August 2025 IICLE FLASHPOINTS

The Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act (UIDDA), 735 ILCS 35/1, et seq., provides a powerful, modern tool for today’s interconnected legal landscape. In our era of instant communication and multistate litigation, attorneys frequently need discovery from witnesses and entities located beyond their home state’s borders. Before the UIDDA’s adoption in 2007, this meant navigating unfamiliar court systems, deciphering varying procedures, and filing new actions in other states. The process was costly, inefficient, and often disrupted the discovery timeline and litigation strategy.

In 2015, Illinois joined the movement to streamline the discovery process and adopted the UIDDA. Illinois joined 47 states, Washington D.C., and the U.S. Virgin Islands, that have adopted the Act.

UIDDA in Illinois: Streamlining Out of State Discovery

The UIDDA defines several key terms broadly to ensure flexibility and consistency between the home state (where litigation is pending) and the discovery state (where the discovery sought is located). A “foreign subpoena” refers to a subpoena issued by a court in the discovery state. A “subpoena” is defined in 735 ILCS 35/2(5) as a document issued by a court of record that can require a person to:

(a) attend and testify at a deposition;

(b) produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, documents, records, electronically stored information, or tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the person; or

(c) permit inspection of premises under the control of the person.

A “person” is defined broadly in 735 ILCS 35/2(3) to include individuals, corporations, trusts, partnerships, government, governmental agencies, and other legal entities.

When an Illinois attorney seeks discovery from a person or entity located in another state, the attorney must submit the Illinois-issued subpoena to the clerk of court in the county where discovery is sought. For example, if discovery is needed in Greenville County, South Carolina, the Illinois attorney submits the subpoena to the Greenville County Clerk of Court. The clerk then issues a subpoena for service on the witness or entity, following the applicable laws and procedures of the discovery state. It is critical that the foreign subpoena include the exact terms of the original Illinois subpoena, as well as include, or be accompanied with, the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all counsel of record in the Illinois proceeding, as well as any unrepresented parties.

Illinois has further refined the UIDDA process by requiring that the service of the subpoena comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 204 (addressing the appearance of deponents and depositions of nonparty physicians) and Rule 247 (signing and filing depositions), as well as §2-1101 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1101). Accordingly, attorneys must ensure proper service of subpoenas, whether by foreign clerk, a process server, or the sheriff’s office of the discovery state. Notably, it falls to the attorney to confirm that service has been properly completed.

Enforcement and Illinois-Specific Protections

Any protective order, or order to enforce, quash, or modify a subpoena issued by a clerk, must be filed in the court of the discovery state where the subpoena was issued.

Illinois’ implementation of the UIDDA includes specific provisions addressing subpoenas seeking information related to activities defined by the Lawful Health Care Activity Act, 735 ILCS 40/28-5, et seq., or requests that would interfere with privacy protections under the Reproductive Health Act, 775 ILCS 55/1-1, et seq. If a subpoena relates to these areas, the recipient may move to quash or modify the subpoena. A clerk may issue the subpoena if the requesting party provides an attestation confirming that an exemption applies.

A clerk may still issue the subpoena if the requesting party provides an attestation confirming that an exemption applies.

The UIDDA is a valuable tool that enables Illinois attorneys to obtain out-of-state discovery more efficiently. Proper use requires close attention to the procedural rules of the discovery state, including clerk requirements, service rules, and unique statutory protections, such as Illinois’ healthcare related exemptions. When carefully applied, the UIDDA reduces the burdens of interstate discovery and facilitates the timely gathering of evidence.

For more information about civil litigation, see CIVIL APPEALS: STATE AND FEDERAL — 2025 EDITION. Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Andrea Fabian-Checkai, Borkan & Scahill, Chicago, IL

Andrea Fabian-Checkai is an associate at Borkan & Scahill, where she focuses on civil litigation with an emphasis on Section 1983 claims, including wrongful convictions, police pursuit, and excessive force cases. As a former Assistant State’s Attorney in Cook County, Andrea handled a range of felony prosecutions, including DNA-based and juvenile matters. Her prosecutorial insight and litigation experience inform her strategic approach to complex civil rights cases. A native Spanish speaker, Andrea emphasizes thoughtful advocacy across communities.

Whenever a unit owner does not pay assessments, the cost of maintaining the condominium property is shifted by that unit owner to the other unit owners. The association has a duty to collect assessments. Indeed, the Condominium Property Act (Condominium Act), 765 ILCS 605/1, et seq., prohibits the board of directors from forbearing the collection of assessments. 765 ILCS 605/18(o). Indeed, it would be reasonable to conclude that, absent special circumstances prohibiting such action, a condominium association’s board of directors has a fiduciary duty owed to all the unit owners to collect unpaid assessments.

In a recent Third District Appellate Court decision, the court reversed summary judgment for a unit owner against an association regarding its counterclaim to collect unpaid amounts due. Du Bois v. Sherwood Commons Townhome Owners Ass’n, 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U. However, under a unique, somewhat inexplicable, set of facts, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the association breached its fiduciary duties to the unit owner in placing a lien and in asserting claims for amounts owed that a prior court previously found to not be assessments but still could be owed.

Facts

There was a prior lawsuit. In 2018, Sherwood Commons Townhome Owners Association, Inc., filed a lawsuit against a townhome unit owner, Ricardo Du Bois, to collect unpaid assessments and for breach of contract in failing to pay his share of common expenses. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶4.

From the prior case and an appeal of the trial court’s ruling for the owner, two conclusions could be derived. First, to the extent the association was attempting to collect water bills, they were not assessments. Related to this conclusion, the trial and appellate courts in the first case found that the association had authority to collect the water bills from the owner, but not as assessments. Also, as of December 2017, no money was owed on the owner’s water bill. Id. Second, the courts in the prior litigation held that the Condominium Act applied to the association. The association argued that it did not manage condominiums, but managed townhomes. However, the courts were persuaded by the fact that declaration recorded against the property, which would have created the association, said that the declaration was adopted pursuant to the Condominium Act. Id.

The instant case arose from a complaint filed by owner against the association sounding in breach of fiduciary duties arising from both the Condominium Act and from the association’s bylaws because the association had recorded a lien against the owner’s unit for unpaid assessments, attorneys’ fees, and costs related to the prior lawsuit (in which no fees had been awarded). 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶5. The owner also sought an injunction to compel the lien to be removed. Id.

The association answered and counterclaimed suing for possession, payment of assessments and common expenses, and breach of the declaration of easements, restrictions, and covenants, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Id.

In its summary judgment motion, filed in October 2023, the association alleged that in 2020, the association’s board adopted a resolution declaring unpaid water and sewer charges as collectible as with common expenses. It also recorded a lien against the owner’s unit for an amount exceeding $10,000 for unpaid common expenses, assessments, water charges, late fees, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶6. It also argued that the fiduciary obligations under the Act were not applicable because it was a townhome association. The association also argued that application of the business judgment rule barred recovery for breach of fiduciary duty. Id.

In his summary judgment motion, the owner argued that the lien had been recorded against his unit encumbering his property, that he had paid any unpaid water charges in 2021, and that the association refused to accept payment of his assessments after he filed the instant action. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶9. He also argued that the association owed him a fiduciary duty not to pursue collection of amounts that a court had previously determined that he did not owe and that the association’s amendment could not be applied retroactively as to the water charges. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶10. He also argued that the association was not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs from the prior action because it did not prevail in that action. Id. In his response to association’s motion, the owner argued that the business judgment rule did not apply, and it could not rely on the advice of counsel when there was no evidence that the association sought counsel’s advice on recording the lien on his unit. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶11.

In its response, the association argued that res judicata did not apply because there was no identity of actions given that the relationship between the parties was a continuing course of conduct. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶12.

The trial court granted the owner’s summary judgment motion and denied the association’s summary judgment motion. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶13. The trial court also found for the owner on the association’s counterclaims. Id. The association appealed.

Analysis

The appellate court applied de novoreview. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶17.

The first question resolved by the appellate court was that the Condominium Act applied to the association under the principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, having already been decided in a prior action between the same parties. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶15.

In addressing the question of what, if any, fiduciary duty was owed to the owner, the appellate court reviewed some often-cited Illinois cases regarding duties owed by the association under the Condominium Act and briefly discussed the business judgment rule. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶¶18 – 19. It concluded that summary judgment for the owner on his claims was appropriate because the lien was in part based on sums litigated in the prior action when the water charges were found not to be assessments and when the association was not awarded attorneys’ fees. Fees would not be recoverable when the association failed to prove its case. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶20.

In holding that the association breached its fiduciary duties in imposing a lien and pursuing collection of sums already determined to not be assessments, the appellate court emphasized that “this is a highly unusual situation with a very unique set of circumstances, where the Association essentially ignored the fact that it lost the prior action against [the owner.]” 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶21. After discussing the association’s conduct further, the appellate court “reiterate[d] that this is an extremely unusual case and that it will rarely be considered a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of an Association to attempt to collect amounts it believes are due and owing from a unit owner.” Id.

As to the association’s counterclaim, the appellate court agreed with the association that there were genuine issues of material fact as to what, if any, assessments and late fees were owed by the owner (apparently excluding any assessment payments that the association refused to accept after this action was commenced). Also, there were issues of fact regarding what, if any, attorneys’ fees the association may be owed based on these alleged unpaid assessments. 2025 IL App (3d) 240122-U at ¶23. Therefore, judgment for the owner on the association’s counterclaim was reversed and remanded.

Sidebar: Neither the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986, 805 ILCS 105/101.01, et seq., nor the Common Interest Community Association Act, 765 ILCS 160/1-1, et seq., (the latter being the Act that probably should have been applicable to the association if the declaration was properly drafted) expressly provides that the board of directors owes fiduciary duties to the members or owners. However, it is not unexpected in the United States that any corporation’s or other organizational entity’s leadership would be recognized to owe fiduciary duties to its membership. Although it is not discussed in this decision and may never have been argued in Du Bois, in 1965, the Illinois Appellate Court recognized that the fiduciary duties owed by directors and officers of a business corporation are similarly owed by the directors and officers of a not-for-profit corporation. Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 62 Ill.App.2d 50, 210 N.E.2d 12 (5th Dist. 1965). For more information on fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule, see Ch. 6, Liability Problems, in particular §6.50, CONDOMINIUM LAW: DAILY OPERATION CHALLENGES (IICLE^®, 2024).

For more information about condominium law, see CONDOMINIUM LAW: GOVERNANCE, AUTHORITY, AND CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Kenneth Michaels, Jr., Bauch & Michaels, LLC, Chicago

Kenneth Michaels, Jr. is a partner at Bauch & Michaels, LLC, with over four decades of experience in commercial litigation, transactions, and corporate governance. He represents a diverse clientele, including banks, insurance companies, and Fortune 500 businesses, specializing in asset sales, property management, and loan agreements. Ken is also a recognized Illinois “Super Lawyer” in real property law and has contributed extensively to legal education and community service. He teaches at the University of Illinois Chicago Law School and has been a public official in Illinois for nearly 30 years.

In People v. Hoskins, 2025 IL App (4th) 240991, the Fourth District Appellate Court upheld a vehicle search in which methamphetamine was discovered that resulted from a K-9 free-air sniff by a K-9 trained to detect cannabis and various narcotics.

In Hoskins, an Illinois State Police sergeant conducted a traffic stop on a pickup truck for not having an illuminated registration light on June 3, 2022. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶10. A K-9 deputy arrived on the scene, and he performed a free-air sniff with his K-9. The K-9 was trained to detect cannabis, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. The K-9 alerted on the truck’s passenger door. The deputy then searched the truck and located methamphetamine and a small amount of cannabis. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶¶17 – 18.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and argued that the vehicle search was unlawful because cannabis was a legal substance and could not be considered contraband for a K-9 alert. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶6. The trial court denied the motion and cited People v. Mallery, 2023 IL App (4th) 220528, 228 N.E.3d 856, 471 Ill.Dec. 347, in which the appellate court held that an alert by a K-9 trained to detect various substances including cannabis could establish probable cause. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶21.

The appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that a K-9 alert by a K-9 trained to detect cannabis can no longer support probable cause because the K-9 might alert to a person’s lawful possession of cannabis. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶60. The appellate court emphasized that cannabis remains unlawful in more ways than it remains lawful in Illinois, including illegal ways to transport and consume and certain illegal amounts to possess. The appellate court further rejected the defendant’s contention that possession of less than 30 grams of cannabis is “perfectly legal.” The appellate court noted that cannabis can legally be possessed in a vehicle only if certain age, storage, consumption, and weight conditions are met. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶¶63 – 64.

The appellate court further stated that the other drugs that the K-9 was trained to detect (cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine) remain illegal to possess in a car or anywhere else. The appellate court explained that “[m]oreover, although society’s attitudes about cannabis have clearly shifted and continue to do so, they have not shifted so far to lead us to conclude that society would recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the transport of cannabis in a vehicle that would preclude the use of drug detection dogs to detect the presence of other illegal narcotics, such as heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine, or the illegal possession or transportation of cannabis.” 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶¶67 – 68.

The appellate court concluded that the defendant’s position would impair law enforcement’s ability to enforce the remainder of cannabis laws that prohibit possession, transportation, and trafficking of more than 30 grams. Because the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing that an unlawful search occurred, his attorney was not ineffective for failing to argue that the K-9 sniff was a search. 2025 IL App (4th) 240991 at ¶¶69 – 70.

For more information about criminal law, see DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES: TRIALS, SENTENCING, APPEALS, AND POSTTRIAL ISSUES (IICLE®, 2025). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Matthew R. Leisten, Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office, Oregon, IL

Matthew R. Leisten serves as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for the Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office in Oregon, Illinois. In his role, he provides essential updates on caselaw relevant to search warrants, focusing on issues such as good faith, staleness, and the impact of modern technology on legal procedures. His experience includes handling complex warrants involving advanced technologies like geofences and Triggerfish. Additionally, Leisten contributes to legal education through publications and presentations, ensuring that attorneys stay informed about current legal trends and practices.

On August 1, 2025, Governor Pritzker signed into law P.A. 104-135, which amends the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/1, et seq. Effective immediately, the IWPCA provides that in any wage claims adjudicated through an administrative hearing at the Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL), damages of five percent will accrue for each month an underpayment remains unpaid, until the date that IDOL’s final order and decision becomes a debt due and owed to the State. 820 ILCS 115/14(a). In addition, if an employer is ordered to pay unpaid wages, the existing nonwaivable administrative fee owed to IDOL has been increased by $250. 820 ILCS 115/14(b). Finally, for claims adjudicated through an administrative hearing at IDOL, if an employer is ordered to pay unpaid wages, a one percent penalty shall accrue for each calendar day that the underpayments remain unpaid, until the date the final order and decision of IDOL becomes a debt due and owed to the State. 820 ILCS 115/14(b).

Paid Military Leave for Funeral Honors Details

On August 1, 2025, Governor Pritzker signed into law P.A. 104-78, which, effective immediately, provides eligible employees with a right to paid leave for funeral honors details under the Military Leave Act (MLA), 820 ILCS 151/1, et seq. Under the MLA, “funeral honors detail” is defined as an honor guard detail provided for the funeral of any veteran in compliance with 10 U.S.C. §1491 (and associated federal regulations), which consists of at least two members of the U.S. Armed Forces, one of whom must be from the deceased veteran’s service branch, with the remainder consisting of members of the armed forces (active or retired) or members of an “authorized provider.” 820 ILCS 151/5. See 820 ILCS 151/5. The funeral honors detail performs a ceremony that includes folding and presenting a U.S. flag to the veteran’s family and playing “Taps.” 820 ILCS 151/5.

The MLA requires employers with 51 or more employees to allow eligible employees to use up to 8 hours per calendar month to participate in a funeral honors detail, up to a total of 40 hours per calendar year (this limit can be increased if authorized by the employer or if provided under a collective bargaining agreement). 820 ILCS 151/12(a), (b). An employee qualifies for paid leave if the employee is trained to participate in funeral honors details and is furthermore either: (1) a retired or active member of the U.S. armed forces or a member of a reserve component; or (2) an authorized provider or a registered member of a nonprofit or other organization that is an authorized provider (which includes members of veterans service organizations). 820 ILCS 151/12(c). Employees taking funeral honors detail leave shall give the employer “reasonable notice, as is practicable,” and an employer may request that a veterans service organization either confirm an employee’s participation in the detail or that an employee provide as proof of the employee’s participation in the detail any official notice received relating to participating in the detail. 820 ILCS 151/12(d), (e).

Removal of Student Growth Component Requirement in Teacher Performance Evaluations

On June 30, 2025, Governor Pritzker signed into law P.A. 104-20, which amends the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/1-1, et seq., to remove an existing requirement that school districts incorporate the use of data and indicators on student growth as a significant factor in rating a teacher’s performance. Effective July 1, 2025, school districts may, but are no longer required to, incorporate the use of student growth data and indicators as a factor in rating teaching performance. 105 ILCS 5/24A-4(b-5). Notable is the removal of the term “significant” to describe the weight given student growth data in an evaluation, which was previously defined as representing at 50 percent of the performance rating. Id. See 105 ILCS 5/24A-7(a). School district employers seeking to continue to utilize student growth as a factor in their teacher evaluation plans after July 1, 2025, may do so in good-faith cooperation with its teachers or, where applicable, the exclusive bargaining representative of its teachers. 105 ILCS 5/24A-4(b-5). If utilized, the weight of student growth data in a teacher’s performance evaluation is to be made locally within each school district in the absence of any requirement that it be a “significant” factor.

For more information about employment and labor law, see LABOR LAW: REPRESENTATION AND COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING MATTERS (IICLE^®, 2025). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Thomas C. Garretson, Robbins Schwartz, Chicago

Thomas C. Garretson is a partner at Robbins Schwartz in Chicago, focusing on labor and employment law. He counsels public and private sector employers on workplace issues, including investigations, disciplinary actions, and collective bargaining. Tom previously worked as a labor relations attorney for the Cook County Health System and with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He holds a J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law and a B.A. with honors from Michigan State University. Tom is admitted to practice in Illinois and is a member of the Chicago Bar Association.

The small estate affidavit is a vital tool in Illinois estate administration, allowing heirs or legatees to transfer a decedent’s personal property without the need for formal probate court proceedings. It allows an affiant to claim a decedent’s personal property by presenting an affidavit to the person or entity holding said property.

Illinois Senate Bill 0083, introduced in the 2025-2026 session of the 104th General Assembly, proposes updates to the small estate affidavit provisions under the Probate Act of 1975, 755 ILCS 5/1-1, et seq. The bill passed the Senate on April 3, 2025, the House on May 22, 2025, and, on June 20, 2025, was sent to Governor J.B. Pritzker for signature. The proposed legislation amends the small estate affidavit provisions of the Act, 755 ILCS 5/25-1.

The small estate affidavit will continue third-party protections for parties, such as financial institutions, that in good faith rely on the statements made by the affiant. The affiant will also remain responsible for paying administration expenses, spouse or child awards, and creditors in the order of preference as provided in the Act, 755 ILCS 5/18-10, prior to distributions to heirs or legatees.

Currently, the small estate affidavit can be used for the transfer of tangible and intangible property of a decedent, provided the decedent did not own real property individually at death and the aggregate value of the gross estate is not greater than $100,000.

S.B. 0083 amends the statute by adding subsection (a-5), which makes clear that one of the prerequisites for the use of a small estate affidavit is that there are no letters of office outstanding and that no petition to open probate exists or is being contemplated in Illinois or any other jurisdiction. Under the current statute, this requirement was inferred via subsection (b), within the statutory small estate affidavit form.

The new subsection also increases the gross estate limit for use of the small estate affidavit to $150,000 and excludes the value of vehicles registered with the Illinois Secretary of State from the gross value of the estate when the small estate affidavit is used. If the small estate affidavit is only being used to transfer title of a vehicle, then the affidavit may be used to transfer the vehicle in accordance with the Illinois Vehicle Code, 625 ILCS 5/1-100, et seq., without considering the value of the decedent’s personal estate. Notwithstanding the exclusion of the value of vehicles registered with the Illinois Secretary of State, the affiant must still describe the make, body type, year, and VIN of each vehicle.

As of the date of this writing, Governor Pritzker has not signed S.B. 0083, but the bill passed with bipartisan support and it is generally expected that the governor will sign the bill into law, which will become effective immediately upon signing. Once effective, the statutory small estate affidavit form in 755 ILCS 5/25-1(b) should be used.

For more information about estate planning and probate, see ESTATE PLANNING FORMS AND COMMENTARY: POWERS OF ATTORNEY AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES (IICLE^®, 2022). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Sandra M. Schildgen, Wilson & Wilson, LaGrange & Deerfield

Sandra M. Schildgen is a Partner at Wilson & Wilson Estate Planning & Elder Law LLC in Deerfield and LaGrange, where she focuses on elder law, estate planning, Medicaid eligibility planning, and trust and probate administration. She is the President-Elect of the Veterans’ Legal Aid Society of Illinois and a former board member of Life’s Plan, Inc. Ms. Schildgen received her BA from Columbia University and her JD from the University of Iowa College of Law.

Schildgen is the author of Ch. 2, Practical and Ethical Considerations, in IICLE’s ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING (IICLE®, 2025).

There are circumstances in which the elder in need of public aid eligibility is a former client and the former client’s spouse contacts the attorney to develop the asset protection plan. Perhaps the spouses were former estate planning joint clients, or the contact is made by a child of a former client. The attorney’s representation will hinge on RPC 1.9 as follows:

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent.

(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client

(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and

(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or

(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

Generally, the transfers an elder makes as part of an asset protection plan for public aid eligibility do not produce an adverse situation. Nonetheless, spouses who are former estate planning clients and part of a blended family may now be estranged and one of them may be seeking the attorney’s representation for asset protection to protect that party’s own children. One could conclude that such representation would be substantially related and materially adverse to a former client.

A substantial relationship is present when the lawyer may be performing services or giving advice that causes a detriment to the former client or a substantial disadvantage to the new client in a matter that pertains to the work the lawyer did for the former client. In the above situation the rule applies since the lawyer obtained confidences from the former client during the prior engagement that could now be used to that former client’s detriment in the new engagement. Again, under RPC 1.9, consent is required if either of those circumstances exists.

Comment [3] to RPC 1.9 gives the following guidance regarding that test:

Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter. . . . Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. . . . A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

There is some judicial guidance on this issue. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983), sets forth a three-stage test. First, the lawyer must undertake a factual reconstruction of the scope of the former representation and understand the services performed for the former clients. Second, the lawyer must determine whether it is reasonable to infer that the information that is now alleged to be confidential would have been likely to have been provided to the lawyer representing clients within that scope of representation. Third, the lawyer must consider whether the information that is allegedly confidential is relevant to the issues raised in the matter pending involving the former client. The Illinois Supreme Court in Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 177 Ill.2d 166, 685 N.E.2d 871, 226 Ill.Dec. 416 (1997), adopted the test annunciated in LaSalle National Bank. Given the judicial guidance, it is likely that representation in the example of the estranged spouses above is not appropriate.

Such a fact pattern is rare in elder law, but it does exist and can come up. The attorney must be especially attentive to identify whether there is a former-client issue with each representation. This is why a conflicts check is so important. The conflicts check is not only of the individual attorney’s direct clients in the past, but also of former clients of the entire firm.

If a former client is identified through a conflicts check, the attorney must guard the confidences of the former client. Even if the potential representation is on the surface not adverse to the former client, the practitioner should still communicate issues of potential conflicts and waivers of confidentiality.

For more information, see ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING (IICLE^®, 2025). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Sandra M. Schildgen, Wilson & Wilson, LaGrange & Deerfield

Sandra M. Schildgen is a Partner at Wilson & Wilson Estate Planning & Elder Law LLC in Deerfield and LaGrange, where she focuses on elder law, estate planning, Medicaid eligibility planning, and trust and probate administration. She is the President-Elect of the Veterans’ Legal Aid Society of Illinois and a former board member of Life’s Plan, Inc. Ms. Schildgen received her BA from Columbia University and her JD from the University of Iowa College of Law.

Schildgen is the author of Ch. 2, Practical and Ethical Considerations, in IICLE’s ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING (IICLE®, 2025).

In In re Marriage of Spangler and DeFauw, 2025 IL App (2d) 240303, a postjudgment action, a wife filed a petition for rule to show cause against her husband for failure to pay child support. The trial court found the husband in indirect civil contempt with an arrearage of $78,885 and ordered him to pay the wife’s attorneys’ fees. The husband appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. At issue was language which provided that the husband would pay $700 per month — 28 percent of his net income — and the husband was required to provide the wife with his income information on an annual basis. 2025 IL App (2d) 240303 at ¶1.

The agreement further stated: “In the event [husband] earns additional income herein, he shall provide to [wife] his child support calculations and his additional child support payments.” 2025 IL App (2d) 240303 at ¶3.

Although the husband made the agreed-upon increases to his monthly payments over the years, he failed to provide required documentation and underpaid based on his actual earnings. At trial, the husband argued that he understood the child support provision to only require additional child support and income documentation in the event he found a second job. The court rejected his arguments and found the language was unambiguous and his arguments were self-serving and unreasonable.

On appeal, the court held that the parties could not orally modify their agreement because the modification of a child support obligation is a judicial function administered exclusively by court order. The court cited to Blisset v. Blisset, 123 Ill.2d 161, 526 N.E.2d 125, 128, 121 Ill.Dec. 931 (1988), which stated, “Allowing former spouses to modify a court-ordered child support obligation by creating a new agreement between themselves without judicial approval would circumvent judicial protection of the children’s interests.”

The court also rejected the husband’s claims that equitable estoppel barred enforcement, noting that the husband’s failure to tender the required income information led the wife to accept a lesser amount of child support than she was entitled to.

Post-judgment 508(b) fees upheld

In In re Marriage of Spangler and DeFauw, 2025 IL App (2d) 240303, a postjudgment action in which a husband was found in indirect civil contempt for failure to pay more than $70,000 in past due child support, the trial court ordered him to pay the full amount of the wife’s requested 750 ILCS 5/508(b) fee petition in the amount of $33,946.32. 2025 IL App (2d) 240303 at ¶17.

The husband appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. The court conducted a fee hearing in which the wife’s attorney submitted voluminous documents showing the services performed by the attorney, the time spent, and the hourly rate. The trial court found the hourly rate reasonable and the fee invoices fair and reasonable based on the arguments and issues presented.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees, and the court noted that an evidentiary hearing is not always necessary in order to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and that the husband was given the opportunity to challenge the amount of fees wife allegedly incurred.

For more information about family law, see ADOPTION LAW (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Michelle A. Lawless, Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago

Michelle A. Lawless, founder of The Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, has over 20 years of experience in family law. After a distinguished career at a prestigious litigation firm, she started her own practice to offer a more compassionate and resolution-focused approach. Michelle specializes in collaborative law, mediation, and attorney-assisted mediation, helping clients navigate family disputes with minimal conflict. She is recognized for her thought leadership, extensive financial experience, and dedication to creating better outcomes for families.

In Holmberg v. City of Kewanee, 2025 IL App (4th) 250628, the Fourth District addressed a municipality’s ability to shut off water services to residents in a mobile home park when the mobile home park’s owner defaulted on its water bill payments to the city.

Kewanee Partners, LLC (Kewanee Partners) was the owner of a mobile home park located in Kewanee, Illinois (City). The mobile home park was serviced by City water mains, with each main shared across several lots. Payment for water service was structured so that the residents of the mobile home park paid Kewanee Partners directly for their home’s share of water service, and Kewanee Partners in turn paid the City for the entirety of the mobile home park’s water bill. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶3.

Kewanee Partners ultimately went into receivership and defaulted on its payments to the City. The City issued a penalty water bill stating that if payment was not made in full by June 2, 2025, the City would shut off the mobile home park’s water service. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶¶4 – 5.

Prior to the mobile home park’s water service being shutoff, a resident of the mobile home park filed a complaint against the City alleging that shutting off water service to their property would violate their equal protection and substantive due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The trial court granted the resident’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), and the City was enjoined from shutting off her water services. The resident then amended her complaint to add four additional residents, each of whom were current on their water payments. At the time that the amended complaint was filed, three of the residents’ water had been shut off and one remained in service. Each of the residents filed emergency motions for TROs and preliminary injunctions requiring the restoration of water services or prohibiting the shutoff. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶¶6 – 9.

The trial court granted a TRO and preliminary injunction for the one resident whose water service had not yet been shut off. However, the trial court denied the requests of the other three residents whose water had been shut off. The trial court based its denial on the fact that granting the injunction “would not preserve the status quo,” which it identified as “the last peaceable uncontested status . . . when the Plaintiffs were receiving water service and the Defendant was receiving payment for the service.” 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶11. The trial court asserted that because granting the TRO would not include payment to the Defendant, it therefore would not represent a return to the status quo. The trial court also determined that the residents did not meet their burden for the requested relief because they had an adequate remedy at law under the Rental Property Utility Service Act, 765 ILCS 735/1, et seq., which would allow for them to have their individual water service accounts placed directly in their names rather than collectively under the property owner’s. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶¶9 – 13.

The residents then filed a second amended complaint, adding an additional resident as plaintiff. The additional resident was also current on his water payments but had his water shut off. He filed an emergency motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction seeking the restoration of his water service. The trial court denied the motion, and the resident filed notice of interlocutory appeal, seeking the reversal of the trial court’s denial of the TRO. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶14.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and directed that a TRO be entered against the City. It found that the trial court did not properly articulate its reasons for denying the TRO but rather relied on “reasons provided in previous court orders.” The appellate court also found that the trial court errored by improperly articulating the status quo because it did not limit its scope to the parties of the current action, which was the resident and the City. Relying on Hammer v. City of Blue Island, 2024 IL App (1st) 232464-U, ¶¶16 – 17, the appellate court asserted that the actions of the third-party responsible for making the payments, in this case Kewanee Partners or its successors, had no bearing on the status quo, and therefore the fact that the City was not receiving payments was inconsequential to its analysis. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶¶18 – 21.

The appellate court further noted that the trial court’s disparate treatment of the residents who had already had their water services shut off and those who had not yet had their water service shut off was an abuse of discretion. The appellate court further asserted that the mere fact that injunctive relief would compel the City to perform an affirmative act was not a valid basis for its denial. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶22.

Finally, the appellate court determined that the trial court’s application of the Rental Property Utility Service Act was improper. It was undisputed by the parties that the service lines in their current state rendered individual billing impossible. Although it may be technically feasible for individual service lines to be constructed to each lot in the future, doing so would take time, require a significant expenditure, and would still require that the resident forego water service for a period of time. The appellate court reaffirmed that having an adequate remedy at law requires that the remedy be clear, complete, practical, and efficient and that the City’s asserted remedy at law did not meet this standard. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶¶23 – 27.

Ultimately, the appellate court determined that the resident raised a “genuine constitutional question regarding the propriety of the City’s actions” and had made a prima facie showing for a TRO. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶31. The matter was reversed and remanded with the instruction that the trial court immediately enter the TRO on behalf of the resident and restore his water service pending a hearing on the preliminary injunction. 2025 IL App (4th) 250628 at ¶32.

For more information about FOIA and OMA, see SUNSHINE LAWS — 2024 EDITION. Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Laura M. Julien, Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C., Sugar Grove

Laura M. Julien is a partner with Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C. in Sugar Grove, Illinois, where she concentrates her practice in municipal law, school law, corporate law, and real estate matters. She is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, Kane County Bar Association, State Bar of Wisconsin, National Council of School Attorneys, Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association, and Illinois Council of School Attorneys. She is also a recurrent presenter with the National Business Institute. Julien earned her undergraduate, with honors, from the University of Wisconsin and her J.D. degree from the University of Notre Dame Law School.

Vernice Thomas and her then-husband (Miller) purchased their home in 1996 and held title as joint tenants. Thomas v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., 2025 IL App (1st) 230439, ¶3, 258 N.E.3d 951, 482 Ill.Dec. 942. At the time of acquisition, the married couple obtained a loan, which both signed unqualifiedly as borrowers. In 2003, Miller refinanced the mortgage with Wells Fargo and, in the process, the first loan was entirely paid off with proceeds from the Wells Fargo mortgage. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶4. Although their names were printed as “borrowers” on the refinanced mortgage, underneath Thomas’ signature handwritten language was added stating that she was signing solely for the purpose of waiving homestead rights. Only Miller signed the promissory note. Id.

Subsequently, the couple divorced. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶5. Pursuant to their martial settlement agreement, Miller quit claimed his interest in the property to Thomas and Thomas agreed to be solely liable for the mortgage, taxes, and insurance moving forward. Id. While Thomas paid the mortgage for a few years, at some point she stopped making payments and Wells Fargo filed its foreclosure complaint. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶6. In turn, Thomas filed a complaint seeking to quiet title in the property, arguing that she received no funds from the Wells Fargo loan and, therefore, she should be free of the mortgage. Thomas’ quiet title complaint was consolidated into the foreclosure action and U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as successor in interest to Wells Fargo, stepped in to continue prosecution of the foreclosure case. Id.

U.S. Bank made several arguments in support of its foreclosure action. First, they argued that Thomas had ratified the mortgage by agreeing to take on the obligation to pay for the mortgage during the divorce proceedings. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶7. Second, they argued that she was estopped from denying the validity of the lien on the entire property because she had accepted the benefit of the mortgage and continued to live at the property. Id. Thomas testified that she did not know Miller had refinanced the property or understood what she had been signing (although she did acknowledge that it was her signature on the mortgage, the mortgage and note were authentic documents, and she did own the subject property). 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶11. U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment and, in response, Thomas argued that she was not a “borrower” within the meaning of the mortgage and that she had qualified her signature on the mortgage as only relating to the waiver of her homestead rights. Id.

Ultimately, the trial court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment and denied Thomas’ quiet title action. After some postjudgment motion practice, Thomas timely filed her appeal. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶12.

Appellate Court

The appellate court, reviewing the lower court summary judgment ruling de novo, reversed and remanded the matter, holding, in part, that Miller was the sole mortgagor and that U.S. Bank could only foreclose on the former husband’s ½ interest in the subject property. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶¶23, 31. In doing so, the appellate court focused its analysis largely on the impact of Thomas’ qualified signature on the mortgage, as she only signed the document for the purpose of waiving homestead rights, and the fact that she did not sign the note. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶19. The appellate court closely studied two cases in particular: CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Parille, 2016 IL App (2d) 150286, 49 N.E.3d 869, 401 Ill.Dec. 167, and Berg v. eHome Credit Corp., 848 F.Supp.2d 841 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The court in Parille reviewed whether a husband, who signed a mortgage with handwritten language stating he signed for the sole purpose of waiving his homestead rights, was liable for the mortgage. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶20. The appellate court upheld the lower court’s ruling that the wife was solely bound to the mortgage, as she, unlike her husband, had signed the mortgage without qualification. Id.

In contrast, the federal court decision in Berg — nonbinding precedent on Illinois’ courts — found both spouses were bound under the mortgage terms because they held title as tenants by the entirety. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶22. Because they were tenants by the entirety, the husband could not mortgage his interest in the property without the consent of his wife, notwithstanding the wife’s handwritten qualifying language that she was waiving her homestead rights only. As a result, the district court determined that the mortgage encumbered the entire interest in the property. Id.

The appellate court found the Berg decision unpersuasive under the circumstances, since, unlike the couple in Berg, Thomas and Miller held title as joint tenants and not as tenants by the entirety. As joint tenants, Miller was able to mortgage his interest if that was his intention. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶23. Relying favorably on the reasoning in Parille, the appellate court noted that the handwritten qualifying language established that Thomas signed the mortgage to waive her homestead rights and not as a borrower and that she also did not sign the promissory note. To not give effect to the handwritten qualification accompanying Thomas’ signature would “render the qualifying language in the signature block superfluous.” Id. (“A court will not interpret a contract in a manner that would nullify or render provisions meaningless, or in a way that is contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the language used.”), Id., quoting Thompson v. Gordon, 241 Ill.2d 428, 948 N.E.2d 39, 47, 349 Ill.Dec. 936 (2011). As a result, Miller was the only mortgagor on the Wells Fargo loan.

Lastly, after briefly addressing and quickly dispatching U.S. Bank’s equitable arguments, the appellate court turned its attention to the effect, if any, of Miller’s conveyance of the property to Thomas pursuant to the martial settlement agreement and her obligation to the Wells Fargo loan, which she had agreed to cover. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶29. While Miller, as a joint tenant, had the ability to encumber his 50 percent interest in the subject property without Thomas’ consent or permission, he did not have an ownership interest in the entire property so as to encumber both his interest and Thomas’ interest when he executed the Wells Fargo mortgage. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶¶ 30 – 31. In other words, the Wells Fargo mortgage was valid and existed as a lien only on Miller’s undivided half-interest in the property, as a result, U.S. Bank could only foreclose and recover on that one-half interest. Id.

When Miller conveyed his interest in the property to Thomas, it was subject to the encumbrance on his 50 percent interest only. Once Thomas stopped paying the mortgage, Wells Fargo (and later U.S. Bank) improperly moved to foreclose on the entire property. U.S. Bank was only able to foreclose on the half-interest Miller conveyed to Thomas. Similarly, Thomas could not quiet title, given the encumbrance created by the Wells Fargo mortgage at its inception and later during its conveyance to her. Id. Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s summary judgment finding and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 2025 IL App (1st) 230439 at ¶¶ 32 – 34.

For more information about real estate law, see MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: CORRESPONDING ISSUES (IICLE^®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Genevieve M. Daniels, Genevieve M. Daniels, P.C.

Genevieve M. Daniels, a versatile litigator and transactional attorney, specializes in commercial, employment, and real estate law. She offers comprehensive legal services, including real estate transactions, employment law compliance, and dispute resolution. Genevieve's unique experience allows her to provide clients with strategic insights and effective advocacy. She is also an active presenter, arts supporter, and passionate about Persian cooking and adventure travel.

On January 24, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Martin v. Goodrich Corp., 2025 IL 130509, upholding the constitutionality of a 2019 amendment to the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (OD Act), 820 ILCS 310/1, et seq. This case required the Illinois Supreme Court to construe §§1(f) and 1.1 of the OD Act in the context of a wrongful-death and survival action. The court was called on to answer three key questions:

1. whether §1(f) imposes a statute of repose, thereby falling within the civil action exception created by §1.1;
2. if so, whether §1.1 applies retroactively or prospectively; and
3. whether applying §1.1 to pre-enactment exposures would violate the Illinois Constitution’s due-process protections.

Factual and Procedural Background

The claimant, Rodney Martin, worked for BF Goodrich from 1966 to 2012. During his employment, he was exposed to vinyl chloride monomer and related chemical products — compounds known to cause sarcoma of the liver. His exposure to vinyl chloride ended in 1974. Decades later, in 2019, he was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver and died in July 2020. His widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil suit in November 2021 under the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/0.01, et seq., and the survival statute, 755 ILCS 5/27-6, alleging that her husband’s occupational exposure caused his illness and death.

She named Goodrich and its successor, PolyOne, as defendants, seeking to proceed outside the workers’ compensation system by invoking §1.1 of the OD Act, 820 ILCS 310/1.1. That provision, added in 2019, allows a plaintiff to pursue a civil action if compensation is barred under the OD Act by the statute of repose.

The defendants moved to dismiss. PolyOne asserted a lack of personal jurisdiction. Goodrich argued that §1.1 was inapplicable because §1(f) constituted a statute of repose and that, in any event, the new provision could not retroactively revive a time-barred claim without violating constitutional due-process rights.

Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act and the Exclusivity Doctrine

The court reiterated that the OD Act was enacted to provide no-fault compensation for occupational diseases that are disabling as a result of workplace exposures (820 ILCS 310/1(d)). Like the Workers’ Compensation Act, the OD Act was intended to replace common-law remedies with a more efficient, administrative process. The exclusivity provisions under §5(a) of the OD Act bar civil actions for work-related injuries in most circumstances.

However, this exclusivity is not absolute. The Martin court noted that employees can pursue civil claims when their condition (1) was not accidental, (2) did not arise from the employment, (3) was not received during the course of employment, or (4) as in Martin, supra, is not compensable under the OD Act. 2025 IL 130509 at ¶20. This exception was squarely addressed in Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070, 43 N.E.3d 108, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, in which the Supreme Court upheld the exclusivity bar despite the claim being time-barred under the OD Act, concluding that the absence of a remedy due to the statute of repose did not render the injury noncompensable.

Folta led to widespread criticism due to its harsh result: the employee was left without any remedy. In response, the legislature enacted §1.1 in 2019, which explicitly allows civil actions when claims are barred under the OD Act by a statute of repose.

Section 1(f) is a Statute of Repose

The first issue was whether §1(f), which bars compensation unless disablement occurs within a specified period after last exposure, constitutes a statute of repose. 820 ILCS 301/1(f). The court held that it does. Like §6(c) — previously identified in Folta as a statute of repose — §1(f) operates to extinguish claims after a defined period, regardless of when the injury manifests or whether it has yet accrued.

The Martin court emphasized that both §§1(f) and 6(c) are conditions precedent to recovery. Compliance with both is necessary for a valid claim under the OD Act. Failure to meet these time limitations results not just in a procedural bar but a substantive extinguishment of the right to compensation. Thus, the protections of the OD Act, including the exclusivity bar, are no longer available to employers when §1.1 applies.

Section 1.1 Applies Prospectively

The court next turned to the temporal reach of 820 ILCS 301/1.1. Because the statute does not expressly provide whether it is retroactive or prospective, the court applied §4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4), which states that substantive amendments apply prospectively unless otherwise provided.

Section 1.1 was deemed substantive, as it created a new right of action outside the administrative system for certain claimants barred from relief under the OD Act. As such, it may not be applied retroactively to revive previously extinguished claims. However, when an occupational disease was discovered after the statute’s enactment, the court concluded that civil remedy under §1.1 is available.

Section 1.1 Does Not Violate Due Process

The final issue was whether applying 820 ILCS 301/1.1 to exposures that occurred decades earlier would violate employers’ due-process rights under the Illinois Constitution. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that employers do not have a vested right in the exclusivity defense until the cause of action accrues. This occurs when all elements of the tort claim are present — namely, the diagnosis or discovery of injury.

In this case, the court noted that the injury (angiosarcoma) was discovered in 2019, and the civil complaint was filed in 2021 — after the enactment of §1.1. Therefore, no vested right was disturbed. The exclusivity defense had not accrued before the legislative change, and the employer’s reliance on repose or exclusivity defenses did not carry constitutional weight under these facts.

This decision reverses the harsh outcomes resulting from Folta, supra, and signals the court’s continued deference to legislative corrections in the complex field of occupational diseases law. Practitioners should carefully evaluate exposure timelines, diagnosis dates, and procedural posture when assessing case viability, particularly in toxic exposure claims arising outside the traditional temporal scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act or the OD Act.

For more information about workers’ compensation, see WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE (IICLE^®, 2023). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Kisa P. Sthankiya

Kisa P. Sthankiya is a Partner at Rusin Law, Ltd., specializing in workers' compensation defense. With extensive experience in litigating workers' compensation claims, she has achieved successful outcomes at various court levels. Recognized as an “Emerging Lawyer” and a “Rising Star,” Kisa has also contributed as an educator and author in her field. She holds a B.S. from Northwestern University and a J.D. from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Outside of work, Kisa enjoys fitness, traveling, and reading.

Our August 2025 FLASHPOINTS Author Spotlight recognizes Keith W. Casteel, who most recently served as a contributing author on FARMING LAW: PROPERTY ISSUES (IICLE^®, 2025). He has also written for previous editions of FARMING LAW: PROPERTY ISSUES since 2015.

Casteel noted that Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, LLP,has had a long history with IICLE. “Our firm has always subscribed to all IICLE publications. We find they fit into our practice, are well written, and are updated on a timely basis. We encourage all attorneys in Illinois to consider using the publications relevant to their area of practice.”

It only made sense then that Casteel, who “enjoy[s] writing legal articles, especially about farming law,” became further involved with the Institute as a contributing author. “My first article was published by the Illinois Bar Journal, receiving second place in the 1981 contest for the ISBA Lincoln Award. Since that time, I have written articles for a number of different publications.”

Farming law is of personal interest to Casteel: “I grew up on a family farm raising corn, soybeans, and angus cattle. Because of my agricultural background and hands on experience several of my articles have been about agriculture law including the handbook FARMING LAW: PROPERTY ISSUES (IICLE^® 2025). As I have grown older, I have felt the need to help younger lawyers by providing articles which can help them as they expand their careers.”

Keith W. Casteel is a Partner with Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, LLP, in Decatur, where he represents business entities of all types, including for-profit and not-for-profit corporations and limited liability companies, in all aspects of operations, including formations, contractual issues, governance, purchases and sales, and employment matters. He represents sellers and buyers of farmland throughout Illinois and provides advice concerning managing and leasing farmland. He also provides advice on wills, trust and estate planning, and prepares necessary documents to implement such plans. In addition to being a member of the Illinois State and Decatur Bar Associations, Casteel is a member of the Leading Lawyers Network and was selected as one of the top ten leading agricultural lawyers in Illinois in 2014 and 2015. He graduated with honors from Purdue University in Industrial Engineering, where he was a member of the Iron Key and recipient of the G.A. Ross Award as the Outstanding Graduating Senior Man. Casteel is also a graduate of the University of Illinois College of Law.