April 2026 IICLE FLASHPOINTS

In February, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of a unit owner’s efforts, after losing on a directed verdict at trial, to relitigate his argument that the association had an obligation to install soundproofing in the common elements between his unit’s ceiling and the floor in the unit above. Chellappa v. Summerdale Court Condominium Ass’n, 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U. Between losing the first trial and filing the second complaint, the plaintiff attempted to create new bases for his claims by sending a demand for “repairs” to be made and by filing a Fair Housing Act administrative complaint. However, the plaintiff’s efforts failed with the appellate court affirming dismissal of two breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty counts as res judicata, looking to the “operative facts” underlying the original and new claims. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶31. Regarding the two discrimination counts, the appellate court affirmed dismissal on a different basis than that applied by the trial court. It reached the conclusion that even giving the plaintiff every benefit of doubt, the plaintiff was a day late in filing the complaint presenting his federal discrimination claims.

Facts

The 2014 Lawsuit

Beginning in 2014, the plaintiff-unit owner tried to force his condominium association to install soundproofing between the ceiling of his unit and the unit above him under the argument that there was a defect in the soundproofing resulting in the plaintiff suffering migraine headaches. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶2. When the association refused to install new soundproofing, he sued the association for various claims, including declaratory judgment, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶8. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief that the board was obligated to adjudicate noise complaints, to maintain a noise barrier between units, and to facilitate acoustic testing between units. Id. The fiduciary duties allegedly breached included a duty to maintain the common elements in such a manner that a unit does not become a nuisance to other units. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶9. The breach of the declaration and bylaws (contract) allegations were based on the board’s refusal to repair the common elements to improve noise resistance, refusal to adjudicate noise disputes, and refusal to sue the upstairs unit owner to stop him from making excessive noise. Id.

The breach of contract claim was dismissed before trial and directed verdict was entered for defendants on the other claims at trial. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶10. No appeal was taken.

The 2016 Federal Lawsuit

About six months later, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in federal court under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq., claiming that the association and its directors engaged in race, color, and national origin discrimination relating to the noise from the upstairs unit. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶12. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant association under res judicata because no basis existed from the plaintiff to split his claims from the 2014 lawsuit. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶13. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The 2023 Lawsuit

In May 2020, the plaintiff complained to the association’s board in writing that a defect in the interior of the ceiling amplified routine noise such as footsteps resulting in “substantial, abnormal, and significant sound pressure” in the ceiling that caused the plaintiff severe ear pain and migraines. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶15. In June 2020, the association rejected the request to do maintenance work in the ceiling, demanding an advance payment for the work the plaintiff wanted. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶16. The association also sent the plaintiff a violation notice for his efforts to talk to the upstairs neighbor to negotiate a resolution and prohibited him from contacting the neighbor. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶17.

In July 2020, the plaintiff filed a housing discrimination complaint with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, which then referred the complaint to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR). 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶18. The plaintiff claimed that he was being discriminated against because of his national origin and his race. Id. In June 2021, IDHR issued a dismissal of the complaint for lack of substantial evidence. Id.

In May 2023, the plaintiff filed the complaint against the association in the Circuit Court of Cook County, which gave rise to the current appeal. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶19. Count I alleged breach of fiduciary duty in refusing to perform or pay for the repairs to the ceiling. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶20. Count II alleged breach of contract (relying on the declaration, bylaws, and rules and regulations) in refusing to repair the interior of his ceiling and pay for the repairs and refusing to allow plaintiff to do the repairs to the interior of his ceiling. Id. Counts III and IV were based on violations of the Fair Housing Act, however, the plaintiff now claimed that his migraine headaches constituted a handicap or disability under §3602(h) of the FHA. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶21. Count III alleged that the May 2020 letter to the board constituted a request for a reasonable accommodation, and the denial of the request constituted disability discrimination. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶22. Count IV argued that the prohibition from discussing the noise complaints with the upstairs neighbor prohibited him from exercising his rights. Id.

The association moved to dismiss on three bases: (a) all four counts were barred by res judicata; (b) the discrimination claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations; and (c) the discrimination claims failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶23. The circuit court dismissed Counts I and II as res judicata and dismissed Counts III and IV for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶24.

Analysis

Illinois courts apply res judicata when there has already been a final judgment entered on the merits of claims by a competent court. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶28, citing River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 703 N.E.2d 883, 889, 234 Ill.Dec. 283 (1998). The bar extends to not only what was decided but “matters that could have been decided in that suit.” 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶29, citing River Park, 703 N.E.2d at 889. Res judicata applies when there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) identification of the causes of action, and (3) identification of the parties. Id.

The appellate court found that as to Counts I and II, the first and third prongs were easily met. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶30. The fact that the members of the board changed did not impact the analysis because “the identity of interest, not the nominal identity of the parties, controls.” Id., citing Carlson v. Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143853, ¶24, 50 N.E.3d 1250, 401 Ill.Dec. 768. As to the second prong, the identity of the causes of action, the Illinois courts ask whether the claims arise from a “single group of operative facts,” rather than the theories alleged. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶31, citing River Park, supra, 703 N.E.2d at 891.

The plaintiff argued that the claims in the second lawsuit arose from actions of the association that occurred subsequent to the adjudication of the first lawsuit. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶32. The appellate court found that the plaintiff’s contention was not without merit. Id. Although the court “could nibble at the margins to find differences in the factual settings, in sum and substance, both the 2014 complaint and the one under review allege that the Association breached its contractual and fiduciary duties by refusing to repair (or at least pay for the repair of) the alleged ‘defect’ in the soundproofing between [plaintiff’s] ceiling and his upstairs neighbor’s floor.” 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶35. The circuit court’s dismissal of Counts I and II was affirmed. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶37.

Regarding Counts III and IV, the appellate court agreed with the plaintiff that the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable to Fair Housing Act claims under 42 U.S.C. §3613(a)(2). 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶41. However, it appears unresolved or at least arguable that the exhaustion doctrine applies under Illinois law, so the appellate court chose not to affirm when there was not a clear and uncontroversial basis to do so. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶42.

Instead, the appellate court explored whether the plaintiff’s private civil action under Counts III and IV was commenced “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice.” 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶44, quoting 42 U.S.C. §3613(a)(1)(A). The court noted that “federal limitations periods generally are considered components of federal law that must be followed when entertaining federal causes of action.” Id., quoting Wellington Homes, Inc. v. West Dundee China Palace Restaurant, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120740, ¶22, 984 N.E.2d 554, 368 Ill.Dec. 608.

The plaintiff filed the case on review on May 5, 2023. The plaintiff alleged that the latest date for the defendants’ discrimination occurred on June 1, 2020. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶46. On its face then, the complaint was clearly filed more than two years after the last discriminatory act. However, federal law applies a tolling provision when the plaintiff applies for administrative relief. “Such 2-year period shall not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based upon such discriminatory housing practice.” Id., citing 42 U.S.C. §3613(a)(1)(B).

The appellate court engaged in a detailed analysis of dates and calculations to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff filed his complaint 731 days after the last discriminatory act, when he needed to file within 730 days (365 days x 2 years) and was therefore a day late in filing his complaint. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶53. The appellate court noted that the complaint should have been filed on a Thursday, so weekends did not factor in the calculation and, also, the period did not involve any leap year calculations. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶¶55 – 56.

Having completed the analysis, the appellate court then expressed that it had “serious doubt that [the plaintiff] was entitled to any tolling at all” because the administrative complaint was based on race and national origin and made no mention, as alleged in the circuit court complaint, of a disability. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶57. The circuit court complaint made no mention of race or national origin and is focused on disability. Therefore, it is more likely that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was not one day late but rather was eleven months late. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶60. However, even giving the plaintiff the most generous calculation, the complaint was still too late.

The appellate court went further analyzing the plaintiff’s arguments or potential arguments that the complaint was against the association’s unlawful practice of discrimination rather than any particular act of discrimination. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶62. However, the complaint was specific in Counts III and IV as to acts of discrimination against the plaintiff in refusing to fix the problem with the ceiling, in refusing accommodation, and in prohibiting the plaintiff from communicating with his neighbor about the ceiling. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶64. The court analyzed that while the plaintiff tried to argue that the association engaged in a continuing violation, the effects of the alleged discriminatory acts show a continuing harm or continuing injury, not a continuing violation. 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶¶65 – 66. Citing several cases, the appellate court found it well-settled that “ ‘the continual ill-effects arising from a single (or multiple) past violation[s]’ does not transform discrete acts of discrimination into a continuing violation.” 2026 IL App (1st) 240415-U at ¶67. The appellate court affirmed dismissal of Counts III and IV on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court.

For more information about condominium law, see CONDOMINIUM LAW: GOVERNANCE, AUTHORITY, AND CONTROLLING DOCUMENTS (IICLE^®, 2024). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Kenneth Michaels, Jr., Bauch & Michaels, LLC, Chicago

Kenneth Michaels, Jr. is a partner at Bauch & Michaels, LLC, with over four decades of experience in commercial litigation, transactions, and corporate governance. He represents a diverse clientele, including banks, insurance companies, and Fortune 500 businesses, specializing in asset sales, property management, and loan agreements. Ken is also a recognized Illinois “Super Lawyer” in real property law and has contributed extensively to legal education and community service. He teaches at the University of Illinois Chicago Law School and has been a public official in Illinois for nearly 30 years.

In People v. Molitor, 2026 IL App (2d) 240644, the Second District Appellate Court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence because police officers conducted an improper Terry search of the defendant while investigating him for a retail theft.

In Molitor, Aurora police responded to a retail theft at a Dollar General in which the defendant was identified as the suspect. Police officers encountered the defendant, who gave consent to search his backpack. Another officer patted the defendant down for weapons and evidence of the retail theft. The officer felt something like a gift card in the defendant’s wallet during the pat-down and gave the wallet to another officer. The officer who received the wallet opened a zipper compartment in the wallet and found suspected fentanyl. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶¶7, 8, 18.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress for an improper Terry search. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶28.

The appellate court reversed and held that search of the defendant’s wallet exceeded a proper scope to determine if the defendant had weapons. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶49. The appellate court restated the holdings from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), in which the U.S. Supreme Court allowed police officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop of a person when the totality of the circumstances reasonably lead officers to believe that criminal activity is afoot and that the person is armed and dangerous. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶39, citing People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶32, 996 N.E.2d 575, 374 Ill.Dec. 880. When the officer is justified in believing that the person whose suspicious behavior is being investigated is armed and dangerous, the officer can take necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶40, citing Terry, supra, 88 S.Ct. at 1881.

However, in order for the officer to conduct a limited search or “frisk” of the detained person for weapons, the officer must reasonably believe that the person is armed and dangerous. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶42, quoting People v. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d 257, 688 N.E.2d 626, 629, 227 Ill.Dec. 933 (1997). See also 725 ILCS 5/107-14, 5/108-1.01. “[T]he scope of the search must be strictly limited to a search for weapons.” 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶42, quoting People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 815 N.E.2d 92, 96, 286 Ill.Dec. 882 (2d Dist. 2004).

The investigatory stop requires a separate inquiry from the inquiry into whether the frisk was valid. The officer does not have to be “absolutely certain” the individual is armed but must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” that, taken with reasonable inferences, justify the intrusion. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶43, quoting Terry, supra, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 1880.

The appellate court criticized the trial court for justifying the scope of the pat-down for weapons and contraband. Even assuming the pat-down was lawful, searching the defendant’s wallet was improper because the officers testified that they did not fear for their safety while interacting with the defendant, and the officers were wrong to conclude that the wallet might contain a weapon because of the defendant’s demeanor. The court reemphasized the holding that the sole justification for a Terry pat-down is to protect the officer and others in the vicinity — not to gather evidence. 2026 IL App (2d) 240644 at ¶¶49 – 54.

For more information about criminal law, see DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES: PRETRIAL ISSUES, GUILTY PLEAS, AND DEFENSES (IICLE^®, 2025). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Matthew R. Leisten, Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office, Oregon, IL

Matthew R. Leisten serves as the First Assistant State’s Attorney for the Ogle County State’s Attorney’s Office in Oregon, Illinois. In his role, he provides essential updates on caselaw relevant to search warrants, focusing on issues such as good faith, staleness, and the impact of modern technology on legal procedures. His experience includes handling complex warrants involving advanced technologies like geofences and Triggerfish. Additionally, Leisten contributes to legal education through publications and presentations, ensuring that attorneys stay informed about current legal trends and practices.

On February 24, 2026, Hon. John Robert Blakey of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a memorandum opinion and order denying a motion for preliminary injunctive relief filed by a group of Illinois charter school operators. Illinois Network of Charter Schools v. Raoul, Case No. 1:24-cv-05057, 2026 WL 509223 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 2026). The plaintiffs argued that enforcement of P.A. 103-0416 (eff. Aug. 4, 2023), which requires the inclusion of a “union neutrality clause” in every charter school agreement and renewal, violated federal and state law and requested that the court grant a preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of the Act pending a ruling on the merits. Charter Schools, supra, and an order denying preliminary injunctive relief reflect that the plaintiffs preemption and First Amendment arguments are unlikely to prevail on the merits as litigation progresses.

Under the Charter Schools Law, 105 ILCS 5/27A-1, et seq., individuals or organizations seeking to operate a charter school are required to submit a proposal to their local school board and the State Board of Education for certification and, if accepted, the parties then enter into a charter agreement. 105 ILCS 5/27A-7. Charter agreements impose several requirements for operating a charter school and, in exchange for accepting those conditions, the charter school then receives funding through its charter authorizer. 105 ILCS 5/27A-5(h). P.A. 103-0416 amended the Charter Schools Law to require that all new charters or charter renewals contain a union neutrality clause within the charter agreement, meaning a charter school must be “neutral regarding the unionization of any of its employees, such that the charter school will not at any time express a position on the matter of whether its employees will be unionized.” 105 ILCS 5/27A-3. The union neutrality clause also requires charter operators to provide labor organizations with access to employee workspaces to discuss unionization and agree to union recognition through a majority card check process (as opposed to an election). Id.

The plaintiffs’ complaint, filed against the Illinois Attorney General, the Illinois State Board of Education, and the Chicago Board of Education, sought declaration that P.A. 103-0416 is invalid based upon preemption under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. 2026 WL 509223 at *2. The plaintiffs concurrently filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Act pending a decision on the merits.

With respect to the NLRA argument, the plaintiffs asserted that the NLRA preempts the state law because the NLRA contains provisions governing labor relations of the charter school employers. 2026 WL 509223 at *3. While denying the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs constitute “political subdivisions” falling outside of the scope of the NLRA, the court did conclude that charter schools act as state contractors and, as such, the state may permissibly impose contractual restrictions (i.e., the requirement to include a union neutrality clause in charter agreements) that may otherwise be preempted by federal law. Here, the court ruled that the state is operating as a “market participant” as opposed to a “market regulator,” stating that P.A. 103-0416 did not impose requirements on noncontractors or implicate conduct unrelated to the charter. 2026 WL 509223 at *5. By virtue of enacting P.A. 103-0416, the court held that the state does not seek to regulate education or labor generally, but the law only manages the state’s specific charter contracts in the world of education and labor. According to the court, the law serves the proprietary interests of the state by promoting labor peace through a union neutrality agreement, reflecting proper proprietary state action, not regulation. As such, the requirement of including a union neutrality clause constitutes an acceptable condition of state funding that satisfies the market participant exception to the federal preemption doctrine. Id.

Regarding the plaintiffs’ claim that the union neutrality clause violates their First Amendment speech rights, the court noted that while the plaintiffs have standing to sue under the First Amendment, P.A. 103-0416 does not reflect that the state is seeking to generally suppress speech related to unions. 2026 WL 509223 at *8. Instead, the law provides that funding of charter schools is conditioned upon acceptance of a union neutrality clause, which reflects that the state “has simply chosen not to subsidize” speech by charter schools related to unions. Id. In addition, the court stated that P.A. 103-0416 does not implicate any viewpoint-based discrimination, as the law prevents speech related to unions without reference to the speaker’s viewpoint. According to the court, the law does not violate the First Amendment and constitutes a permissible condition on funding from the State, as the law does not require the charter schools to express the State’s view on unions, but only prohibits the schools from expressing any view on the issue.

Because the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on their preemption and First Amendment claims, the court did not address the Eleventh Amendment argument and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. While the court did not actually rule on the merits of plaintiffs’ case and the litigation will likely progress, the court’s ruling on the motion for preliminary relief (and the rationale for such) does reflect that the state can, under certain circumstances, legally restrict the speech rights of certain public employers with respect to the issue of employee unionization.

For more information about employment and labor law, see LABOR LAW: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (IICLE®, 2025). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Thomas C. Garretson, Robbins Schwartz, Chicago

Thomas C. Garretson is a partner at Robbins Schwartz in Chicago, focusing on labor and employment law. He counsels public and private sector employers on workplace issues, including investigations, disciplinary actions, and collective bargaining. Tom previously worked as a labor relations attorney for the Cook County Health System and with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He holds a J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law and a B.A. with honors from Michigan State University. Tom is admitted to practice in Illinois and is a member of the Chicago Bar Association.

Excerpted from Ch. 1, Power of Attorney for Property, in Estate Planning Forms and Commentary: Power of Attorney and Advance Directives (IICLE^® 2026), Susan T. Bart and Ben A. Neiburger

Reasonable and Unreasonable Causes for Third Parties To Refuse To Honor a Power of Attorney for Property

In response to frequent refusals to honor powers of attorney for property by third parties, especially financial institutions, the Illinois General Assembly enacted P.A. 103-994 (eff. Jan. 1, 2025), amending the Illinois Power of Attorney Act to establish safe harbors under which a third party must honor a power of attorney for property and under which a third party may refuse to honor a power of attorney for property. 755 ILCS 45/2-8(e), 755 ILCS 45/2-8(f).

Unreasonable Cause To Refuse To Honor

Section 2-8(e) of the Illinois Power of Attorney Act states that it is unreasonable for a third party to refuse to honor an Illinois statutory short form power of attorney for property if the only reason for the refusal is any of or more than one of the following:

1. The power of attorney is not on a form the third party receiving such power prescribes.

2. There has been a lapse of time since the execution of the power of attorney.

3. There is a lapse of time between the date of acknowledgment of the signature of the principal and the date of acceptance by the agent.

4. The power of attorney presented does not bear an original signature, original witness, or original notarization but is accompanied by an Agent’s Certification and Acceptance of Authority, Successor Agent’s Certification and Acceptance of Authority, or Co-Agent’s Certification and Acceptance of Authority bearing the original signature of the named agent.

5. The document appoints an entity as the agent. 755 ILCS 45/2-8(e).

Reasonable Cause To Refuse To Honor

Section 2-8(f) of the Act states that a third party may refuse to honor a power of attorney for property for the following reasons:

1. The agent refuses to provide an affidavit or properly executed Agent’s Certification and Acceptance of Authority, Successor Agent’s Certification and Acceptance of Authority, or Co-Agent’s Certification and Acceptance of Authority.

2. The agent refuses to provide a copy of the original document that is certified to be valid by an attorney, a court order, or governmental entity.

3. The third party, in good faith, refers the principal and the agent or a person acting for or with the agent to the local adult protective services unit.

4. There is actual knowledge or a reasonable basis for believing in the existence of a report by any person to the local adult protective services unit alleging physical or financial abuse, neglect, exploitation, or abandonment of the principal by the agent or a person acting for the agent.

5. There is actual knowledge of the principal’s death or a reasonable basis for believing the principal has died.

6. There is actual knowledge of the incapacity of the principal or a reasonable basis for believing the principal is incapacitated, if the power of attorney tendered is a nondurable power of attorney.

7. There is actual knowledge or a reasonable basis for believing that the principal was incapacitated at the time the power of attorney was executed.

8. There is actual knowledge or a reasonable basis for believing that (a) the power of attorney was procured through fraud, duress, or undue influence, or (b) the agent is engaged in fraud or abuse of the principal.

9. There is actual notice of the termination or revocation of the power of attorney or a reasonable basis for believing that the power of attorney has been terminated or revoked.

10. A title insurance company refuses to underwrite title insurance for a gift of real property made pursuant to a statutory short form power of attorney that does not contain express instructions or purposes of the principal with respect to gifts in Paragraph 3 of the statutory short form power of attorney.

11. The principal’s attorney refuses to provide a certificate that the power of attorney is valid.

12. There is a missing or incorrect signature, an invalid notarization, or an unacceptable power of attorney identification.

13. The third party (a) has filed a suspicious activity report as described in 31 U.S.C. §5318(g), with respect to the principal or agent; (b) believes in good faith that the principal or agent has a prior criminal history involving financial crimes; or (c) has had a previous, unsatisfactory business relationship with the agent due to or resulting in material loss to the third party, financial mismanagement by the agent, or litigation between the third party and the agent alleging substantial damages.

14. The third party has reasonable cause to suspect the abuse, abandonment, neglect, or financial exploitation of the principal if the principal is an eligible adult under the Adult Protective Services Act, 320 ILCS 20/1, et seq. 755 ILCS 45/2-8(f).

In In re Marriage of Winters, 2026 IL App (5th) 250283, a factually complex case, the trial court originally ordered, after a trial, that the husband pay the wife a portion of his military retirement benefits. The court further ordered that if the husband received less in military retirement and more in VA disability benefits, the wife would be made whole; that is, the husband would pay her the difference from his VA disability benefits so that she would essentially receive the same amount she would have received from the military retirement benefits (the “VA waiver clause”). The case has been up on appeal twice on various postjudgment motions. For purposes of this appeal, the wife filed a petition for rule to show cause against the husband for his failure to pay her a certain portion of his military benefits. The husband now claimed that those benefits were his nonmarital asset because he was no longer receiving any military retirement and that all of his payments were now disability pay. The husband raised this affirmative defense at the hearing. The trial court agreed that federal law (10 U.S.C. §1408) preempted state law when it came to military disability benefits and that it prohibited the division of disability benefits in the event of divorce. Therefore, the original judgment’s VA waiver clause was void and unenforceable, and it struck the provision from the judgment. The wife appealed, and the Fifth District affirmed even though there was no motion to modify the judgment on file at the time of the ruling. The VA waiver clause impermissibly conflicted with federal law, and because the judgment’s provision was void from inception, it could be attacked at any time, was not subject to res judicata or state-law reopening requirements, and could not be ratified or enforced by subsequent agreed orders between the parties. Void orders can be addressed at any time, and courts may consider voidness arguments sue sponte. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for rule and removing the VA waiver clause from the judgment.

NOTE: In its opinion, the appellate court distinguished the case of In re Marriage of Tronsrue, 2025 IL 130596, 272 N.E.3d 84, 487 Ill.Dec. 317. In Tronsrue, the parties had entered into a marital settlement agreement that included language that if the government agencies would not withhold the appropriate amounts and send them to the wife, the husband would pay the amounts directly to the wife each month. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that while a court could not order the husband to pay a certain amount of disability benefits to his ex-wife, the fact that he agreed to pay that amount was distinguishable. “We reiterate that federal preemption is not applicable in a case where the circuit court did not order payment but, instead, the parties entered into an agreement that required [the husband] to pay [the wife] disability benefits that he received.” Winters, supra, 2026 IL App (5th) 250283 at ¶51, quoting Tronsrue, supra, 2025 IL 130596 at ¶55.

Trial Court Reversed for Imposing Restrictions on Parenting Time Without the Necessary Finding of Serious Endangerment

In In re Marriage of Williams, 2026 IL App (5th) 241260, the mother filed a postjudgment motion to enforce parenting time and for a finding of contempt on the grounds that the father failed to allow her to care for the children during his farm planting season, that he could not provide proper care for the children during the season because of his long work days, and that the parenting agreement provided that during harvesting and planting season she was supposed to be caring for the children while he was working long hours. The mother argued that the father was allowing the children to sit unsafely on a tractor (two in one seat) and that they were with him in other conditions that were unsafe for children on a farm. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that when the father was operating heavy machinery the children would be in their mother’s care, but the court declined to hold the father in contempt. The father appealed and the appellate court reversed. The trial abused its discretion when it imposed new safety-based restrictions under the guise of enforcing an agreed parenting plan. The machinery-based prohibitions were inconsistent with the parties’ prior allocation of parenting time and constituted a de facto restriction without making the required finding of serious endangerment under §603.10 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA), 750 ILCS 5/101, et seq. Further, §607.5 of the IMDMA may be used to enforce or clarify existing terms but not to add new substantive conditions that limit how or when a parent may exercise parenting time.

For more information about family law, see FAMILY LAW: PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF DISSOLUTION ACTIONS (IICLE^®, 2023). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Michelle A. Lawless, Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, Chicago

Michelle A. Lawless, founder of The Law Office of Michelle A. Lawless LLC, has over 20 years of experience in family law. After a distinguished career at a prestigious litigation firm, she started her own practice to offer a more compassionate and resolution-focused approach. Michelle specializes in collaborative law, mediation, and attorney-assisted mediation, helping clients navigate family disputes with minimal conflict. She is recognized for her thought leadership, extensive financial experience, and dedication to creating better outcomes for families.

Facts

On March 9, 2023, defendant MariGrow, Inc., filed a special-use application with the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Chicago, requesting a special-use permit to operate a cannabis dispensary. Neighbors Against a Marijuana Dispensary at 2573-81 Lincoln, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Chicago, No. 1-24-1910, 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U, ¶2. A public notice sign was posted on the subject property that same day. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U ¶7. On June 1, 2023, an informational community meeting was held, and affected residents were notified by publication, mailing, and through the alderman’s email newsletter of the proposed use. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶8. On July 12, 2023, the plaintiff, a resident group objecting to the dispensary use formed a not-for-profit corporation called Neighbors Against Marijuana Dispensary at 2573-81 Lincoln, Inc. (NAMD). 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶10. A public hearing was held on August 18, 2023. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶11. At the hearing, the attorney for NAMD requested a 60-day continuance, asserting that NAMD needed additional time to meaningfully prepare its arguments. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶13. When asked by the city why a continuance was needed, NAMD’s attorney stated that he had just received numerous responsive documents related to a Freedom of Information Act request that had been submitted the week prior. The city asked whether any of NAMD’s members owned property within 250 feet of the proposed use, and the attorney stated that he did not know. Id. The city denied NAMD’s request for a continuance, and the hearing proceeded. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶14. On September 18, 2023, the city approved the special use and found that the application met all of the requisite special-use criteria under state law and city ordinance. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶15. In its written determination, the city acknowledged that NAMD had requested a continuance and that the request was denied because the applicant had already “undergone a lengthy process,” there had been several community engagement opportunities, and all required statutory notifications had been provided. Id.

Complaint for Administrative Review

Following the city’s decision, NAMD filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court, asserting that its due-process rights had been violated. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶16. MariGrow and the city each filed motions to dismiss, citing NAMD’s failure to adequately state a claim and lack of standing. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶17. After various amendments to the pleadings and supplemental responses, NAMD sought leave to amend its complaint to include equal protection violations and to specifically identify two members who owned property within 250 feet of the proposed special use. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶19. The circuit court denied NAMD’s request for leave to amend the complaint and affirmed the city’s decision, finding that NAMD did not set forth a proper claim and did not sufficiently demonstrate that it had standing. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶21. NAMD filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied on the basis that it was untimely, calculated to cause delay, and an attempt to add facts not in the record. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶¶22 – 23. NAMD then filed an appeal. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶24.

Appellate Court

NAMD raised the following issues on appeal: (1) that the city’s denial of its request for a continuance violated its due process rights; (2) that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying NAMD leave to amend its complaint; (3) that NAMD had standing to file the complaint for administrative review; and (4) that the circuit court’s failure to remand the matter to the city for further development of the administrative record was an abuse of its discretion. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶26.

Standing

The appellate court first addressed the issue of standing. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶34. To establish standing, Illinois nonprofit corporations must demonstrate that at least one of its members would have had standing to act independently. Id. NAMD’s assertion of standing was based on the proposition that some of its membership “lived within 250 feet of the proposed dispensary” and that it had “alleged a specific adverse effect and damages to its members from the special use permit.” 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶33. The appellate court rejected NAMD’s assertions, noting that NAMDs statements were “conclusory” and failed to adequately cite any facts to the record. Id. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the appellate court proceeded to utilize its discretion to address the merits of the remaining claims. Id.

Due Process and Equal Protection

The appellate court further determined that NAMD was not denied due process or equal protection. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶41. The appellate court noted that it was undisputed that all statutory notice requirements had been satisfied and that NAMD had admitted that it had actual notice at least two weeks prior to the hearing date. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶44. While NAMD maintained that it was deprived of due process because it was not permitted sufficient time to prepare its case, the appellate court explained that due process only ensures that a party has a right and opportunity to be heard. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶45. Citing the administrative record, the appellate court specifically noted that NAMD had the opportunity to assert its position and cross-examine and present witnesses at the hearing. The appellate court further noted that the administrative record indicated that NAMD’s representative at the hearing acknowledged that they attended a community meeting a few months prior. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court found that and that any delay experienced by NAMD in obtaining counsel or preparing its case was due to its own actions and did not constitute a denial of due process. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶48. Regarding the equal protection claim, the appellate court noted it was clear from the record that the city’s denial of the continuance request was based on the extensive community engagement that had occurred prior to the hearing and this was distinguishable from otherwise similarly situated applicants. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶52.

Denial of Request To Amend Complaint

NAMD also asserted that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying its request for leave to amend its complaint. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶54. Citing Loyola Academy v. S.S. Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill.2d 263, 273, 586 N.E.2d 1211, 166 Ill.Dec. 882 (1992), the appellate court established that when determining whether to grant leave, a court must consider “(1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified.” 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶56. However, if it is apparent that even after amendment there is no viable cause of action, leave to amend should be denied. 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶57. The appellate court determined that because the equal protection claim was meritless, the amendment of the complaint would not have changed the outcome, but in any case, NAMD could not satisfy the Loyola factors. Accordingly, it determined that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying NAMD’s request for leave to amend its complaint.

Remand

NAMD’s final argument was that the circuit court erred in denying its request to remand the matter back to the city so that it could develop the record to establish standing. Citing §3-111 of the Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3-101, et seq., the appellate court recognized that although a court may remand an administrative matter “for the purpose of taking additional evidence . . . no remandment shall be made on the ground of newly discovered evidence unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that such evidence . . . could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been obtained at such proceedings.” 2026 IL App (1st) 241910-U at ¶65. The appellate court therefore denied NAMD’s request to remand the matter back to the city. Id.

For more information about government law, MUNICIPAL LAW: ANNEXATION, ZONING, AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY (IICLE^®, 2024). Purchase the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Laura M. Julien, Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C., Sugar Grove

Laura M. Julien is a partner with Mickey, Wilson, Weiler, Renzi, Lenert & Julien, P.C. in Sugar Grove, Illinois, where she concentrates her practice in municipal law, school law, corporate law, and real estate matters. She is a member of the Illinois State Bar Association, Kane County Bar Association, State Bar of Wisconsin, National Council of School Attorneys, Illinois Local Government Lawyers Association, and Illinois Council of School Attorneys. She is also a recurrent presenter with the National Business Institute. Laura earned her undergraduate, with honors, from the University of Wisconsin and her J.D. degree from the University of Notre Dame Law School.

In a February 26, 2026, opinion, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, Workers’ Compensation Commission Division, addressed a question of first impression under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Compensation Act), 820 ILCS 305/1, et seq.: whether a claimant who sustains a single injury to one body part may receive concurrent awards under both the scheduled loss provisions of §8(e) and the person-as-a-whole provisions of §8(d)(2). Azcon Metals v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, 2026 IL App (5th) 250301WC. The court held that a claimant must elect one remedy or the other for the same injury, and that an employer who made a voluntary payment under §8(e) is entitled to a credit against a subsequent award under §8(d)(2).

The court affirmed the Commission’s award of permanent partial disability benefits under §8(d)(2) but reversed the Commission’s denial of credit to the employer for benefits previously paid under §8(e).

The decision provides important guidance on the interplay between §§8(e) and 8(d)(2), the election-of-remedies doctrine in workers’ compensation, and the credit principles that apply when employers make prompt voluntary payments under the Compensation Act.

Factual Background

Tom Snyder sustained an injury to his right foot and leg while working for Azcon Metals on March 19, 2020. His right foot was crushed between two rail cars. Snyder initially underwent surgery that resulted in the amputation of four toes on his right foot. However, the following day, he underwent a second surgery that resulted in the amputation of his right leg at the mid-tibia, below the knee.

Following the surgeries, Snyder was fitted for a transtibial prosthetic and participated in physical therapy, work hardening, and a functional capacity evaluation. The evaluation indicated that he could perform work at the heavy physical demand level but had decreased tolerance for prolonged standing and walking on uneven surfaces. Snyder participated in vocational rehabilitation and expressed his intent to pursue employment in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning or in the construction industry, acknowledging that those fields may require traversing uneven ground but believing he could manage the slower pace of such work.

Following the work injury, the employer promptly paid Snyder $97,010.30 in permanent partial disability benefits for the scheduled loss of his right foot pursuant to §8(e)(11) of the Compensation Act. The payment was made in two installments: $60,716.19 on April 20, 2020, and $36,294.11 on April 28, 2022, calculated at 167 weeks using a stipulated minimum statutory amputation rate of $580.90.

Procedural History

On April 17, 2020, Snyder filed an application for adjustment of claim. The matter proceeded to an arbitration hearing on January 27, 2023. At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the employer had paid, and was entitled to credit for, $17,438.31 in temporary total disability benefits and $42,822.94 in maintenance benefits. The parties further stipulated that the employer had paid $97,010.30 in permanent partial disability benefits for the scheduled loss of Snyder’s right foot under §8(e)(11), but they disagreed as to whether the employer was entitled to a credit for that payment against any additional permanent partial disability award.

Snyder waived his right to a wage differential award under §8(d)(1). The arbitrator awarded all requested medical expenses and, after considering the factors set forth in §8.1b(b)(v) of the Compensation Act, found that Snyder sustained permanent partial disability to the extent of 65 percent loss of use of the person as a whole under §8(d)(2). The arbitrator denied the employer’s request for a credit for the §8(e)(11) payment against the §8(d)(2) award.

On review, the Commission unanimously reduced the §8(d)(2) award from 65 percent to 45 percent loss of use of the person as a whole, finding that Snyder was young and remained capable of physically demanding work. The Commission, however, agreed with the arbitrator that the employer was not entitled to a credit. The Commission characterized the credit issue as one of first impression, concluded that §8(d)(2) did not permit an offset for previously paid amputation benefits, and noted that the employer had paid benefits under the incorrect section — §8(e)(11) (loss of foot, 167 weeks) rather than §8(e)(12) (amputation below the knee, compensated as loss of a leg at 215 weeks).

The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision in its entirety. The employer appealed to the appellate court.

The Appellate Court’s Analysis

Framing the Issue

As a threshold matter, the appellate court corrected the framing of the employer’s first argument on appeal. The employer had argued that the Commission erred by awarding benefits under both §§8(e) and 8(d)(2). The court clarified that the Commission did not “award” benefits under §8(e); rather, the employer had made a voluntary payment under that section prior to arbitration. The Commission only awarded benefits under §8(d)(2) and separately considered whether the employer was entitled to a credit. Accordingly, the court reframed the central issue as whether the Commission erred by denying the employer a credit for its voluntary §8(e) payment against the §8(d)(2) award.

Standard of Review

The court noted that while the Commission’s determination of whether an employer is entitled to a credit is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, the Commission in this case interpreted statutory provisions and concluded that §8(d)(2) did not permit an offset. Because the dispute involved statutory interpretation, the court applied de novo review.

Election of Remedies: Section 8(e) Versus Section 8(d)(2) for a Single Injury

The core of the court’s analysis addressed the interplay between §§8(e) and 8(d)(2). The court acknowledged the tension between the two provisions. Section 8(e) provides that a claimant who receives a scheduled loss “shall not receive any compensation under any other provisions of this Act.” 820 ILCS 305/8(e). Section 8(d)(2), on the other hand, states that compensation awarded under that subsection “shall not take into consideration injuries covered under paragraphs (c) and (e)” and that such compensation “shall not affect the employee’s right to compensation payable under paragraphs (b), (c) and (e) . . . for the disabilities therein covered.” 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2).

The Commission had relied on the language of §8(d)(2) to conclude that recovery under §8(e) should have no effect on an award under §8(d)(2), and vice versa, effectively permitting concurrent awards and denying the employer any credit. The circuit court agreed, adding that any ambiguity should be resolved in the claimant’s favor under the principle of liberal construction.

The appellate court disagreed. In its view, the language of §8(e) clearly precluded a claimant from recovering under both sections for the same injury to one body part. The court interpreted the language of §8(d)(2) as permitting an election — not a concurrent award — for a single injury. Specifically, the court concluded that §8(d)(2) permits a claimant to elect an award under either §8(e) or §8(d)(2) for an injury to a single body part, while also permitting recovery under both sections when a claimant sustains injuries to multiple, separate body parts in the same work accident.

Consistency with Prior Caselaw

The court grounded its conclusion in several lines of precedent. First, the court analogized to established caselaw holding that a claimant who sustains a scheduled loss may elect between a scheduled loss award under §8(e) and a wage differential award under §8(d)(1), but may not receive both. Citing Payetta v. Industrial Commission, 339 Ill.App.3d 718, 791 N.E.2d 682, 274 Ill.Dec. 590 (2d Dist. 2003), and General Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission, 89 Ill.2d 432, 433 N.E.2d 671, 60 Ill.Dec. 629 (1982), the court noted that this election principle reflects the understanding that an injured party will choose the award most likely to approximate the earnings loss the Compensation Act is designed to compensate. The Commission had distinguished those cases on the basis that §8(d)(1) contains an explicit exclusion for §8(e) claims, whereas §8(d)(2) does not. The appellate court acknowledged the difference in statutory language but concluded that the exclusionary language in §8(e) itself — prohibiting compensation under “any other provisions of this Act” (820 ILCS 305/8(e)) — resolved the issue.

Second, the court observed that both wage differential awards under §8(d)(1) and person-as-a-whole awards under §8(d)(2) serve to compensate injured workers for reduced earning capacity under certain circumstances. Given this functional similarity, the court concluded that the rationale prohibiting dual recovery under §§8(e) and 8(d)(1) applies equally to §§8(e) and 8(d)(2) when a single injury to one body part is at issue.

Third, the court distinguished its prior decisions in Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 233 Ill.2d 364, 909 N.E.2d 818, 330 Ill.Dec. 796 (2009), and American Coal Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2024 IL App (5th) 230815WC, 248 N.E.3d 493, 478 Ill.Dec. 868. In those cases, the claimants had sustained injuries to multiple body parts during a single work accident, warranting additional compensation under the Compensation Act. In Beelman Trucking, the supreme court permitted concurrent awards under §§8(e)(18) (loss of legs) and 8(e)(10) (loss of arm), reasoning that denying compensation beyond two members would leave additional losses uncompensated. In American Coal, this court extended that reasoning to permit concurrent awards under §§8(e)(18) and 8(d)(2) for nonscheduled injuries sustained in addition to the scheduled losses. The appellate court found those decisions consistent with its holding in Azcon Metals, noting that the present case involved only a single injury to one body part, and that allowing concurrent awards would result in impermissible double recovery.

Employer Entitled to Credit for Voluntary Payment

Having concluded that the claimant was entitled to compensation under only one statutory provision for his single injury, the court turned to the credit issue. The court held that the Commission erred by denying the employer’s credit request. The employer had promptly and voluntarily paid benefits under §8(e) following the work accident, providing the claimant with immediate financial relief. When the claimant subsequently elected to receive benefits under §8(d)(2), the Commission should have credited the employer for its prior voluntary payments.

The court cited World Color Press v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 125 Ill.App.3d 469, 466 N.E.2d 270, 80 Ill.Dec. 818 (5th Dist. 1984), for the proposition that an employer may receive credit for overpayments absent a statutory bar, and Salisbury v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 2017 IL App (3d) 160138WC, 78 N.E.3d 979, 413 Ill.Dec. 703, for the policy principle that encouraging prompt and voluntary payments of benefits furthers the purpose of the Compensation Act. The court emphasized that denying credit for good-faith payments would encourage administrative delays as employers attempt to resolve every ambiguity before paying benefits — a result inconsistent with the Compensation Act’s primary purpose of providing employees with prompt and definite compensation.

Practical Implications

This decision establishes several important principles for practitioners on both sides of the bar.

For employers and carriers, the decision confirms that when a single injury to one body part is involved, a claimant must elect between a scheduled loss award under §8(e) and a person-as-a-whole award under §8(d)(2). The employer who promptly and voluntarily pays benefits under §8(e) will be entitled to a credit against a subsequent §8(d)(2) award. This holding should encourage prompt payment of scheduled benefits, as employers need not fear that early payments will go uncredited if the claimant later elects a different form of permanent disability compensation. Practitioners should carefully document voluntary payments, including the statutory section under which they are made, the calculation methodology, and the dates of payment.

For claimants, the decision preserves the right to elect the more favorable remedy — but it forecloses the possibility of receiving both a scheduled loss award and a person-as-a-whole award for the same injury. Claimants and their counsel should carefully evaluate which remedy produces the greater benefit before making an election, particularly in cases involving amputations or other injuries that may qualify under both sections. The decision also reaffirms that concurrent awards remain permissible when a claimant sustains injuries to multiple, separate body parts in a single work accident, consistent with the rationale of Beelman Trucking, supra, and American Coal, supra.

Finally, the employer’s miscalculation of the scheduled loss payment in this case — paying 167 weeks for loss of a foot under §8(e)(11) when the below-knee amputation should have been compensated as a loss of a leg at 215 weeks under §8(e)(12) — serves as a reminder that correct classification of the injury under the appropriate subsection of §8(e) is critical. An incorrect classification may result in an underpayment that could affect the credit calculation or expose the employer to additional proceedings.

For more information about workers’ compensation, see WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PRACTICE (IICLE^®, 2026). Pre-order the publication here or Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.

Jigar S. Desai

Jigar S. Desai is a Partner with Rusin Law Ltd, where he concentrates his practice in workers’ compensation and employment law. Recognized for his outstanding contributions to the legal field, Desai has been named a Rising Star by Super Lawyers from 2016 to 2018 and a Law Bulletin Emerging Lawyer from 2016 to 2019. He is a member of the Board of Directors at Rusin Law Ltd, and a member of the Chicago and Illinois Bar Associations. Desai received his B.A. from the University of Iowa and his J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law. While at Chicago-Kent, he was honored on the Dean’s Honor List for five out of six semesters and received the Honorable Edmund W. Burke Award for Excellence in Forensic Oratory as a Senior Associate of the Moot Court Honor Society.

Our April FLASHPOINTS Author Spotlight recognizes Catherine Krenz Doan, who is one of the two most recent members to join the IICLE® Board of Directors and is currently serving as a contributing author of the upcoming edition of Workers' Compensation Practice (IICLE®, 2026). Please watch for next month’s FLASHPOINTS Spotlight, when we highlight the other most recent member, Hugh F. Drake.

Doan began her introduction to IICLE as an attendee at various events and seminars and has continued to participate throughout her entire career: “I started attending seminars at IICLE as a law clerk and eventually started speaking at them.” Doan keeps her practice on the cutting edge. She explained: “Through IICLE, I am able to keep up to date on my CLEs, learn more about my practice area, and stay engaged with my peers. It has been a valuable part of my professional career.”

As for IICLE publications, Doan emphasized that “[o]ur office uses IICLE publications all the time. I have the old binder of the Workers’ Compensation practice book at my desk. I frequently refer back to it to refresh my memory about relevant caselaw or other issues. It has helped me file appeals to the circuit court on several occasions. The checklist for filing an appeal is invaluable for making sure that I don’t miss a step.”

When recently asked to serve on the Board, Doan “was honored” and saw an opportunity to “give back and help serve an organization that has meant so much” to her and her professional development.

Catherine Krenz Doan is a Partner at Rubin Law Group, Ltd., in Chicago, where she concentrates her practice in the area of workers’ compensation law. Doan is a Member of the Illinois State Bar Association, the Workers’ Compensation Lawyers Association, the Chicago Bar Association, and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association. In 2023, Doan was elected President of the Workers’ Compensation Lawyers Association. She graduated from the University of Wisconsin–La Crosse with highest honors and received her law degree magna cum laude from Chicago-Kent College of Law.