Thomas C. Garretson, Robbins Schwartz, Chicago
312-332-7760 | Email Thomas C. Garretson
Reassignment Revisited: A Federal Reminder on ADA Accommodation Duties
On January 8, 2026, Judge Matthew Kennelly of the U.S. District for the Northern District of Illinois issued a decision denying an employer’s motion for summary judgment on a former employee’s claims of disparate treatment and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq. The case, Scruggs v. Chicago Transit Authority, Case No. 24 C 2712, 2026 WL 63480 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 8, 2026), serves as an important reminder for all employers that an employee who is unable to perform the essential functions of their position may be entitled under the ADA to temporary placement in a another vacant position with essential functions that they can perform.
Background Facts
Plaintiff Stephanie Scruggs (Scruggs) was employed by the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) as a bus operator. While between work shifts in September 2020, Scruggs was shot by a paintball gun in the thigh and stomach by an individual in a passing car. Scruggs fell to the ground and suffered injuries, including injuries to her left shoulder that required two surgeries. Scruggs submitted an injury-on-duty claim to the CTA’s third-party administrator on the same date, which was denied without explanation.
In March 2021, after Scruggs had been absent from duty since suffering the September 2020 injury, the CTA directed Scruggs to report to work to explain her absence. Scruggs reported and communicated that she intended to request an accommodation, which was submitted in April 2021. The request included medical documentation stating that Scruggs required shoulder surgery (the date of the surgery was not specified), that she could not drive, and that she would be limited in her ability to drive for eight to twelve months following surgery. The CTA denied the request, stating that Scruggs could not perform the essential functions of her position and that the accommodation review committee was unaware of an open position at the CTA for which she was qualified and eligible to fill.
Evidence was submitted to the Court reflecting a CTA program that provides temporary reassignments for certain employees with injuries arising out of and in the course of their CTA employment. The program requires the employee’s medical prognosis to provide for a full recovery within six months, with placements in temporary positions being subject to the CTA’s business needs and lasting a maximum of 90 days. The CTA argued Scruggs was ineligible for participation in this program because the CTA’s third-party administrator had denied her injury-on-duty claim.
In April 2022, a physician cleared Scruggs to return to work, but prohibited her from driving a commercial vehicle, using her arm above her shoulder, repetitive pulling or pushing, and lifting over five pounds. At a subsequent meeting, Scruggs was told by her supervisor that she would not be allowed to return to work unless she could return on a full-time basis driving a bus. In May 2022, Scruggs was terminated from employment for being absent from work since September 2020 without an approved leave. Scruggs then filed a lawsuit against the CTA, alleging disparate treatment and failure to accommodate under the ADA.
Denial of CTA’s Motion for Summary Judgment
In denying the CTA’s motion for summary judgment on both Scruggs’ disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims, the Court initially noted that the parties did not dispute whether Scruggs had a disability under the ADA but instead disputed whether Scruggs was a “qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA. Under the ADA, a “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. §12111(8). The Court confirmed that even if a plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of their position, the plaintiff is still a “qualified individual” if they establish that they were qualified to perform the essential functions of another vacant position that they desire.
According to the Court, it was uncontested that Scruggs possessed the basic qualifications for her position. The CTA instead argued that Scruggs was not a “qualified individual” because she did not report to work for over 600 days due to her injury. However, the Court noted that the CTA’s argument “sidesteps the relevant inquiry, which is whether, on the date of her termination, Scruggs could come to work and perform the essential functions of her position or another vacant position.” 2026 WL 63480 at *4. Prior to her termination in May 2022, Scruggs was cleared to return to work with restrictions and was not able to perform at least one essential function of her job as a bus operator. Despite this, the Court still noted that a reasonable jury could find that Scruggs could have performed the essential functions of a different light-duty position offered to other employees under the CTA’s temporary reassignment program.
The Court also concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Scruggs’ disability was a reason for her termination, highlighting the statement made to Scruggs by her supervisor that unless she returned full-time driving a bus, the CTA would not allow her to return to work. Scruggs’ temporary disability prevented her from driving a commercial vehicle, and the supervisor threatened to terminate her employment for that reason. While the Court stated that it was “by no means indisputable” that Scruggs was terminated due to her disability, Scruggs presented enough evidence to create a genuine factual dispute as to whether her disability was a reason for the discharge, entitling Scruggs to a trial on the disparate treatment claim. 2026 WL 63480 at *5.
Similarly, the Court concluded that with respect to the failure-to-accommodate claim, there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the CTA failed to reasonably accommodate Scruggs’ disability. According to the Court, Scruggs requested a “textbook reasonable accommodation: reassignment to a vacant position.” 2026 WL 63480 at *6. Per the Court, a reasonable jury could find that Scruggs’ request for a temporary light-duty position was reasonable given the CTA has thousands of employees. The CTA failed to identify any evidence that demonstrated a lack of vacant positions for which Scruggs was qualified, nor did it argue that it would have faced an undue hardship by assigning Scruggs to a temporary light-duty position. As such, the Court held that Scruggs was also entitled to a trial on her failure-to-accommodate claim.
Takeaway
The Court’s decision in denying the CTA’s motion for summary judgment confirms that even though an employee may not be able to perform the essential functions of their position due to a disability, this is not necessarily the end of the inquiry required under the ADA. Instead, employers should closely consider whether there are any alternate and vacant positions that the employee is qualified to perform. Failing to consider reassignment to a vacant position could create exposure to disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims under the ADA.
For more information about employment and labor law, see EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (IICLE®, 2026). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.