Michelle A. Lawless,Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago
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Premarital Agreements, Jurisdiction, and Support: Recent Appellate Updates
In In re Marriage of Escamilla, 2026 IL App (4th) 250366, a dissolution of marriage action, the husband asserted that the wife was barred from seeking maintenance under the terms of a premarital agreement. The wife contested this assertion and filed a motion for temporary relief seeking various remedies, including temporary maintenance. The husband subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the court to find the agreement valid and enforceable with respect to the wife’s waiver of maintenance. The agreement had been drafted by the wife, who was a paralegal at a law firm at the time of its execution. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the agreement barred both parties from seeking maintenance from the other, and the wife appealed. The Fourth District reversed, holding that maintenance is a significant and explicit statutory right under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act that may be waived only through an express and unambiguous intent to waive. The court emphasized that while the Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act permits parties to modify or eliminate spousal support, a generalized waiver of rights to a spouse’s “property” or “estate” does not suffice to waive statutory maintenance. The language of the agreement was silent on the issue of maintenance, contained no reference to any related term such as spousal support or alimony, and contained only a waiver of any interest in the “property” and “estate” of the husband acquired by reason of marriage. Further, the agreement did not define “property.” Therefore, the court held no valid waiver existed, reversed the trial court’s ruling, and remanded for further proceedings.
In a postjudgment action, all parties including the minor children had left Illinois, but the mother filed a petition for rule to show cause and a motion to modify child support in Illinois, the last and only state to enter a child support order after the entry of judgment of dissolution of marriage. In re Marriage of Cox, 2026 IL App (1st) 242290. The trial court ultimately granted both of the mother’s petitions, and the father appealed, contesting the court’s ability to hear the matter because neither party nor the minor children remained in Illinois and the parties had not consented for Illinois to retain jurisdiction over the matter. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders and held that the trial court retained the authority to adjudicate the parties’ child support dispute despite all parties having relocated out of Illinois. The court clarified that the “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” language in §205 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 750 ILCS 22/205, does not deal with subject-matter jurisdiction, which is constitutionally conferred, but instead governs when a court may exercise authority as a matter of statutory compliance and personal jurisdiction to modify a support order. The court further held that the father waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and independently consented to Illinois’ continued jurisdiction over the matter by filing an appearance, submitting responsive pleadings, and actively participating in the litigation. The court also noted the distinction between modification (governed by UIFSA §205) and enforcement (governed by UIFSA §206), holding that the statutory limitations applicable to modifications do not restrict a trial court’s ability to enforce an existing support order.
In Cox, the father appealed the trial court’s order, which he alleged failed to enforce the “true-up” provision of the child support order. Specifically, he alleged that the mother failed to provide her tax returns, which were required for the parties to perform the annual “true-up” to determine whether child support had been overpaid or underpaid. When addressing the true-up provision, the trial court determined that the parties could perform annual support reconciliations without exchanging tax returns. The appellate court ruled that this determination constituted a permissible, albeit “slight,” modification of the judgment rather than mere interpretation, but that child support provisions, including mechanisms like income verification, may be modified upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances and that the trial court retains broad discretion to adjust the mechanics of child support administration. In the absence of a complete record, the court presumed the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence.
The father also appealed the trial court’s order modifying his monthly child support amount, and the appellate court affirmed. Despite the father’s arguments that the trial court failed to consider the children’s needs and considered only his income, a substantial change in circumstances may be based solely on the obligor’s increased income. Further, a guideline support award carries a rebuttable presumption of correctness. There was no abuse of discretion when the trial court applied statutory guidelines and made express findings regarding changed circumstances and the parties’ respective incomes. The court again restated that absent a record demonstrating otherwise, reviewing courts will presume the trial court properly considered the statutory factors, including the children’s needs.
For more information about family law, see ADOPTION LAW (IICLE®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.