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A Public Official’s Email, a Lost Job, and the Reach of Qualified Immunity
Facts
In Hayes v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2026 WL 1488048 (7th Cir. 2026), the plaintiff, Kathleen Hayes, was a college administrator who worked with Chicago Public Schools to place student teachers. While employed by the college, Hayes made several disparaging comments on social media about the school district and the district’s leadership. 2026 WL 1488048 at *1. At least one district administrator viewed Hayes’s social media posts and shared them with the district’s chief talent officer, Matthew Lyons. Lyons subsequently sent an email to Hayes’s direct supervisor and the dean of the college’s school of education regarding her social media activity. Id. In the email, Lyons stated that the posts were interfering with the work of both the district and the college, while acknowledging Hayes’s undisputed right to express her views.The email further stated, “I will leave this in your hands to address as you believe appropriate.” Id. Shortly thereafter, the college terminated Hayes’s employment. 2026 WL 1488048 at *2.
Following her termination, Hayes filed a four-count complaint against the board of education and Lyons, alleging that the defendants (1) retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights; (2) conspired to violate her First Amendment rights; (3) tortiously interfered with her prospective economic gain; and (4) conspired to commit tortious interference. Id. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts.
District Court
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the latter three counts. However, it denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation count, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lyons possessed final policymaking authority under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). 2026 WL 1488048 at *2. The district court also found a triable issue regarding whether Lyons’s email constituted an actionable retaliatory threat. Id.
Additionally, the district court held that Lyons was not entitled to qualified immunity because the law clearly established that an individual’s constitutional rights are violated by the sending of a threatening email to the individual’s employer seeking to chill the individual’s speech. The defendants appealed only the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Id.
Appellate Court
The appellate court addressed two jurisdictional issues. First, it considered whether it had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of an order denying qualified immunity. Second, it considered whether the board of education was a proper party to the appeal.
On the first issue, the appellate court acknowledged that while it was true that denials of summary judgment were generally not subject to appeal in interlocutory orders, a denial of qualified immunity could be immediately appealed if the denial turned solely on issues of law. Id. The appellate court further explained that because the appeal accepted Hayes’s version of the facts and exclusively raised legal issues, it properly held jurisdiction. 2026 WL 1488048 at *3. In response, Hayes asserted that because the district court found issues of material fact on the retaliation claim, the matter of qualified immunity was not a purely legal issue. However, the appellate court found that the district court’s denial of qualified immunity was based exclusively on caselaw and not on any issue of fact. Id.
As to the second jurisdictional issue on appeal, the appellate court addressed whether the board was a proper party to the appeal, given that qualified immunity is a personal defense unavailable to governmental entities like the board. 2026 WL 1488048 at *4. The board argued that its participation was necessary to avoid inconsistent verdicts and because it could be subject to indemnification obligations arising from any judgment against Lyons. Id. The appellate court disagreed, finding that Hayes’s claim against the board was based on Lyons’s actions in his capacity as policymaker. Consequently, even if Lyons was entitled to qualified immunity, that determination would not affect the board’s potential liability for unconstitutional actions taken by a policymaking employee. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court rejected the board’s argument regarding the risk of inconsistent verdicts. 2026 WL 1488048 at *5. The appellate court ultimately rejected the board’s assertion that the qualified immunity claim was “inextricably intertwined” with Hayes’s claims against the board, determined that the board’s claim of potential indemnification obligations was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, and dismissed the board from the appeal. Id.
The appellate court then addressed the qualified immunity claim on its merits by invoking the two-pronged standard set forth in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011). Under the first prong, a plaintiff must clearly identify a constitutional right that was violated; under the second prong, the right must be clearly established by existing precedent. Hayes asserted, and the district court agreed, that individuals “enjoy a First Amendment right to be free from a public official’s retaliatory speech. . .intimating that punishment, sanction or adverse regulatory action will imminently follow.” 2026 WL 1488048 at *5. Lyons did not contest the district court’s interpretation of the facts and instead focused on whether existing precedent clearly established that his conduct violated Hayes’s constitutional rights. 2026 WL 1488048 at *6. The appellate court in turn assumed without deciding that the emails could be construed as a violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech. Id. In determining whether it was “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing violated [the plaintiff’s] right,” the appellate court found the situation required comparing the facts of the complaint to the established law. Id., quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987). Citing the standard set forth in Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026), the appellate court established that “[t]he relevant precedent must define the right with a ‘high degree of specificity’ so that ‘every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.’ ” 2026 WL 1488048 at *6. The appellate court further explained that this meant that the caselaw had to be so clear that if Lyons read it before sending the email, he would have no doubt that his actions were unconstitutional. The court distinguished Lyons’s email from Hayes’s cited precedent, noting that those cases involved direct threats of government punishment or sanctions, whereas Lyons’s email expressly left any responsive action to the college. 2026 WL 1488048 at *7. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that existing precedent did not clearly establish that the email violated Hayes’s rights under the First Amendment, and it reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
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