require. Id.

Returns are required to be filed electronically unless a retailer can demonstrate a hardship in paying electronically. The Department may waive the electronic payment requirement if sufficient evidence is shown. Id. Cannabis retailers can take a discount of 1.75 percent on timely filed returns, not to exceed $1,000 per return, to reimburse the retailer for the expenses incurred in keeping records, collecting tax, preparing and filing returns, remitting the tax, and supplying data to the Department. Id.

Further, cannabis retailers are required to make estimated payments throughout the month (on the 7th, 15th, 22nd, and last day of the month) during which the tax liability is incurred. Id. The payments must be at least the lower of 22.5 percent of the cannabis retailer’s actual tax liability for the month or 25 percent of the cannabis retailer’s actual tax liability for the same calendar month in the previous year. Id. The amount of the quarter-monthly payments are credited against the final tax liability of the cannabis retailer’s returns for that month, and if the quarter-monthly payment is not made, then the cannabis retailer is liable for penalties and interest on the difference between the minimum payment due and the quarter-monthly payment actually made. Id. Conversely, if the quarter-monthly payment exceeds the liabilities, the taxpayer can request the Department issue a credit memorandum within 30 days of payment. Id. The taxpayer may assign this credit to a similar taxpayer, but if the taxpayer retains the credit, they may apply the credit against future tax liability. Id. If the Department subsequently determines the credit was not due, then the taxpayer is liable for penalties and interest on the difference. Id.

If a cannabis retailer sells for one price cannabis products bundled with items that are not taxable under the cannabis purchaser excise tax, the tax is imposed on the entire purchase price of the bundled transaction. 410 ILCS 705/65-11.

Jennifer C. Waryjas

Jennifer C. Waryjas is Of Counsel at Jones Day, in Chicago, where she focuses her practice on state and local tax and unclaimed property. She is a Past President and Secretary of the Unclaimed Property Professionals Organization. She is also the Income Tax Co-Chair for the Institute for Professionals in Tax Annual Conference and a former Chair of the Income Tax Symposium. Waryjas received her BA from Illinois Wesleyan University and her JD from the University of Illinois College of Law.

The claimant in Aim National Lease v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U, ¶8, worked as a rental representative conducting “360 inspections” of trucks, which required walking around and climbing in and out of vehicles. On August 13, 2019, she tripped over a parking block during an inspection and fell, testifying that she felt throbbing pain in her left lower leg and shooting pain from her heel to her toes. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶9.

She was treated at Working Well Occupational Health, diagnosed with contusions and left foot and ankle sprains, and placed on light-duty restrictions. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶10. Although X-rays showed no fractures, she continued to experience swelling, antalgic gait, and pain and was referred to physical therapy. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶11.

Beginning in September 2019, Dr. James Hong, a podiatrist, treated her for persistent ankle pain, numbness, and tingling, diagnosing ankle sprain and neuritis, and prescribed therapy, medication, injections, and work restrictions. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶12 – 14. At subsequent visits in September and October 2019, the claimant continued to report sharp, shooting pain and neuritis-type symptoms, though some improvement was noted with gabapentin and therapy. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶13 – 14. Dr. Hong administered a steroid injection, adjusted medications, and maintained work restrictions while documenting ongoing nerve pain and reduced range of motion. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶14.

From October 24 through October 28, 2019, the claimant participated in a 30-mile cancer walk where participants had to walk 10 miles a day. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶18. The claimant testified that she did some walking during the event but spent most of the weekend riding around in a golf cart. Id.

On October 29, 2019, the claimant went to a physical therapy appointment and reported that she was slightly worse than the week prior due to being out of town but she felt 76-to-80-percent better and some improvements. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶19. The following therapy visit on October 30, 2019, she again noticed increased pain in the left heel since the weekend but also showed progress with strength, range of motion, flexibility, and function. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶20.

On November 21, 2019, the claimant followed up with Dr. Hong and complained of numbness, tingling, and shooting pain radiating from her ankle to her toes and calf. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶21. Dr. Hong’s examination revealed positive Tinel’s and Valleix’s signs in the tarsal tunnel, and he diagnosed neuritis/neuropraxia, left foot sprain, and possible plantar fasciitis. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶22 – 23. Because her symptoms were worsening and appeared structural, he ordered MRIs, increased medication, and modified restrictions. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶23.

MRIs of the left ankle were taken on December 14, 2019, and interpreted as largely negative, showing normal ligaments and tendons with only minor findings such as mild arthritis in the first MTP joint. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶24.

At the employer’s request, the claimant underwent an independent medical exam (IME) on December 18, 2019, with orthopedic surgeon Dr. Kamran Hamid. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶25. He diagnosed ankle sprain and instability related to the work accident and suggested the claimant may have had complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) or sympathetic mediated pain, though evaluation was complicated by medication use. Id. Dr. Hamid considered prior treatment reasonable, found that the claimant was not at maximum medical improvement (MMI), and recommended further MRI imaging due to poor quality of the December 14 images. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶26.

On December 19, 2019, Dr. Hong expressed concern about early CRPS and referred the claimant for pain management, recommending possible dorsal root ganglion (DRG) treatment while maintaining work restrictions and agreed with new MRI imaging. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶27.

Additional MRIs of the left tibia/fibula, left ankle, and foot in January 2020 showed mild edema, fluid, and bursitis but no major abnormalities. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶28. Dr. Hong continued to suspect early CRPS and recommended pain management due to persistent nerve pain and limited relief from medication. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶29 – 30.

In contrast, Dr. Kenneth Candido, who conducted an IME on January 28, 2020, opined that the claimant did not have CRPS but instead had tarsal tunnel syndrome and that she could return to full-duty work without restrictions. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶31. Based on his opinion, the employer denied further pain management treatment. Id.

With the employer’s consent, the claimant started treatment with Dr. Hamid in March 2020. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶32. He expressed concern of CRPS versus sympathetic mediated nerve pain and recommended pain clinic consultation, which the employer refused to approve. Id.

In April 2020, during a telemedicine visit with Dr. Hamid, claimant reported an increase in nerve pain. He reviewed the January 2020 MRIs as showing ligament tears and recommended surgical reconstruction but cautioned that pain management was necessary first due to likely CRPS exacerbation. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶33.

A third IME was performed by orthopedic foot specialist, Dr. Anand Vora, in May 2020. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶34. He found no instability or CRPS and concluded the claimant had reached MMI with only a resolved contusion, releasing her to full duty without further treatment. Id. Dr. Vora questioned the claimant’s reported symptoms based in part on records referencing her participation in the cancer walk in October 2019. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶35.

Meanwhile, the claimant began treatment with pain specialist Dr. Thomas Pontinen, who disagreed with the tarsal tunnel diagnosis and supported a diagnosis of CRPS based on symptom distribution and examination findings. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶36. After a lumbar sympathetic block in May 2020 resulted in approximately 90-percent pain relief, Dr. Pontinen concluded that the improvement strongly supported CRPS rather than tarsal tunnel syndrome. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶38.

The employer scheduled claimant for a reexamination with Dr. Candido in June 2020 that the claimant refused to attend. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶37. A meeting was held by the parties with the arbitrator, and, according to the employer, the arbitrator opined during that meeting that the IME should not proceed. Id.

Dr. Candido performed a record review in August 2020 and opined that claimant had sustained a neuropraxia of the posterior tibial nerve. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶39.

Dr. Hamid maintained his CRPS diagnosis and recommendation for surgery after pain control. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶40. Throughout 2020 and 2021, the claimant, under Dr. Pontinen’s care, continued lumbar sympathetic blocks with temporary relief. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶41.

In April 2021, Dr. Candido reaffirmed his view that no CRPS was present and that no further treatment or restrictions were necessary upon an updated examination and reviewing surveillance video. Id.

In January 2022, Dr. Matthew Jaycox, a pain management specialist who agreed with the CRPS diagnosis and noted that although an anterior talofibular tear had been confirmed, surgery was not feasible due to CRPS. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶42. He recommended neuromodulation treatment and referred the claimant to Dr. William Landphair to consider a DRG stimulator. Id. After consultation, the claimant proceeded with a DRG trial in March 2022. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶43.

The claimant reported greater than 80-percent pain relief following the trial and elected to proceed with permanent implantation. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶44. The permanent DRG was implanted on March 23, 2022, and subsequent follow-ups documented 90-percent or greater relief, decreased swelling, and significant functional improvement. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶45. By August 29, 2022, her pain had decreased to two out of ten, she was active with walking and swimming, and she continued to report substantial improvement. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶46.

The arbitrator found that the conditional ill-being was related and awarded medical expenses and prospective medical treatment. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶3. The employer appealed the decision to the Commission. The Commission denied some medical bills due to no evidence of supporting medical records. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶4. They affirmed the arbitrator’s denial to admit certain documents offered by the employer and denying a fourth IME. Id. The Circuit Court of Cook County subsequently affirmed the decision on appeal. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶5.

At trial, Arbitrator Amarillo found that the claimant proved her left foot and ankle condition was causally related to the August 13, 2019, work accident and credited the opinions of her treating physicians, concluding that the DRG implant’s success supported causation and the necessity of treatment. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶47. The arbitrator also found the claimant’s testimony credible and supported by objective findings, rejecting any suggestion that she was exaggerating her symptoms. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶48.

The arbitrator determined that the opinions of Dr. Candido and Dr. Vora were not credible or persuasive, noting inconsistencies with the medical evidence and treating physicians’ findings. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶49 – 50. The arbitrator specifically found Dr. Vora’s malingering theory unsupported, criticized his selective reliance on the record, and remarked negatively on his deposition demeanor. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶50 – 51. The arbitrator further rejected the employer’s experts’ assumption that the claimant had walked 30 miles shortly after cancer surgery. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶52.

The arbitrator held that the claimant’s medical treatment was reasonable and necessary and ordered the employer to pay the submitted medical bills paid by claimant’s private insurer pursuant to §§8(a) and 8.2 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶53. He also ordered the employer to authorize ongoing care, including Lyrica and maintenance of the DRG stimulator, but declined to award penalties or fees. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶54 – 55.

On appeal, the Commission modified the decision by disallowing certain unsubstantiated medical bills but otherwise affirmed, finding the remaining medical expenses reasonable, necessary, and causally related to the accident. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶56. The Commission also ordered payment for prospective care related to the DRG and Lyrica. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶57.

The Commission rejected the employer’s argument that it had been improperly denied a §12 IME, noting the employer had invited the arbitrator’s guidance and that the record did not support a finding of error. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶58 – 59. The Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision in all other respects. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶60.

The employer sought judicial review, and the Circuit Court of Cook County confirmed the Commission’s decision. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶61. The circuit court rejected the employer’s argument that it was not liable for group health insurer-paid “billed charged” on a “subrogation lien statement” because some of the charges were not substantiated by any medical bills from the claimant’s healthcare provider. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶62. The circuit court rejected the employer’s argument that it is liable to pay the lesser of the healthcare provider’s actual charges, the negotiated rate, or the amount identified in the fee schedule provided in §8.2 of the Act, 820 ILCS 305/8.2. Id. The employer maintained that such a determination cannot be made unless the healthcare providers’ bills are produced at the time of trial. Id.

1. Causation and Intervening Injury

The first issue the employer raised was regarding whether the October 2019 breast cancer walk that the claimant participated in was an independent intervening cause breaking the chain of causation.

The court noted that every natural consequence flowing from a work-related injury is compensable unless an independent intervening accident completely breaks the chain of causation between the original injury and the subsequent condition, as recognized in National Freight Industries v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2013 IL App (5th) 120043WC, ¶26, 993 N.E.2d 473, 373 Ill.Dec. 167. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶69. To relieve an employer of liability, the intervening cause must entirely sever the causal connection rather than merely contribute to the claimant’s condition, as explained in Global Products v. Workers’ Compensation Commission, 392 Ill.App.3d 408, 411, 911 N.E.2d 1042, 1046, 331 Ill.Dec. 812 (1st Dist. 2009). Id. A non-work-related accident that only aggravates a weakened condition does not break the causal chain, and other incidents that aggravate the claimant’s condition are legally irrelevant, as held in Teska v. Industrial Commission, 266 Ill.App.3d 740, 640 N.E.2d 1, 3, 203 Ill.Dec. 574 (1st Dist. 1994), and Vogel v. Industrial Commission, 354 Ill.App.3d 780, at 821 N.E.2d 807, 813, 290 Ill.Dec. 495. Id. So long as a “but-for” relationship exists between the original work injury and the subsequent condition, the employer remains liable, consistent with Global Products, supra, 911 N.E.2d at 1046. Id.

The court upheld the Commission’s rejection of the employer’s argument that the claimant’s participation in a breast cancer charity walk constituted an independent, intervening cause of her subsequent left leg, foot, heel, and ankle conditions. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶72. They noted that the Commission found implausible the employer’s assertion that the claimant walked 30 miles one week after major breast cancer surgery, crediting her testimony that she did not complete the full distance and spent most of the event riding in a golf cart due to postoperative pain. Id. Because the Commission found the claimant credible, the court noted it was entitled to rely on her testimony regarding the extent of her activity. Id.

Although the employer pointed to therapy and treatment records reflecting a temporary increase in heel pain and new clinical findings after the event, the court concluded that this evidence did not compel a finding of an independent intervening cause. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶¶73 – 74. The post-event therapy records also documented substantial overall improvement, including increased strength, range of motion, ambulation tolerance, and decreased pain frequency and intensity. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶74.

The court further emphasized that neither the medical records nor expert testimony supported a finding that the charity walk broke the causal chain. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶75. The treating physicians consistently attributed the claimant’s lower extremity conditions, including CRPS, to the August 13, 2019, work accident. Id. The employer’s reliance on testimony that plantar fasciitis could be aggravated by prolonged standing was insufficient. Id.

Even assuming there had been a post-walk aggravation, the court held that such evidence, at most, demonstrated a contributing aggravation of a preexisting work-related injury — not a complete break in causation. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶76. The record contained no medical testimony establishing that walking alone was the sole cause of her disabling conditions. Id. To the contrary, citing Vogel the court held that the evidence supported a “but-for” causal relationship between the original work injury and the claimant’s subsequent condition, and thus the employer failed to establish an independent intervening cause. Id.

2. Medical Bills and Group Health Payments

The most important issue on appeal was regarding the medical bill award by the Commission.

First, the employer argued that the Commission erred in awarding the claimant medical expenses for physical therapy treatments related to her left shoulder. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶78. The employer correctly noted that the claimant’s case involved injuries to her left lower leg, foot, ankle, and heel — not her shoulder. Id. Nevertheless, the Commission awarded payment for several physical therapy sessions in November and December 2019 that appeared to involve shoulder treatment alone. Id. The court agreed that these shoulder-related expenses should not have been awarded. Id.

The employer also argued that the Commission improperly awarded certain medical expenses despite the absence of supporting medical bills in the record. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶79. After the employer refused to pay for pain management treatment following Dr. Candido’s January 2020 IME report, the claimant’s private group health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), began covering those treatments. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶80. The claimant introduced medical bills from her providers and a “Consolidated Statement of Benefits” from BCBS covering medical treatments from January 5, 2021, through November 1, 2022. Id. The employer asserted that BCBS prepared this document in connection with a subrogation lien claim. Id.

The “Consolidated Statement of Benefits” listed total amounts billed for each date of service but did not itemize the specific treatments performed. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶81. The document reflected that BCBS paid a total of $208,342.16 in benefits, including approximately $169,000 to Rush Surgicenter for services on March 23, 2022, approximately $30,000 to Rush Oak Park Hospital for services on March 10, 2022, and payments for anesthesiology services on both dates. Id. After determining that the claimant’s medical expenses were reasonable and necessary, the Commission awarded $204,559.62 — the amount identified in the BCBS statement — minus certain medical bills lacking corresponding treatment records. Id.

The employer contended that this award was improper because the BCBS statement showed only amounts BCBS claimed to have paid for unspecified services and was unsupported by the medical providers’ actual bills. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶83. The employer argued that without the providers’ actual medical bills in evidence, there was a failure of proof and no basis for liability for the bill. Id. The employer further maintained that, even if it were liable for some treatments, the actual bills were necessary to determine the correct amount owed under §8(a) of the Act. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶84. According to the employer, §8(a) requires payment at the lesser of the negotiated rate, the provider’s charge, or the statutory fee schedule rate under §8.2, and such a comparison could not be made without the actual bills. Id.

The court rejected these arguments. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶85. It explained that §8(a) requires payment at the negotiated rate if applicable, or otherwise at the lesser of the provider’s charge or the fee schedule rate. Id. Because BCBS had already paid the providers, the amount BCBS had paid constituted the “negotiated rate” under §8(a), which the employer was required to pay. Id. The court noted that analysis of actual charges versus the fee schedule is only necessary when the medical bills have not yet been paid by a third-party insurer. Id.

However, the court identified a discrepancy between the BCBS “Consolidated Statement of Benefits” and a separate BCBS spreadsheet that itemized charges and payments. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶86. Although both documents reflected the same amounts billed by providers, they listed dramatically different amounts paid by BCBS. Id. For example, while both documents showed Rush Surgicenter billed $169,119.60 on March 23, 2022, the Consolidated Statement recorded a payment of $168,526.34, whereas the spreadsheet listed only $50,059.40 as paid. Id. The Commission did not address this discrepancy, and the claimant did not explain it. Id.

Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the Commission to resolve the discrepancy and determine the actual amount BCBS paid for the services at issue. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶87. The court held that only the amount actually paid by BCBS should be awarded. Id.

3. Arbitrator’s Actions Regarding the Employer’s Fourth IME Request

The employer contended that the arbitrator improperly interfered with its statutory right to obtain a fourth IME on June 23, 2020, by ruling that the examination should not proceed. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶89. The court rejected this argument, noting that the employer itself invited the arbitrator’s involvement by requesting guidance after the claimant refused to attend the scheduled IME. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶90. In an email to the arbitrator, the employer’s counsel expressly asked for a prompt discussion and indicated that “if that is what you decide,” thereby submitting the issue to the arbitrator for determination. Id. Having requested the arbitrator’s opinion, the employer could not later claim error based on that involvement. Id.

The court further observed that no transcript of the discussion existed and as a result, the record did not permit meaningful review of the alleged procedural error. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶91.

The court remanded the case back to the Commission to disallow any charges for treatments to the claimant’s left shoulder and to determine the amount that BCBS paid the claimant’s healthcare providers for medical services relating to the claimant’s work-related injuries, and to award the claimant that amount. 2026 IL App (1st) 250494WC-U at ¶93. The remainder of the Commission was affirmed.

PRACTICE POINTER: Proving and Defending Medical Bills When Group Insurance Has Paid

Ultimately, the significance of this case is the second issue the court addressed on appeal. This case reinforces that in group-health-paid claims, the dispositive figure is the actual negotiated amount paid. Additionally, the record should be clear to either sustain or defeat a medical expense award.

This case underscores the evidentiary and strategic importance of properly substantiating medical expenses when a claimant’s group health insurer has made payments for medical bills. For petitioner’s counsel, reliance on a consolidated insurer statement alone may be insufficient if discrepancies exist between the consolidated statement of benefits reflecting a paid amount and the actual medical bills. Practitioners should ensure the record clearly establishes (1) the services rendered via medical records, (2) medical bills, and (3) the actual amount paid for medical treatment when a group health insurer has made payments.

For respondent’s counsel, it is important to scrutinize the medical bills to the actual medical treatment records for discrepancies to determine what they are obligated to pay under the award. Further, this decision highlights that once a group health insurer has paid medical providers at a negotiated rate, the employer is obligated to pay the actual amount paid for the medical service and not the amount paid listed on the Consolidated Statement of Benefits in the lien itemization. If the medical bills remain unpaid, the fee schedule would apply. Respondent’s counsel should scrutinize the Consolidated Statement of Benefits and the actual medical bill to determine the accurate amount paid. If the petitioner fails to admit this information into evidence, the respondent should present the evidence to determine the actual amount paid and clearly raise the issue to preserve it for review.

For more information about workers’ compensation, see WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE (IICLE^®, 2023). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Kisa P. Sthankiya

Kisa P. Sthankiya is a Partner at Rusin Law, Ltd., specializing in workers' compensation defense. With extensive experience in litigating workers' compensation claims, she has achieved successful outcomes at various court levels. Recognized as an “Emerging Lawyer” and a “Rising Star,” Kisa has also contributed as an educator and author in her field. She holds a B.S. from Northwestern University and a J.D. from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Outside of work, Kisa enjoys fitness, traveling, and reading.

Our March FLASHPOINTS Author Spotlight recognizes Adam C. Toosley, who most recently served as a contributing author of CONSTRUCTION LAW DISPUTES (IICLE^®, 2025).

The IICLE Online Library is “an indispensable part” of Toosley’s legal practice: “Whether I need a quick refresher on a familiar issue or am tackling a subject for the first time, [the Online Library is] always my starting point. [Its] depth, clarity, and practicality make [it] an unmatched research tool for any Illinois practitioner.” Those very qualities are why he has “fully integrated [the IICLE Online Library] into the training of young associates” at his firm. “When an associate is assigned to a matter in an unfamiliar area of law, I consistently recommend the relevant IICLE chapters so they can quickly build a strong foundational understanding through a concise, accessible format.”

In addition to his work on CONSTRUCTION LAW DISPUTES (IICLE^®, 2025), Toosley has also recently served as a contributing author of CAUSES OF ACTION: CONTRACT AND BUSINESS DISPUTES (IICLE^®, 2024), MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: CORRESPONDING ISSUES (IICLE^®, 2024), and REPRESENTING THE PARTIES TO A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT (IICLE^®, 2024). As to why he became an IICLE author, Toosley explained: “Most importantly, I believe strongly in giving back to the profession. I benefited tremendously from exceptional teachers and mentors early in my career, and contributing to IICLE allows me to support and educate the next generation of attorneys. In addition, authoring chapters sharpens my own practice. It forces me to stay current with evolving caselaw and statutes, rather than relying solely on past experience, serving as a valuable reminder that the law is constantly changing. Finally, I genuinely enjoy legal writing beyond traditional pleadings, and my work with IICLE provides a meaningful outlet for that passion.”

Adam C. Toosley is a Partner at Thompson Coburn LLP in Chicago, where he focuses his practice on business litigation. He has been recognized as a Leading Lawyer and a Super Lawyer in both Illinois and Michigan. Toosley received his BA from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and his JD from the University of Illinois College of Law.