Laura M. Julien, Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C.
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Beyond the Verdict: How a Police Officer’s Past Led to Termination Despite Acquittal
In McDonald v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 2025 IL App (1st) 231616, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District affirmed the decision of the circuit court, upholding the Village of Maywood’s Board of Police and Fire Commissioners’ termination of a police officer “for cause” following his arrest for domestic battery, even though the officer was found not guilty of the underlying charges. Relying on principles of administrative deference, the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record independent of the criminal charges to support the officer’s termination.
In 2021, Village of Maywood police officer Darrell McDonald was arrested and charged with domestic battery. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶1. Following the arrest, the village’s police chief filed charges of termination against McDonald. Id. In lieu of arbitration, McDonald elected to have a hearing before the Village’s Board of Police and Fire Commissioners. Id.
The 2021 arrest was not McDonald’s only infraction while employed with the village’s police department. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶7. In 2014, McDonald had been terminated following an incident related to an off-duty domestic battery but was ultimately reinstated. Id. In 2017, McDonald received a 3-day suspension for insubordination. Id. In 2019, McDonald was suspended for a total of 16 days pursuant to two separate settlement agreements. Id. In 2020, McDonald received a 20-day suspension following an off-duty arrest for driving under the influence. Id. He was placed on 12 months’ probation, which he was still subject to at the time of his 2021 arrest for domestic battery. See 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶¶9,12.
At the hearing before the board, the police chief requested summary termination based on McDonald’s violation of the terms of the 2020 settlement agreement and McDonald’s probationary status. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶12. Following a five-day bifurcated hearing, the board ruled that there was sufficient cause to warrant McDonald’s immediate termination. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶97.
In McDonald’s complaint for administrative review, he alleged that the board lacked jurisdiction and legal authority over his termination. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶101. He also asserted that the board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, and legally erroneous. Id. The circuit court affirmed the board’s decision, and McDonald appealed. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶102.
Jurisdictional Challenge
McDonald’s jurisdictional challenge was based on his claim that the board was divested of jurisdiction over his termination because the board did not strictly follow certain procedures set forth in the governing collective-bargaining agreement. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶115. McDonald further asserted that the collective bargaining agreement’s procedures superseded any statutory processes. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶115. In response, the village argued that the board’s jurisdiction was derived from state statute, which could not be abrogated by a collective-bargaining agreement. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶116. Rather, the village noted that any procedural challenges related to the collective-bargaining agreement should be adjudicated through the grievance procedure. Id.
Upon review of the matter, the appellate court determined that McDonald was confounding the legal principle of subject-matter jurisdiction with contractual adherence to a collective-bargaining agreement. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶118. Quoting §10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17), the appellate court established that “the Board is empowered to preside over disciplinary actions for removal or discharge” and that such hearings “are to be provided as set forth in statute, unless the employer and union representing the individual ‘have negotiated an alternate or supplemental form of due process.’ ” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶120.
The appellate court identified that the statute provides a 30-day timeframe for the board to commence the hearing. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶120. Accordingly, the appellate court determined that the only way that the board’s jurisdiction could be divested would be if it failed to commence the hearing within the statute’s 30-day timeframe. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶121. The appellate court disagreed with McDonald’s assertion that failing to abide by the collective-bargaining agreement’s procedural requirements would strip the board of jurisdiction over the matter. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶123. The appellate court noted that a collective-bargaining agreement “could not trump the Board’s ability to investigate and adjudicate potential misconduct” and determined that the Board retained jurisdiction under state statute, notwithstanding any deviations from the contractual provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶124, quoting Scatchell v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners for Village of Melrose Park, 2022 IL App (1st) 201361, ¶103, 213 N.E.3d 446, 464 Ill.Dec. 409.
Impartiality of Hearing
McDonald also alleged that the board was unfairly biased against him, as demonstrated by a single communication between his counsel and the hearing officer during the standard of proof ruling whereby the hearing officer’s finding regarding the applicability of the clear and convincing standard was interpreted as the hearing officer’s finding that the standard had been satisfied. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶129. The appellate court relied on the principle that “[a]t minimum, a ‘fair hearing before an administrative agency includes the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartiality in ruling upon the evidence.’” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶130, quoting Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill.2d 76, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1120, 180 Ill.Dec. 34 (1992). Upon an examination of the record, the appellate court did not find any evidence of partiality during the hearing before the board and found the contention that the hearing officer’s misstatement could be characterized as such to be “meritless.” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶132.
Burden of Proof
McDonald’s third challenge pertained to the Board’s application of the preponderance of the evidence standard, arguing that the clear and convincing standard should have been used uniformly for all charges against him. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶135. Relying on Wilkey vs. Illinois Racing Board, 65 Ill.App.3d 534, 381 N.E.2d 1380, 21 Ill.Dec. 695 (1st Dist. 1978), McDonald noted that although a civil proceeding, the underlying charges against him giving rise to the action were criminal in nature and therefore a heightened burden of proof was required. Id. The village refuted McDonald’s contention, noting that the preponderance of evidence standard was appropriate for the noncriminal charges, which were premised on McDonald’s unprofessional conduct and violation of department policy, not the criminal charges. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶136. The village further noted that it invoked a more stringent burden of proof standard to one of the charges that was required and therefore committed no error. Id.
The appellate court agreed with the village and noted that McDonald’s citation to Wilkey was inapplicable, as the subsequent Illinois Supreme Court case Board of Education of City of Chicago v. State Board of Education, 113 Ill.2d 173, 497 N.E.2d 984, 100 Ill.Dec. 715 (1986), was the superseding authority for establishing burdens of proof in administrative review cases. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶138. It further noted that the preponderance of the evidence standard was “sufficient to protect a police officer’s position, even when criminal conduct is alleged” and “given that the Board applied the higher clear and convincing evidence standard to the violation of laws charge . . . any error in the Board’s burden of proof determination in this case was harmless.” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶140.
Cause vs. Just Cause
McDonald asserted that the board also erred by applying a “cause” standard to his termination proceeding rather than a “just cause” standard, as referenced in the collective-bargaining agreement. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶142. The village challenged McDonald’s interpretation, noting the collective-bargaining agreement required that “cause” be found, and that the language of the collective-bargaining agreement expressly incorporated the Illinois Municipal Code’s standard of “for cause.” Id. The appellate court noted that even though the parties had used “cause” and “just cause” interchangeably throughout the proceedings, the “just cause” provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement were only applicable to proceedings before an arbitrator, not proceedings before the board. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶143. As there was no dispute that McDonald had elected to proceed with a hearing before the Board, the “cause” standard was proper. Id.
Against Manifest Weight of Evidence
McDonald also argued that the board’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence because they relied exclusively on inadmissible hearsay. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶147. The village contended that the evidence utilized was admissible and that there was sufficient evidence of guilt, both through the recordings that were admitted and on another officer’s independent observations at the scene. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶148. The village further noted that Administrative Review Law permits the reversal of an agency’s decision on evidence only if there was material error that affected the rights of the parties and caused a substantial injustice. The appellate court did not opine on the admissibility of the evidence but agreed with the village in that “technical errors in administrative proceedings . . . are insufficient to reverse a decision ‘unless it appears to the [appellate] court that such error or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted in a substantial injustice.’ ” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶151, quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-111(b). In addition, the appellate court did not believe that the finding of guilt was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the board’s findings were supported in the record and based on express departmental rules of conduct. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶152.
Cause for Termination
McDonald’s final challenge was that the record did not support his termination under any “cause” standard, regardless of whether the standard was “for cause” or “just cause”. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶157. In addition, McDonald contended that his arrest was an illegal basis for adverse employment action under the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/2-103(A)). Id. The village refuted McDonald’s claims, explaining that the arrest was not the sole basis for McDonald’s termination, rather that McDonald had a long-standing history of discipline and had repeatedly demonstrated his inability to exercise sound judgment during his tenure as a police officer with the village. 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶158.
Evaluating McDonald’s claim, the appellate court noted that, although “[d]eterminations of cause for discharge are not prima facie correct and are subject to judicial review . . . ‘[a]n administrative tribunal’s finding of cause for discharge commands respect, and it is to be overturned only if it is arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of service.’ ” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶159, quoting McCleary v. Board of Fire & Police Commission of City of Woodstock, 251 Ill.App.3d 988, 622 N.E.2d 1257, 1265, 190 Ill.Dec. 940 (2d Dist. 1993). Citing Valio v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of Itasca, 311 Ill. App. 3d 321, 330-41 (2000), the appellate court further affirmed that“the decision to terminate is given substantial deference as the Board, not the reviewing court, stands in the best position to determine the effect of an officer’s conduct on the department.” 2025 IL App (1st) 231616 at ¶15. Looking beyond the criminal charges and to McDonald’s demonstrated lack of trustworthiness, reliability, good judgment, and integrity, the appellate court found that the board’s determination was appropriate and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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