Michelle A. Lawless,Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago
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Second District Holds Postjudgment Motion To Modify Parenting Time Should Be Evaluated Under a Change in Circumstances Standard, Not a Substantial Change in Circumstances Standard
In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2025 IL App (2d) 240028, a postjudgment action, a father filed a petition for increased parenting time only (not a change in decision-making), based on certain changes, including the children’s increased ages and his transition to full-time remote work. At the end of a lengthy multi-day hearing, the mother moved for a directed finding, arguing that the father had not proven a substantial change in circumstances; the trial court granted the mother’s finding. The Second District vacated and remanded the matter, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard under §610.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA), 750 ILCS 5/610.5. When a party seeks only a modification of parenting time, IMDMA §610.5(a), which references a change in circumstances standard applies, not IMDMA §610.5(c), which references a substantial change in circumstances. The father needed to show only changed circumstances to move to the next question, which was whether a modification was in the best interest of the children. 2025 IL App (2d) 240028 at ¶33. In its ruling the court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the plain language of §§610.5(a) and 610.5(c) and concluded that the statute’s language was not ambiguous and that the legislature intended to have different standards when modifying only parenting time separate and apart when a party requests a modification of decision-making or both parenting time and decision-making. 2025 IL App (2d) 240028 at ¶87. The court relied on the reasoning in In re Marriage of Salbi, 2024 IL App (2d) 240322-U and rejected the analysis in In re Marriage of Trapkus, 2022 IL App (3d) 190631, ¶87, 207 N.E.3d 1043, 462 Ill.Dec. 740. The court also cited to the 2017 amendments to the IMDMA, which included the following sentence in §610.5(a): “Parenting time may be modified at any time, without a showing of serious endangerment, upon a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the best interests of the child.” 2025 IL App (2d) 240028 at ¶102. Justic Birkett issued a lengthy dissenting opinion.
Investigators Performing Investigative Work on Behalf of Attorneys Are Entitled to the Same Absolute Litigation Privilege Afforded Attorneys
In a case of first impression, a target of a private investigation (an alleged paramour) filed a tort claim against a divorce litigant and a private detective hired by the divorce litigant’s counsel. Lewis v. Kalbhen, 2025 IL App (1st) 242110. The claim was a three-count petition filed under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq., alleging unauthorized intrusion into her private affairs, public disclosure of private facts with the intention of causing severe emotional distress, and violation of the DPPA when the investigator ran a check on her license plate and disclosed private information contained in her motor vehicle records. 2025 IL App (1st) 242110 at ¶2. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the target appealed. The appellate court held that the absolute litigation privilege extended to the private investigator hired by the divorce litigant’s counsel. During the divorce case, the wife’s counsel directed an investigative firm to run a license-plate check on a vehicle suspected to belong to the husband’s girlfriend and then to prepare a background report to investigate a potential dissipation of assets claim. The report included identifying information that could be used to facilitate subpoenas and additional discovery. 2025 IL App (1st) 242110 at ¶9. The litigation privilege extended beyond counsel and parties to investigators acting as agents of counsel, even absent a written engagement or payment, as long as the communications and conduct are pertinent to proposed or pending litigation.
Postjudgment Child Support Modification Upheld Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
In re Parentage of Jade J., 2025 IL App (1st) 241803, was a parentage action in which neither the mother or the father resided in Illinois at the time of the entry of the original order for support or during the subsequent modification proceedings including the appeal. At issue in the case was the interpretation of what constitutes “consent” to Illinois modifying a support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 750 ILCS 22/101, et seq. The original support order was entered well after the birth of the child in Harvey, Illinois, in 2005. The mother initiated the proceedings in 2009, and a support order was entered in 2012. In 2015, the father filed a petition to modify support and determine arrears, alleging he had no income. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶4. In December 2015, the court held a hearing and issued three orders: (1) allowing a lawyer for the mother to file an appearance, granting the mother time to file responses to certain motions, a discovery timeline, and set a file hearing for a date in March 2016; (2) temporarily reducing the father’s child support; and (3) a uniform order for support in which the court found it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶5. The lawyer for the mother never filed an appearance, and the case proceeded for two years with several continuances in which neither the mother or a lawyer on the mother’s behalf appeared. In 2017, the trial court issued a permanent order for support in the amount of $265 per month. In 2023, six years after the final modification order and after the minor child’s emancipation, the mother filed a motion under §2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, seeking to vacate the 2017 order on the grounds the court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order and that the mother did not receive any notice of any of the hearing and, therefore, did not consent to its entry. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶8. The father filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied the mother’s motion to vacate. The mother appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. Section 205 of the UIFSA, 750 ILCS 22-205, states that if Illinois is not the residence of the obligor, the oblige, or the child, the parties need to consent in the record or in open court that Illinois may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its original support order. The court rejected the mother’s attempt to collaterally attack the order years later via §2-1401, emphasizing that consent to jurisdiction under the UIFSA is sufficient to confer continuing authority to modify child support even when Illinois is no longer the parties’ home state. The mother’s attorney appeared at a 2015 modification hearing, did not object to jurisdiction, allowed the court to enter substantive temporary support orders, received and accepted reduced support for years, and later withdrew her argument challenging personal jurisdiction during the appeal process. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶24. Collectively, these actions reinforced the conclusion that she consented to the entry of the order under §205(a)(2) of the UIFSA. 2025 IL App (1st) 241803 at ¶26. Justice Howse issued a dissenting opinion.
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