July 2025 IICLE FLASHPOINTS

The Third District Appellate Court clarified the long-standing Illinois Rule of Evidence 602 in Capsel v. Burwell,2024 IL App (3d) 230170, 255 N.E.3d 1083, 481 Ill.Dec. 798. The ruling reinforced key principles governing civil litigation, including refresh recollection, the foundation necessary for testimony, and avoiding double hearsay, solidifying important takeaways for civil litigations on witness recollection and hearsay issues.

This matter arises from a July 3, 2016, car accident when Beverly Rodriguez, the plaintiff’s grandmother, was rear-ended by defendant, Rebekah J. Burwell, on Interstate 80. Rodriguez, the plaintiff, and five family members were traveling together when their vehicle was pushed off the highway. The vehicle overturned multiple times, causing the plaintiff to sustain long-term injuries. Trooper Thomas Vodicka arrived on scene and spoke to several of the plaintiff’s family members and the defendant. Afterwards, Trooper Vodicka authored an Illinois Traffic Crash Report. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶¶4 – 7.

Several months later, on November 10, 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligence and submitted multiple motions in limine. One motion sought to bar testimony from Trooper Vodicka regarding an unknown truck that was allegedly driving recklessly on Interstate 80 just before the accident. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that Trooper Vodicka should not testify about the unidentified truck cutting in front of Rodriguez’s vehicle and causing her to brake suddenly, because during his deposition, he could not recall speaking to either party or the sources of information in the crash report. This included Trooper Vodicka’s lack of recollection of any statements about the unidentified truck or who had informed him about it. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶8.

The court partially granted the motion in limine, barring Trooper Vodicka’s testimony about the unknown truck, unless he was later able to recall the relevant events at trial. The court found that without Trooper Vodicka’s recollection, the statements in the report lacked the necessary foundation. During his deposition, Trooper Vodicka testified he did not specifically recall speaking to either party or the substance of any conversations. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶27.

At trial, the only claim was negligence, focused on whether the defendant acted negligently prior to the collision. The defendant asserted affirmative defenses, stating she was driving in the right lane about three to four car lengths behind Rodriguez’s vehicle. The defendant testified that an unknown truck was driving at a high rate of speed, passed her, swerved into her lane, sped ahead, cut in front of Rodriguez’s vehicle, and braked suddenly. The defendant then collided with Rodriguez’s vehicle.2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶10.

The plaintiff called his six family members to testify; all stated they did not see any vehicle driving in front of Rodriguez or observe Rodriguez braking suddenly. Testimony differed on when the plaintiff and his family first saw the defendant, and on whether the defendant gradually drove closer behind Rodriguez’s vehicle before colliding with it two to four times. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶48.

Trooper Vodicka testified that when he arrived on scene, he inspected the vehicles and spoke with some occupants, though he could not exactly recall whom. Further, he testified he authored the crash report within hours of the accident, based on his “firsthand knowledge of [the] statements” made by those involved, and prepared the report while he clearly and accurately remembered his investigation. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶11.

Trooper Vodicka further testified that the statements about the unidentified truck may have come from the defendant rather than the passengers in Rodriguez’s vehicle, as he originally believed. The narrative section of the report stated that the defendant saw Rodriguez brake but did not have enough time to prevent the collision. It was also noted that one occupant of Rodriguez’s vehicle stated that a truck was driving recklessly, cutting in front of Rodriguez, causing her to brake. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶12.

The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the defendant, and the court entered judgment. The plaintiff appealed, arguing among other issues, that the circuit court erred by allowing statements from Trooper Vodicka’s report into evidence. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶22.

The appellate court reasoned that the circuit court’s decision to admit the statements contained in the report was based partly on testimony elicited at trial and the facts of the case, rather than only on evidentiary rules. As a result, the appellate court reviewed the ruling for abuse of discretion, rather than de novo. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶25.

During Trooper Vodicka’s trial testimony, defense counsel recited statements from the report, and the court found that Trooper Vodicka’s memory had been sufficiently refreshed. Trooper Vodicka testified that someone in Rodriguez’s vehicle made the statement about the unidentified truck, though he could not specify who. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶36.

However, the appellate court found that, based on Trooper Vodicka’s own testimony that he could not recall who provided the information, his memory was not sufficiently refreshed regarding relevant facts. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶37.

Although Trooper Vodicka testified about the unidentified truck and its reckless driving, there was nothing in the record to show he had personal, firsthand knowledge. Notably, Trooper Vodicka had not witnessed the collision himself. Instead, the occupant who provided the information to Trooper Vodicka was the one with firsthand knowledge. Using the report to refresh Trooper Vodicka’s recollection did not justify admitting the statements about the unidentified truck, as the report could not substantiate any relevant facts. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶38.

Following Loughnane v City of Chicago, 188 Ill.App.3d 1078, 545 N.E.2d 150, 136 Ill.Dec. 626 (1st Dist. 1989), four prerequisites govern admitting a police report as a past recollection recorded:

1. the witness has no independent recollection of the event;
   
   
2. the report fails to refresh the witness’s recollection;
   
   
3. the report was made at or near the time of the event; and
   
   
4. the truth and accuracy of the report when made is established

Regarding double hearsay, the past recollection recorded exception can apply only if each hearsay level meets an exception to the hearsay rule. Id.

The last prerequisite requires the witness to have firsthand knowledge of the events.

Under Capsel, supra, even after attempts to refresh his memory, Trooper Vodicka could not recall who he spoke with specifically. Although he authored the report several hours after the accident, he lacked firsthand knowledge of the unidentified truck’s existence, as he was not present when the truck was allegedly there. He received the information from an unidentified passenger in a vehicle that had rolled over multiple times in a ditch. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶44

Under the past recollection recorded exception to hearsay, or any hearsay exception, Trooper Vodicka’s testimony lacked foundation regarding the unidentified truck.

The appellate court concluded that although not all evidentiary errors require reversal, this error was not harmless and warranted reversal.

Finding further that the assessment of the truth involving the unidentified truck hinged greatly on which witness the jury decided to believe. Trooper Vodicka’s testimony, specifically that one of the passengers from Rodriguez’s vehicle told him about the unidentified truck, did not permit any opportunity to assess the accuracy of the statement or the underlying facts. Trooper Vodicka could not confirm who made the statement, when it was made, or whether the person actually witnessed the truck. As a result, his testimony served only to bolster the defendant’s theory of the case. The appellate court concluded that Trooper Vodicka’s testimony was so persuasive that it influenced the jury’s decision in favor of the defendant. Without his testimony, the court found, the outcome would likely have been different. 2024 IL App (3d) 230170 at ¶52

Key takeaways for litigators:

1. A document used to refresh recollection does not create personal knowledge. Refreshed recollection cannot bridge gaps in firsthand experience.

2. In Capsel, the court emphasized that both the officer’s report and the underlying statement by an unknown declarant had to satisfy hearsay exceptions. The testimony failed on both levels as Trooper Vodicka could not identify who gave the information about the unidentified truck, or confirm they witnessed the event.

3. The court in Capsel reaffirmed that the past recollection recorded exception requires strict foundational requirements, and a deficiency in any element, particularly regarding the reliability or identity of the source of information, can affect whether the evidence is admissible.

For more information about civil litigation, see CIVIL APPEALS: STATE AND FEDERAL — 2025 EDITION. Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Andrea Fabian-Checkai, Borkan & Scahill, Chicago, IL

Andrea Fabian-Checkai is an associate at Borkan & Scahill, where she focuses on civil litigation with an emphasis on Section 1983 claims, including wrongful convictions, police pursuit, and excessive force cases. As a former Assistant State’s Attorney in Cook County, Andrea handled a range of felony prosecutions, including DNA-based and juvenile matters. Her prosecutorial insight and litigation experience inform her strategic approach to complex civil rights cases. A native Spanish speaker, Andrea emphasizes thoughtful advocacy across communities.

It is axiomatic in condominium law practice that irate unit owners and, sometimes their attorneys, believe that they will punish an association by sending out emails or letters burying an association with document demands accompanied by threats of recovery of attorneys’ fees if the responders do not drop everything to focus on document production. Frequently these requests for documents fail to comply with applicable statutes. Often such requests also include an instruction to “just produce everything electronically to my email.” Such requests explicitly violate the Illinois Condominium Property Act, 765 ILCS 605/1 et seq, (Condo Act). For more complete information on document requests of condominium associations, see IICLE, Condominum Law: Daily Operation Challenges, Representing the Condominium Association (2024 Ed), §§9.31 – 9.34.

Recently, the First District Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of a unit owner’s action for breach of §19 of the Act relating to condominium association records and producing copies of them (Count I) and an action for breach of fiduciary duty on the same basis (Count II). Blue Ocean 21-1, L.L.C. v. Greenway Court Condominium Association, 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶11.

Facts

The case we consider this month has an unusual twist in that the condominium association that prevailed was in default throughout the proceedings and did not file a brief on appeal. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶¶3 – 4. On appeal plaintiff failed to produce any transcripts or a bystanders report. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶4. Plaintiff was a limited liability company which was a unit owner initially requested documents from the association in May 2022. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶9. In its holding, the Appellate Court described the request as “a blunderbuss request rather than one made with ‘particularity’ as the statute requires[.]” 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶1. The manager responded promptly that she would forward the requested information at no cost. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶9. Some information was eventually produced but it appears hardly any of the requested records were produced.

While there were other counts such as defamation, only Counts I and II were appealed by the plaintiff. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶11. In August 2022, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶7. By November 2022, a default order had been entered against the defendant condominium association, manager, management company, association president, and association treasurer. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶18. Initially prove-up was to take place in December 2022, but it was continued to October 2023. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶25. Meanwhile, an amended complaint and motion for prove-up were filed by the plaintiff, in part because the plaintiff had sold the unit in December 2022. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶¶13 – 14.

At prove-up, the trial court denied recovery under Count I relating to production of the association records because the plaintiff failed to show a proper purpose for obtaining the records. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶25. Also, as the fiduciary duty claim in Count II, recovery was denied for the same reason. Id.

Two months after entry of judgment plaintiff moved for leave to file a late notice of appeal which was granted. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶27. Eventually, only plaintiff filed a brief in the Appellate Court with the common law record. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶27.

Analysis

A condominium association may incorporate under the Illinois General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986, 805 ILCS 105/101.01, et seq. (NFP Act). See also 765 ILCS 605/18.1. Even if condominium associations do not incorporate, they have the powers and responsibilities of a NFP corporation under the NFP Act, to the extent the powers and responsibilities are not inconsistent with those in the Condo Act or the condominium instruments. 765 ILCS 605/18.3. In Illinois, condominium associations, like homeowners associations and other common-interest community associations, are almost always incorporated as not-for-profit corporations.

It is also axiomatic of corporate law throughout the United States that access to corporate records requires a “proper purpose.” It is a requirement under both the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983, 805 ILCS 5/7.75(b) and the Illinois General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986, 805 ILCS 105/107.75(a). The latter NFP Act applies to condominium associations. However, in 2018, the Illinois legislature removed the “proper purpose” requirement for access to condominium association records when it amended the Condo Act. The NFP Act was not so amended. This author has not found any precedent in Illinois since the amendments to §19 of the Condo Act as to whether the proper purpose requirement is still applicable (as not being inconsistent) under the NFP Act.

In our instant case, the Appellate Court never addressed any of this history or background relating to the proper purpose requirement. The trial court relied on the “proper purpose” requirement in its rulings. Nor did the Appellate Court address any inter-relationship between the NFP Act and Condo Act. Instead, the Appellate Court noted that it could affirm the trial court’s rulings based upon anything in the record. 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶31. So, it shifted attention to the requirement that a document requester must describe requested documents with particularity.

The Appellate Court based its decision on the scope of requests from the plaintiff. The court began by examining §19 of the Condo Act.

First, subsection (a) of section 19 lists ten broad categories of records that every condo association must “keep and maintain … at the association’s principal office.” 765 ILCS 605/19(a)(1)-(10) (West 2022) (categories). In order to examine or make copies of these records, a member of the association “must submit a written request to the association’s board of managers or its authorized agent, stating with particularity the records sought to examined.” 765 ILCS 605/19(b) (West 2022).

Subsection (g) lists several categories of records that an association does not have to provide, unless otherwise directed by a court order. 765 ILCS 605/19(g) (West 2022).

2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶¶34 – 35. In this action, “plaintiff sought almost the entirety of categories (1) through (6) and (9), as well as records from categories of documents that an association is not required to turn over without a court order.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶37. “If the drafters of the section had just meant ‘retype the statute,’ they would not have had to add the requirement that a requestor must state the desired documents ‘with particularity.’ 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶38.

The Condo Act does not define the term particularity. However, the Appellate Court, which could not find a case defining the term in context of section 19, looked to Illinois rules requiring pleading with particularity as “a ‘requirement that allegations must be made with particularity heightens the pleading requirement beyond that which would normally be required to survive’ a challenge.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶39, quoting Wells v. Reed, 2024 IL App (1st) 230502 at ¶27. Also dictionary definitions show that particularity refers to “a minute detail” or “the quality of being individual or unique.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶39. The Appellate Court found that “[t]here was nothing unique or minute about plaintiff’s request, which sought ‘all’ records in each category, going back several years..” 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶39. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court based upon the document requests being a proverbial “laundry list” rather than made with “particularity.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232423-U at ¶43.

For more information about condominium law, see CONDOMINIUM LAW: GOVERNANCE, AUTHORITY, AND CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Kenneth Michaels, Jr., Bauch & Michaels, LLC, Chicago

Kenneth Michaels, Jr. is a partner at Bauch & Michaels, LLC, with over four decades of experience in commercial litigation, transactions, and corporate governance. He represents a diverse clientele, including banks, insurance companies, and Fortune 500 businesses, specializing in asset sales, property management, and loan agreements. Ken is also a recognized Illinois “Super Lawyer” in real property law and has contributed extensively to legal education and community service. He teaches at the University of Illinois Chicago Law School and has been a public official in Illinois for nearly 30 years.

In People v. Pyles, 2025 IL App (4th) 240220, the Fourth District Appellate Court upheld a “parole search” of the defendant in which methamphetamine was found on the defendant despite the defendant’s mandatory supervised release (MSR) agreement not being entered as evidence because the investigating agent confirmed that the defendant was on MSR before the search.

In Pyles, a drug task force received a tip that the defendant was transporting methamphetamine on an Amtrak train. After arriving in Illinois, officers searched the defendant and located the methamphetamine. An investigator confirmed the defendant was on MSR before the search and testified that he was unaware if the defendant’s MSR agreement contained a mandatory search condition. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶¶10 – 11.

The court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, and the defendant was convicted at trial. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶¶11 – 12.

On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Prisoner Review Board sets MSR conditions, but it does not have the discretion to effect mandatory MSR conditions set out under 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶5. One of the mandatory conditions is that a parolee must “consent to searches of their person, their property, or their residence...” 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶8.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not categorically prohibit suspicionless parole searches, but the parole searches must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶23, citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 165 L.Ed.2d 250, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006).

Police officers, however, must be aware that the suspect is on MSR before they can conduct a suspicionless parole search. Learning that a suspect is on MSR after a search will not salvage a parole search. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶26. “An officer’s advanced knowledge that a suspect is on MSR demonstrates that a suspicionless search was reasonable.” 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶37.

On appeal, the appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that an officer must obtain the parolee’s MSR agreement from the parolee and the parole officer, noting that the Code of Corrections requires that the MSR agreement is only required to be retained by the parolee and a supervising officer. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(c). The court stated that although no paperwork system is perfect, public officials are presumed to have fulfilled their duties, such as having a parolee sign a MSR that contains the search condition. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶¶38 – 39. Furthermore, police should be able to quickly communicate whether a person is on MSR. Id.

The appellate court held that the State can meet its burden at a suppression hearing by showing that the officer who conducted the parole search had knowledge that the defendant was on MSR. 2025 IL App (4th) 240220 at ¶40.

The court disagreed with People v. Vasquez, 388 Ill.App.3d 532, 902 N.E.2d 1194, 327 Ill.Dec. 808 (1st Dist. 2009), which had criticized the State for not providing the trial court with certified copies of the defendant’s conviction and parole conditions and concluded that it could not confirm that the defendant was on parole. 2025 IL App (4^th) 240220 at ¶¶52 – 53.

In Pyles, the court stated that there would be no reason to confirm that the defendant was actually convicted of the offense for which the defendant was on parole for when he was subject to parole conditions and stressed that ordinary restrictions on evidence are relaxed at a suppression hearing. In comparison, certified copies of a divorce decree would be unnecessary evidence to show that someone was divorced if there was a witness who could testify from their own knowledge that someone was divorced. 2025 IL App (4^th) 240220 at ¶¶53 – 54

For more information about criminal law, see CRIMINAL RECORDS: EXPUNGEMENT AND OTHER RELIEF (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Matthew R. Leisten, Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office, Oregon, IL

Matthew R. Leisten serves as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for the Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office in Oregon, Illinois. In his role, he provides essential updates on caselaw relevant to search warrants, focusing on issues such as good faith, staleness, and the impact of modern technology on legal procedures. His experience includes handling complex warrants involving advanced technologies like geofences and Triggerfish. Additionally, Leisten contributes to legal education through publications and presentations, ensuring that attorneys stay informed about current legal trends and practices.

In Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 24-2179, 2025 WL 1778643 (7th Cir. June 27, 2025), the plaintiff worked for United Airlines for 16 years. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge after United made changes to her job responsibilities and placed her on a performance improvement plan (PIP) following complaints she made about discrimination and harassment.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of United on the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment and dismissed the constructive discharge claim without prejudice.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to show that she suffered adverse employment actions due to age discrimination. Further, the plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed because the actions taken by United were not materially adverse. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a hostile work environment based on age, as the incidents alleged were not severe or pervasive enough to meet the legal standard. The dismissal of her constructive discharge claim was also upheld.

Background Facts

Plaintiff Mary Ann Arnold worked in communications at United from March 14, 1994, until May 20, 2020. Between 2017 and 2018, she made several complaints to United, including age discrimination, failure to promote, retaliation, harassment, hostile work environment, and sexual harassment by her supervisor. None of the claims were substantiated, and her supervisor was not disciplined. 2025 WL 1778643 at *1.

The plaintiff’s 2018 mid-year review was conducted by the supervisor she claimed sexually harassed her. She was rated “on track with peers.” Id. The plaintiff’s 2018 year-end and her 2019 mid-year reviews were conducted by different supervisors because of the sexual harassment investigation, though her primary supervisor was consulted. The reviews included positive and critical feedback. Specifically, the 2018 year-end review said that the plaintiff should take “[a] more assertive role and proactively build strategic comms [sic] plans. . . . You have a passion for making sure the frontline gets what they need to be effective in their jobs, but you need to be proactive in identifying and solving the problems so that our business partners can achieve that goal.”The 2019 mid-year review also noted that the plaintiff should work on certain time management skills. Id.

In September 2019, United reorganized its communications functions. As part of this reorganization, the plaintiff and her team were moved to the Corporate Communications Department. The plaintiff’s title was also changed from “Senior Staff Representative” to “Senior Writer.” The plaintiff claimed that this change altered her role from “project-based” to “data entry” work, resulted in “far less visibility and partner interaction,” and greatly increased her workload. United’s position was that the basic function of the position was unchanged in that she still dealt with internal corporate communications. Id. The plaintiff was also moved from a project called “Core4,” and two younger employees were added to the project. 2025 WL 1778643 at *2.

In October 2019, there was an email exchange among United’s human resources department. The participants discussed a seating change for the plaintiff and mentioned offering the plaintiff an exit package. The exit package was not pursued, and the human resources employees decided to focus on the plaintiff’s performance. Id.

Later in 2019, the plaintiff received her first negative performance review. Her supervisors criticized her time and project management and also noted that she had difficulty meeting deadlines. The plaintiff claims that she was never informed of or coached about the deficiencies before the review. Id.

The plaintiff was immediately placed on a PIP. She claimed that the PIP “constitute[d] an adverse action because it worsened [her] employment with its excessive workload, unrealistic deadlines, public criticism, [and] reductive administrative tasks.” She also claimed that her supervisors “regularly corrected her in front of business partners and United leaders who previously approved and praised her work.” She believes that she was generally treated unfairly. Id.

There was disagreement over whether the plaintiff successfully completed the PIP. Both United and the plaintiff acknowledge that during the PIP they discussed instances of subpar performance. The final meeting under the PIP was planned for May 2020. The meeting was rescheduled multiple times. The plaintiff ultimately resigned on May 20, 2020, before she had her final PIP meeting. The plaintiff referred to her resignation as an “involuntary retirement.” Id.

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against United alleging age discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. Id. She believed that the PIP was abusive treatment, in response to the complaints she made, and used as a plan to force her exit. The plaintiff also claimed that a younger employee had similar performance issues but was not placed on a PIP. 2025 WL 1778643 at *3.

District Court Decision

The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliation claims. Specifically, on the age discrimination claim, the court held that United had not subjected her to materially adverse employment actions. Further, United had given legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and the plaintiff failed to establish that these proffered reasons were pretextual. Id.

The district court also dismissed the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because she had not submitted evidence to show a sufficiently severe work environment and had not demonstrated causation. Finally, the constructive discharge claim was dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Id.

The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis Applying Muldrow

On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the district court employed the incorrect definition of an “adverse” employment action by failing to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 218 L.Ed.2d 322, 144 S.Ct. 967 (2024).

In response to United’s argument, the Seventh Circuit made clear that Muldrow is not limited to job transfers. The Seventh Circuit also found that the district court incorrectly applied a pre-Muldrow “materially adverse” standard. The Seventh Circuit was therefore left to decide whether the plaintiff can prevail under the more lenient standard of Muldrow. Id.

While Muldrow has been confronted infrequently, the Seventh Circuit has applied its new standard by focusing on whether the harm was to “an identifiable term or condition of employment.” 2025 WL 1778643 at *4, quoting Muldrow, supra, 144 S.Ct. at 974. While the harm need not be “material” or “significant,” the harm must affect the “terms or conditions of employment.” 2025 WL 1778643 at *4, quoting Muldrow, supra, 144 S.Ct. at 976. In Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335 (7th Cir. 2024), the Seventh Circuit considered a Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub.L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, claim of employment discrimination and held that, under the Muldrow “some harm” standard, delaying training, denying vacation times, transferring shifts, and considering family circumstances in a biased way are all adverse actions. 120 F.4th at 1336 – 1337. These decisions by the employer adversely affect the terms and conditions of employment because employers “must distribute fringe benefits equally” and “[d]eferred training can mean deferred promotions or deferred raises.” 120 F.4th at 1337. By contrast, in Phillips v. Baxter, No. 23-1740, 2024 WL 1795859 (7th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025), the Seventh Circuit held, albeit in an unpublished order, that a swapped role that was in the same building and did not affect the employee’s “position, job duties, salary, or benefits” was not an adverse action. 2024 WL 1795859 at *3. The court further explained that even when there were changes in the employee’s duties, those changes were within the scope of his role and were “mostly temporary inconveniences.” Id.

Here, even under the more generous standard of Muldrow and considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Seventh Circuit can maintain only that she was placed on a PIP and that the reorganization brought about some changes in her daily responsibilities. She remained a member of the same team and continued to work in the communications department of United’s operation. Her compensation, benefits, vacation times, and working hours were not affected. Nor did she provide any evidence that her assignments while on the PIP were impossible for her to complete. She was given some additional assignments, and some of her assignments changed. But these changes were all within the normal scope of her employment and thus did not adversely affect the terms and conditions of her employment. “The record hardly describe[d] an adverse action under the standard articulated in Muldrow.”Arnold, supra, 2025 WL 1778643 at *5.

The Seventh Circuit held that even if the plaintiff could establish that United subjected her to an adverse employment action, she has not shown that United treated her differently from other employees who were similarly situated except for age. Id.

The remaining prong of establishing a prima facie case was whether the plaintiff met her employer’s legitimate expectations. United maintained that the plaintiff’s performance was deficient and that this was the reason she was placed on a PIP. As the district court did, the Seventh Circuit proceeded directly to considering whether United’s reasons for instituting the PIP were pretextual. See Vichio v. US Foods, Inc., 88 F.4th 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2023) (allowing courts to “skip the McDonnell Douglas [Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2e 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973),] prima facie analysis if the employer raises the employee’s performance as the reason for the adverse employment decision” and go directly to pretext). Arnold, supra, 2025 WL 1778643 at *6.

“To establish pretext, an employee must ultimately show by a preponderance of the evidence either ‘(1) that the employer was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason, or (2) that the employer’s proffered reason is unworthy of credence.’ ” Id., quoting McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff claimed that the performance deficiencies were pretextual and untrue, as she was meeting United’s expectations, no one had discussed any deficiencies prior to the 2019 year-end review, and it came on the heels of an email about focusing on her performance versus offering an exit package. However, the plaintiff did not offer anything to suggest that her performance did not display the deficiencies claimed by United. United’s explanation therefore remained unrebutted, and the plaintiff did not demonstrate pretext or that she had performed to United’s legitimate expectations. Furthermore, the ADEA requires not just “that age was a motivating factor. The plaintiff must prove that, but for his age, the adverse action would not have occurred.” [Emphasis in original.] Arnold, supra, 2025 WL 1778643 at *7, quoting Martino v. MCI Communications Services, Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 455 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s arguments would require significant speculation and assumption of ulterior motive. As such, she could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. Id.

The Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment on the other claims and the dismissal of the constructive discharge claim.

The Arnold decision proves helpful to employers as they navigate employment discrimination claims in a post-Muldrow environment.

For more information about employment and labor law, see LABOR LAW: REPRESENTATION AND COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING MATTERS (IICLE^®, 2025). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Catherine R. Locallo, Robbins Schwartz, Chicago

Catherine R. Locallo, a partner at Robbins Schwartz, specializes in labor and employment law with a focus on education and board governance. She provides guidance on employment law, collective bargaining, and compliance with various acts. Catherine started as a paralegal, joined Robbins Schwartz in 2004, and became a partner in 2017. She holds a J.D. from The John Marshall Law School and a B.S. from Southern Illinois University. Notably, she is also involved in multiple professional organizations and community activities, including the Glenview Stars Hockey Association.

In In re Marriage of Kriley, 2025 IL App (1st) 241923, a protracted matter lasting several years that began with both parties filing petitions for emergency orders of protection against each other, the husband was ultimately granted a plenary order of protection against the wife, which included their young son as a protected person. The wife was ordered to have supervised virtual visitation. The wife appealed the issuance of the order of protection, and the appellate court affirmed. The wife claimed the trial court did not make the relevant findings required by the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (IDVA), 750 ILCS 60/101, et seq., and challenged the court’s findings with respect to the alleged abuse. The evidence showed the wife had engaged in a number of harassing actions, including absconding with the child to New York, changing the locks on the husband’s apartment and ransacking it, sending threatening messages to the husband’s family, and sending an email to the husband’s employer. The trial court’s finding of abuse was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court further addressed the wife’s argument that her alleged acts were “stale” because they were from three years prior to the time of the hearing, stating that any past evidence of abuse, no matter how remote, may be relevant to prove abuse under the IDVA. 2025 IL App (1st) 241923 at ¶¶73 – 75. The appellate court also declined to agree with the wife’s argument that the mental health examiner’s report should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not timely delivered pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215(c), which requires delivery of the report within 21 days of the completion of the examination. However, because no court order was entered appointing a S.Ct. Rule 215 examination (it appears an agreed order was prepared but never entered), this argument failed. The appellate court also noted that even if it further considered such argument, it was unclear when the examiner completed her examination and that several continuance orders were entered continuing the matter on the grounds that the parties were awaiting the completion of the report, and the wife had not objected to timeliness at any point.

Supervised Visitation Order Vacated

In Kriley, supra, the wife was ordered to have only supervised virtual visitation with the child. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) as the supervisor and ordered the parties to divide equally the payment of the GAL’s fees, including requiring his current bill to be brought current in order for the visitation to commence. The record indicated that during the course of the case, there was difficulty finding a supervisor who was willing to take on the case given the specific set of facts. The appellate court questioned the appointment of the GAL as the supervisor noting that it was an “odd extension” of the role, particularly when other professionals specialize in the area. It also clarified that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have ordered supervised visitation given the evidence presented and both the GAL and mental health examiner’s conclusions that the wife needed significant mental health support. The appellate court vacated the order regarding the supervised visitation and asked the trial court to take another look at it, including whether there was a professional supervisor who would be willing to do supervised virtual visitation. The appellate court made it clear it was not ordering the trial court to reach a different result on remand.

Nonmarital Character of Accounts Upheld due to Motion in LimineBeing Granted

In In re Marriage of Xinos and Marino, 2025 IL App (1st) 232326, a dissolution of marriage action, the husband failed to identify or produce documentation in discovery supporting his claim that various financial accounts were nonmarital property. As a result, the trial court granted the wife’s motion in limine pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 219(c) brought on the eve of trial barring the husband from introducing evidence of the accounts’ nonmarital character at trial. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse discretion, and noted the husband failed to supplement discovery responses prior to the discovery deadlines and failed to make an offer of proof regarding the accounts’ origins or tracing of funds at trial. When a motion in limineis granted, an offer of proof is critical to save for review the argument that the exclusion of the evidence was in error. The appellate court further rejected the husband’s arguments that he was prejudiced by the timing of the motion in limine or by proceeding pro se at trial. The appellate court also upheld the 75-percent/25-percent division of the marital accounts in the husband’s favor.

Plenary Order of Protection Affirmed with Respect to Two Persons in a Prior Dating Relationship

In Montelauro v. Lutkus, 2025 IL App (2d) 240369, the Second District affirmed the trial court’s entry of a plenary order of protection in favor of the petitioner, finding that the respondent engaged in harassment and interfered with the petitioner’s personal liberty. The parties had a brief dating relationship that ended in September 2022, after which the petitioner repeatedly told the respondent to cease contact. Despite this, the respondent left numerous voicemails, sent texts from alternative numbers, appeared at the petitioner’s home uninvited, and ultimately sent an explicit photo of the petitioner via Snapchat more than a year after their breakup. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that these actions constituted harassment causing emotional distress and that the respondent’s conduct was intended to compel the petitioner to maintain unwanted contact. The court also rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court failed to properly consider the statutory factors under the IDVA, noting that the trial court’s written order reflected consideration of those factors and that its findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For more information about family law, see ADOPTION LAW (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Michelle A. Lawless, Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago

Michelle A. Lawless, founder of The Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, has over 20 years of experience in family law. After a distinguished career at a prestigious litigation firm, she started her own practice to offer a more compassionate and resolution-focused approach. Michelle specializes in collaborative law, mediation, and attorney-assisted mediation, helping clients navigate family disputes with minimal conflict. She is recognized for her thought leadership, extensive financial experience, and dedication to creating better outcomes for families.

The Illinois Office of the Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor (PAC), the entity responsible for ensuring compliance with the state’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 ILCS 140/1, et seq., and Open Meetings Act (OMA), 5 ILCS 120/1, et seq., issued three binding opinions in June. These opinions reaffirm a public body’s duty to comply and further clarify its obligations under these Acts.

Freedom of Information Act — Duty To Respond

In Public Access Opinion 25-005 (June 6, 2025), the PAC reaffirmed a public body’s obligation to timely respond to FOIA requests. On March 19, 2025, the Village of Lynwood received a FOIA request seeking various documents and records related to the mayor’s salary between 2021 and the present. Public Access Opinion 25-005, p. 2. The village failed to respond to the request within the five business days prescribed by statute and on April 1, 2025, the requester sent a request for review to the PAC pursuant to FOIA §9.5(a), 5 ILCS 140/9.5(a). On April 15, 2025, the PAC forwarded the request for review to the village and asked the village to confirm whether it had responded to the initial request and, if so, to provide a copy of its response letter and associated documents. The village did not acknowledge or reply to the PAC’s inquiry. On May 1, 2025, the PAC sent an additional copy of the request for review to the village by both email and U.S. mail and the village again failed to respond. Public Access Opinion 25-005, p. 4.

On June 6, 2025, the PAC issued a binding opinion finding that the village violated FOIA §3(d), 5 ILCS 140/3(d), by failing to respond within five business days after its receipt of the request or otherwise requesting an extension under §3(e). Additionally, the PAC noted that because the village failed to comply with the statute’s five-day timeframe, it waived its ability to treat the request as unduly burdensome or to impose copying fees. Public Access Opinion 25-005, p. 6 n.14. The village was directed to take immediate action to respond to the request.

While this decision largely restates existing law, it emphasizes the importance of timely responding to FOIA requests. Moreover, it serves as a reminder to public bodies that strict adherence to the statutory timeframe will result in a waiver of certain benefits otherwise afforded under FOIA §3(e).

Freedom of Information Act — Basis for Withholding Records Related to Settlement Agreements

Settlements agreements have proven to be a recurring theme in PAC opinions in recent years. In 2016, FOIA was amended to expressly provide that settlement agreements are public records and are to be produced, subject to applicable redactions under §7 of the Act. In Public Access Opinion 25-006 (June 18, 2025), the PAC addressed the scope of a public body’s obligation to produce records related to settlement agreements.

On February 22, 2025, the City of Chicago received a request for records relating to a settlement payment made to a city alderman, documents sufficient to show the nature and extent of the settlement, and documents sufficient to show the definition of a contribution claim. The documents in question were related to a class action lawsuit that the requester was involved in against the city and the named alderman. After extending its timeframe to respond, the city granted the request in part and denied the request in part, citing exemptions under FOIA §§7(1)(b), 7(1)(c), 7(1)(m), and 7(1)(kk). After a number of exchanges, the requester limited the scope of the request for review for documents withheld under §7(1)(m) of the Act, 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(m), which prohibits from disclosure certain records relating to the communications between a public body and its attorney that would not be subject to discovery in litigation and materials prepared or compiled in anticipation of a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding upon request of an attorney advising the public body. Public Access Opinion 25-006, p. 4. To demonstrate that a document is protected by attorney-client privilege under this exemption, the burden is on the public body to show that (1) a statement was originated in confidence with the attorney having the expectation that it would not be disclosed; (2) the statement was made to the attorney while the attorney was acting in a legal capacity and for the purpose of seeking legal advice or services; and (3) the statement remained confidential. Id.

In this case, the document that was being withheld related to a settlement agreement that was signed by both an alderman and the city attorney. At that time, the city had been dismissed from the case and the alderman had retained his own private attorney. Examining the available facts, the PAC noted that notwithstanding the fact that the city law department was authorized by ordinance to represent city officers and departments in legal matters, it did not follow that all communications between the city law department and others within the organization were privileged, even if those communications related to ongoing litigation. Public Access Opinion 25-006, p. 6.

In making this determination, the PAC referenced the fact that the alderman had retained his own legal counsel. It further observed there was nothing in the settlement document that would indicate that the alderman was seeking legal advice from the city’s law department. Instead, the document affirmed the fact that the city and the alderman had divergent interests. After making these findings, the PAC turned to Article VIII, §1(c) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which expressly provides that “reports and records of the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of . . . units of local government . . . are public records available for inspection by the public according to law.”

Accordingly, the PAC determined that because the facts did not support an expectation of attorney-client privilege under §7(1)(m) of the Act, 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(m), the city did not meet its burden in exempting the documents from disclosure and was directed to release the document. Public Access Opinion 25-006, p. 7.

Public bodies, including their board members and employees, should be cautioned that communications with legal counsel are not automatically privileged, even when discussing matters of a legal nature. Such communications may be subject to FOIA unless the public body can clearly demonstrate an attorney-client relationship (beyond just serving as general counsel) and an expectation of confidentiality.

Open Meetings Act — City’s Informal Committee Is a Subsidiary Body

In Public Access Opinion 25-007 (June 24, 2025), an Open Meetings Act complaint was filed with the PAC alleging that the City of Peru was holding committee meetings that were closed to the public. The committee in question was created following a referendum to explore options for establishing a municipal swimming pool. The committee contained individuals who were informally appointed by the mayor and was comprised of two elected officials, a department head, and city residents. Public Access Opinion 25-007, p. 4. The committee meetings were not open to the public and the committee did not take meeting minutes.

Section 1.02 of OMA defines “public body” to include “any subsidiary bodies . . . including but not limited to committees.” However, the city asserted that the committee was an “informal advisory committee” that did not qualify as a subsidiary or advisory body within the meaning of the Act. Public Access Opinion 25-007, p. 6.

In determining whether the committee was a “public body” within the meaning of OMA, the PAC invoked the four factor test: (1) the extent to which the committee had a legal existence independent of governmental resolution; (2) the degree of governmental control exerted over the committee; (3) the extent to which the committee was publicly funded; and (4) the nature of the functions performed by the committee. Public Access Opinion 25-007, pp. 6 – 10.

It was undisputed that the committee did not enjoy an independent legal existence from the city. While the city contended that it did not control the committee and that the committee was an “independent group of volunteers,” the PAC noted that the mayor’s appointments of individuals to the committee, even without a city council vote, demonstrated a degree of city control over the committee. Public Access Opinion 25-007, p. 7. Minutes from the city council meetings also revealed that the city had allocated significant resources toward the committee, including the use of city personnel, facilities, and the city council’s approval of funds for a preliminary study. Although the city asserted that the committee was not publicly funded because it was comprised of unpaid volunteers, the PAC noted that the committee did receive at least indirect public funding in relation to the foregoing. Finally, when examining the committee’s purpose, the PAC determined that the function of the committee is “a quintessential role of a municipal committee.” Public Access Opinion 25-007, p. 9. Upon review of the foregoing factors, with emphasis on the governmental function and degree of city control over the committee, the PAC determined that the committee was a public body subject to OMA and that the private committee meetings were in violation of the Act.

Public bodies should heed caution and note that even “informal” committees are likely to be subject to OMA requirements if they are not legally independent from a public body, are under the general control of a public body, are performing a governmental function, and/or are operating with or benefitting from the use of public funds.

For more information about FOIA and OMA, see SUNSHINE LAWS — 2024 EDITION. Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Laura M. Julien, Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C., Sugar Grove

Laura M. Julien is a partner with Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C. in Sugar Grove, Illinois, where she concentrates her practice in municipal law, school law, corporate law, and real estate matters. She is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, Kane County Bar Association, State Bar of Wisconsin, National Council of School Attorneys, Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association, and Illinois Council of School Attorneys. She is also a recurrent presenter with the National Business Institute. Julien earned her undergraduate, with honors, from the University of Wisconsin and her J.D. degree from the University of Notre Dame Law School.

In Singleton v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (1st) 240120WC-U, the First District Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of a workers’ compensation appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing the strict, jurisdictional nature of statutory deadlines for filing a circuit court review of a Commission decision.

Rashun Singleton filed two applications for adjustment of a claim in 2016 and 2018, alleging a work-related injury from Singleton’s employment with Amita Health/Advent Health. The cases were consolidated. In July 2019, both claims were dismissed for want of prosecution. Singleton filed multiple motions to reinstate, all of which were denied by the arbitrator. The Commission affirmed the arbitrator’s denial on January 31, 2023. 2025 IL App (1st) 240120WC-U at ¶¶5 – 6.

That same day, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission sent notice of its decision to both parties via its CompFile system. Singleton, representing herself, did not file a petition for judicial review in the circuit court until March 1, 2023 — well outside the 20-day statutory deadline.

Amita moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under §2-619(a)(1) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1). The circuit court agreed and dismissed the petition. Singleton’s subsequent motions to vacate and reconsider were denied.

The issues before the appellate court included the following:

1. whether the 20-day period to seek judicial review under §19(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq., began on January 31, 2023, when electronic notice was sent via CompFile;

2. whether the method of notice (email) complied with the statutory requirement for notice; and

3. whether Singleton’s late filing could be excused on equitable grounds.

The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held:

1. The 20-day filing deadline began when notice was sent via CompFile. Under §19(f)(1) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, judicial review must be initiated within 20 days of receiving notice of the Commission’s decision — not the decision itself. Here, notice was deemed received on January 31, 2023, when the CompFile system generated and sent emails to the parties. The court took judicial notice of these public records.
   
   
2. Electronic notice is valid when the party subscribes to CompFile. The court rejected Singleton’s argument that §19(i) of the Workers’ Compensation Act required personal or mailed notice. By registering with CompFile and consenting to electronic service, Singleton agreed to receive notice via email. Under 50 Ill.Admin. Code §9015.50(c), such service is deemed complete upon transmission.
   
   
3. Late filing is jurisdictional and cannot be excused. The court reaffirmed that the statutory filing period is jurisdictional. Absent strict compliance, the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Singleton’s argument that the email may have gone to Singleton’s spam folder was irrelevant under existing caselaw. 2025 IL App (1st) 240120WC-U at ¶17.

The Singleton decision is a reminder that while the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission may exercise discretion in certain procedural matters, the statutory deadlines for initiating judicial review in circuit court are strictly jurisdictional. The appellate court reinforced the following:

1. Receipt of electronic notice via CompFile satisfies the statutory requirement for notice if the party has registered for the system.

2. The statutory 20-day window to seek circuit court review under 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) begins on the date notice was issued, not on the date of receipt of the decision itself or a party’s actual knowledge.

3. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by equitable arguments, such as misunderstanding or inadvertent delay.

Comparison to Ryba: Different Rules at Different Levels

In May’s FLASHPOINTS, we analyzed the appellate court’s decision in Ryba v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2025 IL App (2d) 230596WC-U. In Ryba, the appellate court affirmed the Commission’s reinstatement of a claim when the motion to reinstate was filed well after the 60-day period provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

The Ryba and Singleton decisions present a clear contrast in how timing issues are treated, depending on whether the matter remains before the Commission or has moved into the judicial review phase.

In Ryba, the appellate court allowed reinstatement of a claim long after the 60-day reinstatement period had passed. The court emphasized that when factual disputes exist — such as denial of notice — the Commission retains discretion to resolve those facts and, when appropriate, toll deadlines. The decision acknowledged the Commission’s broader procedural discretion, particularly during unusual periods like the COVID-19 pandemic.

By contrast, Singleton confirms that once a case moves into the judicial review phase, the jurisdictional lines are strictly drawn. The 20-day filing period under §19(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not a discretionary deadline — it is a jurisdictional bar. Unlike in Ryba, factual disputes such as whether an email went to a spam folder are irrelevant if notice was properly issued and the statutory clock began.

The key distinction lies in statutory discretion vs. jurisdictional mandates:

1. The Commission has discretion to determine factual disputes regarding notice and may permit reinstatement based on equitable considerations (Ryba).

2. The circuit court’s jurisdiction under §19(f)(1) is strictly limited by statute, and equitable considerations cannot extend the deadline (Singleton).

Practitioners must understand the procedural posture of a workers’ compensation case and the implications it has on applicable deadlines. Before the Commission, factual disputes over notice and good cause may allow some leeway. But once a decision is final and the case moves into judicial review, strict compliance with statutory deadlines is essential. Electronic notice is deemed sufficient, and failure to act within 20 days will likely prove fatal to the appeal, as it did in Singleton.

For more information about workers’ compensation, see WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE (IICLE^®, 2023). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visitwww.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Jigar S. Desai

Jigar S. Desai is a Partner with Rusin Law Ltd, where he concentrates his practice in workers’ compensation and employment law. Recognized for his outstanding contributions to the legal field, Desai has been named a Rising Star by Super Lawyers from 2016 to 2018 and a Law Bulletin Emerging Lawyer from 2016 to 2019. He is a member of the Board of Directors at Rusin Law Ltd, and a member of the Chicago and Illinois Bar Associations. Desai received his B.A. from the University of Iowa and his J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law. While at Chicago-Kent, he was honored on the Dean’s Honor List for five out of six semesters and received the Honorable Edmund W. Burke Award for Excellence in Forensic Oratory as a Senior Associate of the Moot Court Honor Society.

Our July 2025 FLASHPOINTS Author Spotlight recognizes Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer and Scott F. Uhler, who most recently served as General Editors and wrote for School Law: Organization, Finance, and Property (IICLE^®, 2025). Krafthefer and Uhler have both been longtime contributors to IICLE publications across a variety of handbook titles.

Krafthefer noted that Ancel Glink, P.C. "has had a long relationship with IICLE. I first became [involved] in writing chapters many years ago when other attorneys from the firm who were chapter authors retired… IICLE publications are a wonderful resource for new and experienced attorneys. The process of updating them is a lot of work, but it helps me keep abreast of changes in the law and provides a way to give back to the legal community. At times, authorship of chapters has even resulted in other attorneys hiring our firm, because the chapters showcase our knowledge in certain areas of the law. I am especially thankful to my colleagues in the election bar who have contributed to the [Election Law (IICLE®, 2024)] [h]andbook. Election cases move through the hearing and court process extremely quickly and the [h]andbook allows me to have access to valuable information very quickly. It is an invaluable tool during Illinois’ crazy election seasons!”

Regarding the Institute and its resources, Uhler remarked, “IICLE is a valuable resource for attorneys at all levels. It provides updated federal and state regulations as well as continuing education opportunities. Whether an attorney is newly admitted or has years of experience, IICLE is a great tool kit.”

Krafthefer is an Equity Partner at Ancel Glink, P.C., in Naperville, and focuses her practice on local government law and election law. Illinois Super Lawyers named her one of the Top 50 Female Attorneys in the State of Illinois, and Leading Lawyers Magazine named her one of the top ten leading women lawyers in government, municipal, lobbying, and administrative law. Krafthefer has been named as a Super Lawyer representing cities and villages for every year that such distinction has been awarded. She received her B.A. from the University of Illinois and her J.D. from The UIC John Marshall Law School.

Uhler is a Partner at Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, Ltd., in Chicago, where he concentrates his practice in school, municipal, and election law. He is a member of the Illinois Municipal League, the National and Illinois Councils of School Attorneys, and the Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association. Uhler received his B.S.W and M.S.W. from the University of Illinois Chicago and received his J.D. from DePaul University College of Law.