Michelle A. Lawless, Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago
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Two-Year Plenary Order of Protection Upheld, Supervised Visitation Order Vacated and More
Two-Year Plenary Order of Protection Upheld
In In re Marriage of Kriley, 2025 IL App (1st) 241923, a protracted matter lasting several years that began with both parties filing petitions for emergency orders of protection against each other, the husband was ultimately granted a plenary order of protection against the wife, which included their young son as a protected person. The wife was ordered to have supervised virtual visitation. The wife appealed the issuance of the order of protection, and the appellate court affirmed. The wife claimed the trial court did not make the relevant findings required by the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (IDVA), 750 ILCS 60/101, et seq., and challenged the court’s findings with respect to the alleged abuse. The evidence showed the wife had engaged in a number of harassing actions, including absconding with the child to New York, changing the locks on the husband’s apartment and ransacking it, sending threatening messages to the husband’s family, and sending an email to the husband’s employer. The trial court’s finding of abuse was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court further addressed the wife’s argument that her alleged acts were “stale” because they were from three years prior to the time of the hearing, stating that any past evidence of abuse, no matter how remote, may be relevant to prove abuse under the IDVA. 2025 IL App (1st) 241923 at ¶¶73 – 75. The appellate court also declined to agree with the wife’s argument that the mental health examiner’s report should not have been admitted into evidence because it was not timely delivered pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215(c), which requires delivery of the report within 21 days of the completion of the examination. However, because no court order was entered appointing a S.Ct. Rule 215 examination (it appears an agreed order was prepared but never entered), this argument failed. The appellate court also noted that even if it further considered such argument, it was unclear when the examiner completed her examination and that several continuance orders were entered continuing the matter on the grounds that the parties were awaiting the completion of the report, and the wife had not objected to timeliness at any point.
Supervised Visitation Order Vacated
In Kriley, supra, the wife was ordered to have only supervised virtual visitation with the child. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) as the supervisor and ordered the parties to divide equally the payment of the GAL’s fees, including requiring his current bill to be brought current in order for the visitation to commence. The record indicated that during the course of the case, there was difficulty finding a supervisor who was willing to take on the case given the specific set of facts. The appellate court questioned the appointment of the GAL as the supervisor noting that it was an “odd extension” of the role, particularly when other professionals specialize in the area. It also clarified that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have ordered supervised visitation given the evidence presented and both the GAL and mental health examiner’s conclusions that the wife needed significant mental health support. The appellate court vacated the order regarding the supervised visitation and asked the trial court to take another look at it, including whether there was a professional supervisor who would be willing to do supervised virtual visitation. The appellate court made it clear it was not ordering the trial court to reach a different result on remand.
Nonmarital Character of Accounts Upheld due to Motion in LimineBeing Granted
In In re Marriage of Xinos and Marino, 2025 IL App (1st) 232326, a dissolution of marriage action, the husband failed to identify or produce documentation in discovery supporting his claim that various financial accounts were nonmarital property. As a result, the trial court granted the wife’s motion in limine pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 219(c) brought on the eve of trial barring the husband from introducing evidence of the accounts’ nonmarital character at trial. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse discretion, and noted the husband failed to supplement discovery responses prior to the discovery deadlines and failed to make an offer of proof regarding the accounts’ origins or tracing of funds at trial. When a motion in limineis granted, an offer of proof is critical to save for review the argument that the exclusion of the evidence was in error. The appellate court further rejected the husband’s arguments that he was prejudiced by the timing of the motion in limine or by proceeding pro se at trial. The appellate court also upheld the 75-percent/25-percent division of the marital accounts in the husband’s favor.
Plenary Order of Protection Affirmed with Respect to Two Persons in a Prior Dating Relationship
In Montelauro v. Lutkus, 2025 IL App (2d) 240369, the Second District affirmed the trial court’s entry of a plenary order of protection in favor of the petitioner, finding that the respondent engaged in harassment and interfered with the petitioner’s personal liberty. The parties had a brief dating relationship that ended in September 2022, after which the petitioner repeatedly told the respondent to cease contact. Despite this, the respondent left numerous voicemails, sent texts from alternative numbers, appeared at the petitioner’s home uninvited, and ultimately sent an explicit photo of the petitioner via Snapchat more than a year after their breakup. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that these actions constituted harassment causing emotional distress and that the respondent’s conduct was intended to compel the petitioner to maintain unwanted contact. The court also rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court failed to properly consider the statutory factors under the IDVA, noting that the trial court’s written order reflected consideration of those factors and that its findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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