Catherine R. Locallo, Robbins Schwartz, Chicago
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Former DePaul Instructor Loses Appeal in Racial Discrimination Suit
In Saud v. DePaul University, 154 F.4th 563 (7th Cir. 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of an Arab American term faculty member’s §1981 race discrimination claim. The Seventh Circuit found that DePaul had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions (nonrenewal and ineligibility for future employment based on misconduct allegations, low enrollment, and his compensation request) and that the plaintiff failed to show these reasons were pretext for racial animus. As set forth in more detail below, the decision reinforces key doctrines in discrimination law, including the adverse action requirement, honest-belief rule, appropriate comparator analysis, and but-for causation, all within the academic employment context.
Background Facts
The plaintiff, an Arab American, was employed as nontenure-track term faculty member in the Religious Studies Department at DePaul University. Prior to becoming a term faculty member, he was employed as an adjunct instructor in same department. 154 F.4th at 565.
On April 10, 2017, DePaul informed the plaintiff and another faculty member that their contracts would not be renewed for budgetary reasons. That same day, DePaul received a letter from an attorney alleging that the plaintiff had engaged in repeated acts of sexual misconduct with one of his students. While DePaul did not have a policy prohibiting relationships between faculty and students, it did have a policy that “[t]he determination of what constitutes sexual harassment depends upon the specific facts and the context in which the conduct occurs.” 154 F.4th at 566.
DePaul’s Title IX Office conducted an investigation. The student did not participate in the investigation. The plaintiff admitted to a sexual relationship with the student in the investigation but said it was consensual and occurred after she was no longer his student. The Title IX Office found insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of misconduct. Id.
In mid-May 2017, DePaul informed the plaintiff that it was reinstating his adjunct instructor position to teach two courses. The plaintiff made a compensation request that was more than the department chair could offer. Id.
On June 29, 2017, the student filed a civil lawsuit against the plaintiff, alleging sexual harassment. The student claimed that he had sex with her and offered her alcohol when she was still his student. The lawsuit also claimed that he told her she would get an “A” in his class and would not have to take the final exam. Id.
A few days later on July 6, 2017, the department chair informed the plaintiff that due to projected low course enrollment and his compensation requirements, they could no longer offer him employment as an adjunct instructor. Id.
Thereafter, DePaul initiated a second Title IX investigation. The plaintiff gave DePaul the verified answer that he filed in the lawsuit brought by the student. The verified answer confirmed that the plaintiff asked the student out for a drink when she was still a student and that they had sex. The plaintiff did not deny that the sex occurred when she was still a student. The Title IX office concluded that the plaintiff had sexually harassed the student. DePaul informed the plaintiff that based on these findings, he was no longer eligible for future employment. Id.
In June 2019, the plaintiff sued DePaul and two individuals for a variety of claims. Only the §1983 race discrimination against DePaul survived various motions to dismiss. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for DePaul. The plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 154 F.4th at 565 – 566.
The Seventh Circuit’s Decision
Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment contracts. The plaintiff invoked the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework (see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973)) to answer the question of whether a reasonable factfinder would conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, or religion or other factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action. Id.
Neither party disputed that the plaintiff met the first three requirements for a prima facie case: (1) as an Arab American, he is a member of a protected class; (2) prior to the events at issue, he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations; and (3) he suffered adverse employment actions (the decision to not hire him as an adjunct instructor and the decision to deem him ineligible for future employment). DePaul offered nondiscriminatory reasons for its decisions, so the court proceeded directly to the pretext inquiry. 154 F.4th at 567 – 568.
As to pretext for the decision to not hire him as an adjunct instructor, the plaintiff invoked comparator evidence, shifting/inconsistent reasons, and contradictory evidence. In this instance, the plaintiff attempted to compare himself to a white faculty member who had an anonymous allegation of sexual assault posted online but was rehired. The court rejected the plaintiff’s comparator argument because the white faculty member was not “directly comparable to [the plaintiff] in all material respects.” 154 F.4th at 568, quoting Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2024). Namely, DePaul could not identify the accuser against the site faculty member, the plaintiff admitted to having sex with a student, no lawsuit was filed against the white faculty member, and the decision was made after the student filed a civil lawsuit against the plaintiff and after the plaintiff made a request for compensation beyond the department chair’s means. 106 F.4th at 568.
The court likewise rejected the plaintiff’s claim that DePaul’s reasons to not hire him as an adjunct instructor were shifting or inconsistent because they were not consistently referenced. The court accepted DePaul’s articulated reasons, including the student’s civil lawsuit, additional reports of misconduct, low projected enrollments in his courses, and the plaintiff’s compensation request above budgeted levels. It relied on the principle that “[w]here an employer relies on multiple reasons for the termination, its failure to address all of the reasons in each communication about the employee is not enough to show contradictions or shifts in rationales that suggest pretext.” [Emphasis in original.] 106 F.4th at 569, quoting Castro v. DeVry University, Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 577 (7th Cir. 2015).
As to the plaintiff’s last point of contradictory evidence, the court determined that the plaintiff did not put forth evidence to meet the inquiry of “[w]hether a reasonable juror could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have [been employed as an adjunct for the fall quarter] if he had a different ethnicity, and everything else remained the same.” 154 F.4th at 570, quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016).
As to pretext for the decision deeming him ineligible for future employment, the plaintiff again invoked comparator evidence and a cat’s paw theory of liability. The court rejected the plaintiff’s comparator argument as noted above for one white faculty member and for another white faculty member in this instance because DePaul treated the other white faculty the same way: deeming him ineligible for future employment because of verbal exchanges of a sexual nature that he made to a student. 154 F.4th at 571.
The plaintiff also argued that bias by the Title IX investigator (who is not the final decision-maker) could be imputed to the Dean via a cat’s paw theory because she investigated him when DePaul did not have a policy prohibiting relationships with students. This theory applies when “a biased subordinate who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision maker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.” 154 F.4th at 571, quoting Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., 726 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2013). The court’s sole focus was “on whether the employer’s stated reason can be characterized as a falsehood rather than an honestly held belief.” 154 F.4th at 572, quoting Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 435 (7th Cir. 2022). The plaintiff did not show that the investigator did not honestly believe the plaintiff violated the sexual harassment policy following her second investigation. As such, the theory failed. 154 F.4th at 572.
Finally, the court looked at the totality of evidence and concluded no reasonable juror could infer that the plaintiff would have been treated differently if he were not an Arab American. Summary judgment was affirmed.
The case underscores the importance of documenting legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for employment decisions, conducting adequate investigations when misconduct allegations arise, and ensuring consistent treatment of faculty in comparable circumstances.
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